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SUMMARY 
This thesis focuses on queer intimate and familial life in urban Guangdong, China. By 
examining the dynamic understandings and practices of same-sex intimacies, a marriage 
of convenience (xinghun) between a gay man and a lesbian, and queer parenting, it 
unpacks the intricate link between cultural imaginations produced by globalised queer 
culture, social transformations in Chinese society, and personal choices in queer daily 
lives. My analysis is rooted in one year of ethnographic fieldwork, made up of participant 
observation and semi-structured interviews. 
 
This thesis employs ‘queer’ and ‘kinship’ as fluid and dynamic concepts and practices.  
The practices of queer intimacy, parenting, and family formation detailed in this research 
suggest innovative and diverse forms of belonging, family, and relatedness beyond blood 
ties and the heterosexual nuclear family; at the same time, class stratification and gender 
inequalities are often reproduced during the dynamic interplay of socio-economic class, 
state policies and moral discourse that come to articulate Chinese queer life-worlds. This 
ethnography further delineates how queer co-parenthood is constructed and strengthened 
through the language of bodily experience and affective recognition. Non-heterosexual 
people’s tactics of forming and sustaining mutuality in their loving relationships both 
reproduce and transgress assumptions about biological parenthood and its centrality in 
the Chinese kinship system. 
 
This thesis makes an original contribution to the studies of Chinese queer kinship in the 
context of our understanding of kinship and Chinese society in general. It investigates 
Chinese non-heterosexual people’s kinship practices with the purpose of furthering our 
understanding of sexualness, kinship, and social change in China. It also engages 
theoretically with discussions on queer utopia related to reproduction, modernity, risk, 
and care. In the context of socio-economic transformations and the technologization of 
biological reproduction, this thesis demonstrates how queer futurity and queer utopian 
imaginaries in urban China are made vivid and normalised by state-constructed modernity, 
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
 
In this thesis, I present a critical ethnographic exploration of non-heterosexual intimate 
and family lives in Shenzhen and its neighbouring urban areas of Guangdong Province, 
China. By focusing on the practices of same-sex intimate relationships, gay-lesbian 
xinghun (contract)1 marriage and queer parenting, I investigate shifting kinship values in 
relation to sexuality, the state, moral landscapes, and the market. Through the lens of 
queer personal lives, I also explore transformations in Chinese society and queer futurity 
more generally. I will argue that, although the idea of blood and biology still holds 
centrality in Chinese family life, the various arrangements of parenting and family-
forming practices in queer life-worlds demonstrate the mobilising possibilities beyond 
the singular definition of biology. This ethnography includes how queer co-parenthood is 
constructed and strengthened through the language of bodily experience and affective 
recognition. This research has found that the practices of queer intimacy, reproduction 
and parenting in urban Guangdong have created innovative and diverse forms of 
belonging, family, and relatedness beyond blood ties and the heterosexual nuclear family; 
at the same time, class stratification and inequalities are often reproduced in these 
processes. In the context of socio-economic transformations and the technologization of 
biological reproduction, this thesis demonstrates how queer futurity and queer utopian 
imaginaries in urban China are made vivid and normalised by state-constructed modernity 
and glocal market actions. In short, kinship in China is transforming, and queer 
relationships should not be defined as imitative or alternative to blood ties; the kinship 
practices documented in this research both reproduce and transgress the assumptions 
about biological parenthood its centrality in family-forming processes.  
 
It is important to clarify my use of the term ‘queer’. Originally meaning ‘strange’ or 
‘unusual’, ‘queer’ came to be used as an umbrella term for sexual and gender minorities 
and as a theoretical critique in and beyond academia. As research on Chinese societies 
has already pointed out, the word ‘queer’ (or its Chinese version ‘ku’er’) is neither the 
common vernacular nor an identity label widely recognised among Chinese sexual 
minorities (Wei 2020:19). Scholars have chosen to use ‘gay’ and ‘lesbian’ (Sang 2003, 
 
1 Xinghun marriage refers to the marriage of convenience between a gay man and a lesbian, often for the 
purpose of easing family pressure and producing offspring. 
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Rofel 2007, Kong 2010), local terms such as ‘tongzhi’ (Chou 2001, Zheng 2015, Bao 
2018) and ‘lala’2 (Engebretsen 2008, Kam 2013) in ethnographic research on Chinese 
sexual minorities, and ‘queer’/ ‘ku’er’ (Engebretsen & Schroeder 2015, Bao 2018, Wei 
2020) in Chinese media studies and activist literature. In common use, each of these terms 
may be perceived differently. My friend-respondents have used innumerable terms such 
as gay, bisexual, les, lala, tongzhi, and zhiren (straight person) to describe their sexualness 
or those of their same-sex lovers at certain life moments. During my stay in Shenzhen, 
younger respondents preferred to use the English terms ‘les’ and ‘gay’ to describe 
themselves. In other words, not all perceive Chinese terms like lala and tongzhi as 
essentially culturally unique and appropriate. Some of my friend-respondents have 
experienced changes in gender or sexual identity during their lifetime. Some of my friend-
respondents were not certain about labelling themselves with any term. Some of my 
friend-respondents used these terms interchangeably. As I shall discuss in the literature 
review and chapter 3, these terms shouldn’t be understood as fixed and timeless identity 
categories for certain ‘types of people’; neither should these terms be put into an alleged 
Western-Oriental comparison. Even the concept of being Chinese no longer involves 
commonly accepted cultural standards (Cohen 2005:59). Therefore, using any of these 
idioms as if it is a self-evident signifier would be problematic. In short, my respondents 
were far from a homogenous group but, for the sake of simplicity, I choose ‘queer’ as the 
key word to distinguish their lives and relationships from heterosexual intimate and 
familial relations and heteronormative social spaces in urban China.  
 
In this thesis, I use ‘queer’ as both a fluid descriptive term and an analytic perspective, a 
verb, and a method. Firstly, I don’t intend to use ‘queer’ as a categorical or politicised 
identity, but rather to understand queerness strategically as an umbrella term to refer to 
various forms of non-heteronormative genders and sexualness. This means I will not use 
‘queer’ as a noun to refer to human subjects in my thesis. Instead, I choose to use ‘non-
heterosexual’ as a loose adjective to refer to my friend-respondents. Furthermore, in this 
research I don’t see queer subjects as “always already avant-garde for all time and in all 
places” (Grewal & Kaplan 2001:670). In this way, this research uses ‘queer’ to disrupt 
the essentialist categorisation of sexuality and centrality of identity. Secondly, I use ‘queer’ 
 
2 ‘Tongzhi’ (which literally means ‘comrades’, roughly referring to LGBT people) and ‘lala’ (roughly 
referring to queer women) are flexible terms that include gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, and sexually 
fluid people. I will use these terms interchangeably with ‘queer men’ and ‘queer women’.  
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to refer to the ongoing and transforming forms of kinship. My focus on queer kinship 
involves not only non-heterosexual people and sexualities per se, but also the practices 
of kinship that destabilise normative kinship norms and provide us with new perspectives 
on reproduction, futurity, and relatedness. Queer theory, as a field, has expanded beyond 
issues of sexuality and identity politics (Moore 2019, Boyce et al. 2019), and queer itself 
might act less like a noun/adjective and more like a verb, “a ‘queer studying’ even of 
things not self-evidently queer” (Boellstorff 2010:215). As I will elucidate in the literature 
review, kinship is not biological facts but a dynamic process (Strathern 1992a, Franklin 
2013). By bringing the term ‘queer’ into Chinese kinship studies, I perceive queer as 
beyond sexuality and identity, using it as “a critique, an analytic” (Weiss 2016: 628). The 
‘queering’ of kinship is not perceived merely within the scope of (queer) sexual desires, 
but exists in every aspect of the society at large.  
 
Since the introduction of gaige kaifang (reform and opening-up) policy in 1978, China 
has experienced radical socio-economic transformations and modernisation. The notions 
of family, marriage, and intimacy in Chinese society have changed enormously in recent 
decades as the younger generation enjoys more individual autonomy, privacy, and is 
subject to less parental authority when it comes to love and marriage (Yan 2003, Riley 
1994, Wolf 1984). At the same time, scholars have observed that contemporary Chinese 
familial life and intimate relations have remained “similar to itself” (Brandtstädter & 
Santos 2008), demonstrated by few out-of-wedlock childbirths (Xie 2013), unrecognised 
intimate relationships outside marriage (Yu & Xie 2015), continuing parental 
involvement in married lives (Pimentel 2000), the imperative to marry (Kam 2013, Santos 
& Harrell 2017), and filial piety and elderly care mainly provided by offspring (Li 2011b, 
Tang & Chen 2012, Xie 2013). Kinship in contemporary China thus holds some distinct 
characteristics in ongoing transformations, which are most pronounced and complicated 
in queer personal lives and the emerging practices of new reproductive technologies. Still, 
kinship studies in China are dominated by the study of heterosexual relationships 
(Engebretsen 2008, Kam 2013); work that makes wider links to kinship and family is 
limited. Although there have been extensive studies on Chinese non-normative sexualities 
(Kong 2010, Kam 2013, Engebretsen 2014, Zheng 2015; Bao 2018, Wei 2020), Chinese 
non-heterosexual people are often delineated through the lens of non-normative sexuality 
and gender rather than the lenses of care and durable relationships. Chinese non-
heterosexual subjects are rarely imagined as being able to form families, and hence 
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studies of non-heterosexual families and queer parenting remain marginal. Chinese non-
heterosexual people’s participation in the field of assisted reproductive technologies has 
also not been ethnographically studied.  
 
This research, therefore, draws attention to non-heterosexual people’s strategies of 
forming and sustaining kinship relationships. The central questions this research 
addresses are: how is queer kinship practiced and recognised in Chinese society in relation 
to state policies, cultural conventions, and modernisation processes? How do non-
heterosexual couples choose certain tactics to construct enduring loving relationships and 
families? How do Chinese non-heterosexual individuals imagine their future and plan for 
their elderly lives? By exploring the dynamic understandings and practices of love, care, 
risk, and parenthood in non-heterosexual people’s personal lives, this thesis unpacks the 
intricate link between cultural imaginations produced by Euro-American originated queer 
politics, social transformations in Chinese society, and personal choices in queer daily 
lives. By capturing the emerging family-forming practices and the image of the role 
model same-sex nuclear family promoted in queer communities, I stress the dynamic 
interplay of socio-economical class, state law and moral values that come to articulate 
queer family relations and relatedness in today’s queer everyday lives.  
 
The major part of my fieldwork was conducted in Shenzhen, the well-known city of 
migrants in Guangdong Province, China. Located on the southeast coast, Shenzhen is the 
city that links Hong Kong and mainland China. Within an hour’s train ride from Shenzhen, 
Guangzhou is the capital city of Guangdong Province, also attracting thousands of 
migrants each year. Both Shenzhen and Guangzhou belong to the Pearl River Delta 
Metropolitan Region, the largest economic hub in China. Here I highlight the internal 
regional variation within China rather than seeing Chinese society through a rural/urban 
comparison, as each region has its unique cultural history that has shaped and continues 
to shape queer personal lives. The prominent urban areas in Southeast Coast China 
became my chosen site for exploring the interplay of urban utopian imaginaries and queer 
kinship. Indeed, first-tier cities like Shenzhen have become a destination for young non-
heterosexual people who are attracted by the promise of better opportunities, metropolitan 
anonymity, and sexual freedom (Luo 2020). Yet, such queer utopian imaginaries of 
cosmopolitan life have been questioned in recent anthropological literature (Sorainen 
2015, Boyce & Dasgupta 2017). This research finds that rising living expenses and the 
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constricting possibilities for upward mobility have inevitably shaped young queer 
subjects’ material desires, relationships with their parents, careers, marriage and 
parenting choices, and future aspirations. 
 
The focus of my research has arisen as a result of my ongoing academic interests and 
close involvement in Chinese queer communities. The discontinuity between studies on 
Chinese queer life-worlds and on Chinese kinship demonstrated in the literature review 
is notable. Studies on Chinese non-heterosexual people and domestic quantitative 
research on Chinese families have tended to reduce kinship to blood ties and traditional 
cultures, while anthropological studies on Chinese kinship have suggested a turn to 
understanding Chinese kinship as a fluid and malleable concept (Stafford 2000, 
Brandtstädter & Santos 2008). My experience with and previous research on queer 
women in China urged me to investigate relatedness in China as well as the 
transnationality of queer theory. My research makes an original contribution to the studies 
of parenthood and new reproductive technologies of Chinese non-heterosexual people in 
the context of our understanding of kinship and Chinese society in general. My research 
also contributes to the discussion on queer utopian imaginaries and futurity that is related 
to reproduction, cosmopolitan life, and family care (Edelman 2004, Muñoz 2009, Boyce 
& Dasgupta 2017).  
 
In the following subsections of this chapter, I will first delineate the historical and social-
legal context of Chinese non-normative sexualities, market reforms, and family life in 
general. Then, I will discuss the relevant literature on the anthropology of kinship, queer 
studies, and post-reform Chinese society to locate my research on queer kinship in urban 
China. This is followed by an outline of the structure of the thesis.  
 
Scope and Context 
Same-sex sexualities and intimate relationships  
The historical documents of same-sex desire and romance in China are as ancient as China 
itself. Ancient literature has documented homosexual practices ranging from having 
luantong (catamite) in imperial families to nanchang (male prostitutes) among city 
dwellers. Although male homoerotic behaviours were believed to be tolerated in ancient 
China, it is crucial to note two facts: one is the coexistence of homosexual erotic relations 
and heterosexual marriage; the other is the absence of female homosexuality in ancient 
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Chinese literature (Hinsch 1990, Sang 2003, Li 2009, Ho 2010). Despite any belief that 
it was tolerated, homosexuality was in a marginalised position in ancient Chinese culture, 
“existing as peripheral to the gendered hierarchies of the Confucian family and marriage 
institutions” (Kong 2010:151). Traditional Confucian 3  values place little weight on 
conjugal relations and pay no attention to love among women. The youth had little 
autonomy, especially young women. With the philosophy of Jiaguotonggou 
(cohesion/pan-familism), Confucianists believed that filial duty in the family could be 
applied to the wider society; a person needed to be xiao (filial) to family elders first and 
expand filial piety to other elders and ultimately to the nation (An et al. 2013, Wang, Q 
2011, Wang, P 2010). In traditional China (pre-19th century), marriage was arranged by 
family elders and was viewed as a corporate relationship between two families rather than 
an individual matter.  
 
Throughout the last century, discourses of sexuality in China became “the site of cultural 
production in discrepant dialogue with Western power” (Rofel 2007:95). It is widely 
believed that the penetration of Western imperialism in the late Qing Dynasty (1840-1911) 
imported a scientific discourse of gender and Western homophobia into China (Ho 2010). 
During the Republican period (1912-1949), especially the May Fourth decade (1915-
1927), China experienced a significant change in gender and sexual conceptions that 
associated same-sex intimacy with psychobiological abnormality (Sang 2003). From late 
Imperial China to the Republican period, male homosexual relationships, in the form of 
sodomy (jijian)4, became legal and moral concerns. The discourse of homosexuality and 
sexuality was erased from the public sphere until the late 1970s. The state strictly 
regulated sexual activities to be within marriage.  
 
Chinese economic reform began in 1978 when the gaige kaifang (reform and opening-up) 
policy was passed. Since then, collective interest has been de-emphasised and individual 
mobility has increased. After the reform period, the public discourse of homosexuality 
increased dramatically (Kam 2013, Ho 2010, Rofel 2007). The appearance of terms such 
as ‘tongxinglian’ (homosexual), ‘tongzhi’ (‘comrades’, roughly referring to LGBT 
 
3 Confucianism has been regarded as the most influential ideology in China for over two millennia. It 
became the official state ideology in the Han Dynasty (206 BC–220 AD).  
4 Sodomy (jijian) appeared as a crime in late Qing Dynasty law. Until 1997, sodomy was implicitly 
included in hooliganism (liumang xingwei) under the old criminal law. 
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people), ‘gay’ and ‘lesbian’ in public media and on the internet has helped non-
heterosexual people from urban and rural areas to express their sexualities. Urbanisation 
and increased geographical mobility have led to the emergence of same-sex communities 
in major Chinese cities (Kam 2013).  
 
In 1997, homosexuality was excluded from legal prosecution through the abolishment of 
the category of hooliganism (liumang xingwei) under the old criminal law, which had 
previously included male homosexual activities. In 2001, the Chinese Psychiatry 
Association removed homosexuality (tongxinglian) from the medical category of 
‘perversions’. Although these two changes are often regarded as signifying the de-
criminalisation and de-pathologization of (male) homosexual behaviours, Chinese non-
heterosexual people face continual surveillance and repression (Zheng 2015). To date, 
many Chinese universities still use textbooks that define homosexuality as ‘abnormal’ or 
as ‘mental illness’, and the publishers of these textbooks refuse to make any change. No 
domestic law protects gender and sexual minorities. On the one hand, same-sex romance 
has become a pop topic in mass media and online communities. On the other hand, male 
homosexuality is almost always linked to the high risk of HIV in public discourse, while 
female homosexuality is often ignored or not acknowledged (Kam 2013, Sang 2003). 
Despite the fact that online surveys often show increasing awareness and acceptance 
toward homosexuality, a recent survey conducted by the United Nations Development 
Programme (2016) suggests that, although the public attitude toward same-sex 
relationships has been changing for the good, especially among the younger generation5, 
non-heterosexual people remain invisible and vulnerable within society, with only 5% of 
them willing to live openly. For most non-heterosexual people, no matter what gender 
and sexual desires they have, there is still a strong injunction for them to be in a 
heterosexual marriage and have children.  
 
Modernisation and internal migration since the economic reform 
The power-holding stratum in China has shifted remarkably from the Mao era (1949-
1976) to the post-Mao era (1976-1989) (He 2000, Anagnost 2008). During the Mao era, 
China was highly unified and centralised; the Communist Party of China monopolized all 
kinds of resources, including material resources like land, property, income, political 
 
5 77% of survey respondents are post-90s, 19.4% are post-80s, only 3.6% are post-70s or older. 
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resources of power, and cultural resources like education (He 2000: 69). It should also be 
noted that, during the Mao era, not only sexual desires but individual desires in general 
could not be openly celebrated in public.  
 
In 1976, Deng Xiaoping (paramount leader from 1978 to 1989) proclaimed that the 
contradiction was no longer between classes but between “the backward and the advanced 
forces of production” (Osburg 2013:4). One of Deng’s most famous sayings is to “let 
some people, some areas get rich first, and eventually all”. Consequently, reform and 
opening policy was passed in 1978, marked as the beginning of market reforms. 
Independent household businesses first appeared in the early 1980s as small shops, 
restaurants, etc. The enormous potential of profit-making and the increasing foreign 
investment attracted people from various backgrounds to enter the market economy. The 
development of the private sector has led to the rise of the ‘enterprising/desiring self’, 
which is expressed and maintained mostly in terms of individual desires and self-interests 
and is, at the same time, brought under the restraining power of the Chinese state through 
the language of neoliberalism (Rofel 2007, Kleinman et al. 2011). As a double-edged 
sword, the economic reform has contributed to the growth of individual mobility and 
simultaneously formed unequal social stratums (Anagnost 2008). The middle class 
(zhongchan jieceng) is a small but growing emerging stratum in China made possible by 
privatization (Zhang 2008). Yet, it is not a coherent group but a “diverse array of different 
social positions with differing degrees of power and affluence” (Anagnost 2008:507).  
 
The emergence of market economy and the relaxation of the household registration 
(hukou) system since the 1980s have contributed to a rural-to-urban migration surge. 
China’s hukou system was formally set up in the 1950s. From the 1950s to the early 1980s, 
internal migration was tightly controlled under the hukou system. Each citizen is required 
to register in one and only one place of permanent residence (hukou suozaidi) with either 
agricultural or non-agricultural status (hukou leibie) (Chan & Zhang 1999). The hukou 
residence links one’s accessibility to a wide range of state-provided benefits and 
opportunities such as public schooling, healthcare, housing, and eligibility to work in state 
sectors. Until the late 1980s, anyone wishing to travel within China had to obtain an 
official ‘permission’ letter from local officials. Changing hukou residence and status was 
extremely difficult (Bao et al. 2011). Since the late 1980s, Chinese cities began to issue 
temporary resident permits to migrants and gradually eased the restrictions on the in-
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migration of rural workers. The economic and hukou reforms considerably encouraged 
labour mobility. The temporary (or ‘floating’) population away from their hukou 
residence had increased from 6.1 million in 1982 to 149.4 million in 2005 (Shen 2013). 
The four first-tier cities - Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen - are the most 
popular cities for migrants in China. 
 
Shenzhen is the youngest and smallest city among the four first-tier Chinese cities, being 
as it was merely an ‘uncultured’ fishing village of 30,000 people three decades ago. As 
part of its reform and opening-up plan, China established Special Economic Zones (SEZs), 
including Shenzhen. The increased social mobility and the growing number of migrants 
have contributed to the rapid industrialisation and urbanisation in Shenzhen. Despite the 
high housing prices, Shenzhen’s policies and job opportunities attracted nearly 500,000 
new citizens in 2016 (excluding residents who did not obtain official citizenship). By 
2017, Shenzhen had 4.3 million permanent registered citizens, while the total permanent 
population, including migrants without local hukou, was 12.5 million (Shenzhen 
Municipal Bureau of Statistics 2018). Shenzhen released its famous slogan in 2012, ‘laile 
jiushi shenzhenren (once you come here, you are a Shenzhener)’. Growing vigorously, 
Shenzhen has had numerous nicknames: ‘mushroom/instant city’ for its rapid growth, 
‘Chinese Silicon Valley’ for its renowned high-tech industry, and ‘cultural desert’ for its 
lack of cultural history. It also attracts the greatest number of young university graduates 
in China6 . Shenzhen is undoubtedly an ideal site for exploring the interplay of queer 
kinship and queer migration. 
 
Marriage, parenting, and family transformations 
To understand the pressure to marry that Chinese non-heterosexual people face, we need 
to find out what marriage, cohabitation, and childrearing mean in contemporary Chinese 
society. Since 1949, parental authority has weakened and arranged marriage has become 
rare in rural and urban China. The shift in control over the decision to marry from parents 
to young people was promoted by the Communist Party of China, both explicitly through 
the introduction of the Marriage Act of 1950 (and 1980) and indirectly through 
encouraging women into the job market (Pimentel 2000). The average age of a first 
 
6This is based on the Tecent company’s report. Tecent is one of the largest Internet companies, offering 
services including the well-known instant messenger QQ and the mobile chatting application Wechat.  
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marriage and the divorce rate has risen since then7. The younger generation in mainland 
China now enjoys more autonomy and values romantic love and freedom of marriage. 
Moreover, women’s social and economic status has improved since 1949, shown in the 
rapidly growing percentages of women receiving postsecondary education (Xie 2013). 
The one-child policy introduced in 1979 has also played a critical role in improving urban 
daughters’ status (Fong 2007). In the traditional patrilineal kinship system, parents tended 
to invest in sons rather than daughters. Being the one and only child who is expected to 
support her parents in the future, urban daughters have access to more emotional and 
material support than daughters with siblings. In a word, the traditional disadvantaged 
identity categories of women and young people have gained increased individual freedom. 
Nevertheless, parents are still involved in spouse choice and married lives (Pimentel 2000; 
Li 2011b). Surveys have shown that parental approval is still a crucial factor in marital 
quality (ibid). Social hypergamy - the tendency of women to marry men of higher social 
and economic status - remains a cultural expectation for women (Xie 2013). Furthermore, 
singlehood remains extremely rare 8 . Heterosexual marriage is still the dominant 
preference in Chinese society. Consequently, youths may have increased freedom to 
choose whom to marry, but they may not have such freedom to choose not to marry at all.  
 
At the same time, intimate relationships outside marriage have been transforming. 
Premarital cohabitation was once regarded as an immoral and illegal practice in socialist 
China. The China Family Panel Study has shown a dramatic rise in premarital 
cohabitation rates from nearly absent before the 1980s to one-third in 2010-2012 (Yu & 
Xie 2015). One reason for this is the change in the Marriage Law that decriminalised the 
practice of cohabitation9 . Urbanisation and migrational experience are also important 
factors. While Yu and Xie’s data on cohabitation is limited to married couples born before 
1980, a trend in social acceptance toward cohabitation and premarital sex is pronounced. 
Various scholars have described the sexual revolution during the last three decades (Pan 
1995, Kleinman et al. 2011, Zhang 2011). The emergence of dating culture in urban China 
has increasingly delinked sex from marriage as the relationship between sex, romantic 
 
7 Others have argued that the transformation of family and marriage in China began earlier in the 1920s 
when the May Fourth liberating Movement took place (Lee 2006). 
8 For the birth cohort of 1976–83, almost every woman had been married by age 30; and by age 33, over 
95% of men had entered their first marriage. Available in Chinese General Social Surveys 2010, 2012, 
and 2013. 
9 The Chinese Marriage Law of 1980 referred to cohabitation as “illegal cohabitation,” while a 2001 
amendment to the law changed the wording to “non-marital cohabitation”. 
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love, and companionate love is constantly being negotiated by young urbanites 
(Jankowiak & Li 2017). Nevertheless, cohabitation is not legally protected10. Also, the 
tolerant attitude toward cohabitation may still only be within the territory of marriage, as 
cohabitation is considered a temporal and transitional status before getting married11 . 
Long-term cohabitating relationships are rare (Yeung & Hu 2016). It remains 
questionable whether cohabitation is accepted as a form of union among people in urban 
China. The question is pronounced in non-heterosexual cohabiting couples, for they 
cannot ‘develop’ their cohabiting relationships to legal marriage. At the same time, their 
experiences are different from heterosexual cohabiting couples, for they may not 
necessarily be recognised as cohabiting couples within a heteronormative perspective. 
 
Childbirth and parenting in China are tightly associated with its socio-cultural emphasis 
on reproduction and unique birth planning policies (Handwerker 2002; Klein 2017). Filial 
duty (xiao), as the moral standard in Confucian China, focuses on the continuation of the 
family line (Ikels 2004). In this sense, reproduction is a family duty bonded with marriage. 
In 1979, the state introduced the one-child policy to restrict births per household, and it 
was replaced by the two-child policy in 2015. The Population and Family Planning Law 
became effective on 1 September 2002. Many other administrative issues, such as the 
enforcement of social maintenance fees12, are directly related to the state’s strict birth 
planning project (Jiang & Liu 2016). In 2001, the Ministry of Health issued two orders to 
regulate the use of assisted reproductive technologies (ART) and sperm banks. They came 
in line with the Population and Family Planning Law, meaning that ART, including IUI 
(intrauterine insemination, also known as artificial insemination), and IVF (In Vitro 
Fertilization), were only available to married infertile couples. Meanwhile, the orders 
prohibit surrogacy and trading of human sperm, eggs, and embryos. According to the 
Ministry of Health, medical personnel must not apply ART to married couples and 
unmarried women who do not comply with the state’s planned birth project.  
 
 
10 Even though cohabiting partners were included in the Anti-Domestic Violence Law of the People's 
Republic in 2015, the definition of a cohabiting partner is vague and same-sex cohabiting relationships 
are not included. This law doesn’t specify the department to enforce the policies either. 
11 Studies shows that the duration of cohabitation in Chinese society is still shorter than Western societies.  
12  In 2002, the State Council of the People’s Republic of China promulgated the measures for 
administration of collection of social maintenance fees. Social maintenance fee is a euphemism for fines as 
a punishment for excess/unplanned births and is used for the operation of grassroots governments. It was 
previously called ‘fines for excess birth’ and ‘out-of-quota birth fees’. The exact amount of social 
maintenance fee is decided by local family planning commissions and can be extremely high. 
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Moreover, recent national surveys indicate that out-of-wedlock childbirths remain almost 
non-existent partly because of the governmental control over the household registration 
(hukou) system (Xie 2013). One must have a hukou certificate identifying personal details 
including name, date of birth, family members and residence to be legally recognised as 
a Chinese citizen and receive necessary welfares and the right to go to school. Without 
two parents who are legally married and complying with the family planning policy, the 
newborn cannot be registered in a household booklet (hukou ben) and thus risk becoming 
legal nonpersons (Greenhalgh 2003). To get hukou for out-of-wedlock children, 
unmarried parents often have to pay a high social maintenance fee. 
 
Although there is a trend toward the nuclear family, strong parent-child bonds and the 
high percentage of elders co-residing/living close with their children are still remarkable 
in urban China13 (Li 2011, Tang & Chen 2012, Xie 2013). Family care remains the main 
model for elderly support. A significant number of elderly people still count on their 
children for support due to the patrilocal tradition and the lack of public support (2013:7). 
Simultaneously, the one-child policy has placed familial pressure solely on the only child, 
who is expected to excel in school, have a decent job, get married, continue the family 
line, and take the primary responsibility for supporting the family elders. We must note 
that the average non-heterosexual person born under the one-child policy is often an only 
child who has no siblings to share the burden to care for parents and cannot be legally 
bound with a same-sex lover (Hildebrandt 2018). Since elderly care is strongly dependent 
on kinship norms under the current welfare system, not having children can be a profound 
concern when considering the future and old age.  
 
To summarise, quantitative research to date has demonstrated apparent paradoxes in the 
changing values and practices of marriage and family. On the one hand, there is a growing 
pursuit of individual freedoms when it comes to love, intimacy, and marriage. On the 
other hand, entering heterosexual marriage remains a dominant life choice tightly 
associated with parenting. Long-term cohabitating relationships and non-marital 
childbirths remain extremely rare for cultural and legal reasons. Old age support is still 
 
13 Research shows that about 43 percent of elderly persons aged 60 and above co-reside with a child, 
another 31 percent have a child living in the same neighbourhood, and 13 percent more in the same county 
but not in the same neighbourhood. Data also shows a high frequency of financial transfers between elderly 
parents and their children (Lei et al. 2013, cited in Xie 2013). 
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expected to be provided primarily by one’s offspring. These paradoxes imply a difficult 
situation for alternative life choices, including queer relationships and family formation. 
At the same time, it is crucial to study the actual practices behind the official data.  
 
The practice of xinghun marriage and queer parenting 
One of the popular strategies often discussed in Chinese same-sex communities is 
xinghun (contract) marriage, which is also called ‘marriage of convenience’ between a 
gay man and a lesbian. According to a report by the United Nations Development 
Programme (2016), non-heterosexual people generally marry less than straight people of 
the same age, but the pressure to get married and the marriage rate increases as non-
heterosexual people grow older. Among the LGBT respondents, 0.6% of post-90s are 
married, 13.5% of post-80s are married and 42.7% of post-70s are married. 84.1% of 
married LGBT respondents are married to heterosexual people, 13.2% are in a “marriage 
of convenience” with opposite-sex non-heterosexual people, and 2.6% are in same-sex 
marriages registered in foreign countries (24). In the case of xinghun, the husband (who 
usually identify as a gay man) and the wife (who usually identify as a lesbian) do not 
marry for romantic love, but mainly for the purpose of releasing tensions between 
individual freedom and familial duty (Engebretsen 2017). The recognition of kinship 
through state law, blood ties and love are complicated in this practice of ‘faking’ marriage. 
Some non-heterosexual people simultaneously co-parent with their opposite-sex xinghun 
partners, show filial piety to their xinghun parents-in-law, and date same-sex lovers. The 
intricate relationships they have with their same-sex lovers, their xinghun partners and 
extended families both complicate and destabilise the concept of the conventional 
Chinese family. In this sense, the boundary between ‘conventional/normative’ and 
‘alternative/queer’ forms of family and kinship seems to be vague as the practice of 
xinghun marriage creates not singular but multiple ‘truths’ and perspectives. In this thesis, 
I explore non-heterosexual people’s practice of xinghun marriage beyond the scope of 
marriage pressure, as xinghun marriage is often linked with parenting. As I will explore 
in chapter 4, non-heterosexual people in xinghun marriage struggle to walk the blurred 
line between the concept of a ‘nominal’ and ‘real’ family. 
 
While same-sex marriage has not gained legal recognition in mainland China and 
childbirth outside marriage has been strictly restricted, non-heterosexual people with 
children have gradually become visible in online communities as well as in professional 
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agencies which assist non-heterosexual people in having children through assisted 
reproductive technologies such as in-vitro fertilization (IVF) and surrogacy. Here, queer 
parenting can involve a diverse range of tactics and outcomes. For example, a Chinese 
gay couple living in Shenzhen became co-parents by contracting with a surrogate agency 
in Russia. They had a child using one man’s sperm and a Russian model’s egg, and the 
child was carried by a surrogate from Thailand. This couple (An and Ye)’s case will be 
further explained in chapter 3 and 6. Under existing legal policies, one of the gay co-
parents would be neither biologically related to the child nor married to his lover. 
Studying parenthood which is not recognisable by alleged biology or law furthers our 
understanding of kinship, a concept that has been destabilised and denaturalised by 
anthropologists such as Strathern (1992a&b), Weston (1991), Latour (1993), Carsten 
(2000), and Franklin (2013). Since Chinese non-heterosexual people are scarcely 
imagined as being able to form enduring relationships that can reproduce and establish 
families, queer parents remain invisible to the general public, and social research into 
such practices is especially limited. Such an absence of research into Chinese queer 
parenting in the social sciences is connected to the lack of these relationships’ wider 
representation in Chinese society and the heteronormative perspective that dominates 
mainstream social studies. 
 
Against this background, this research explores the tactics non-heterosexual people 
employ to have children with or without entering heterosexual marriage and their 
experience of validating (or losing) kinship relations through their negotiation with 
biological relatives and state legislation. In examining these tactics, this research creates 
a new ethnographic perspective for the anthropology of kinship in China. Also, the ART 
business sectors that assist non-heterosexual people in having children reveals links 
between Chinese sexualness and the transnational economic market, as the high costs and 
duration needed for IVF and surrogacy automatically make economic capital a 
prerequisite for intended clients. Overall, queer personal lives in contemporary China 
reveal discursive and affective tensions between tradition and modernity, individualism 






Gender, sexuality, and heteronormativity 
It is essential to clarify the conceptions and uses of ‘sex’, ‘gender’, ‘heterosexuality’, and 
‘heteronormativity’ as they form the basis of queer theory and this research. During the 
last century, the essentialist view of sex, gender, and sexuality as binary distinctions and 
natural facts have been challenged by feminism and lesbian/gay studies. De Beauvoir 
(1953) distinguishes gender from sex as she points out that one’s body is sexed, yet sex 
doesn’t cause gender, and gender cannot be used to express sex. Gender is a social 
construct that cannot be naturalised. Butler writes, “Whatever biological intractability sex 
appears to have, gender is culturally constructed; hence, gender is neither the causal result 
of sex nor as seemingly fixed as sex” (1990: 9). Foucault (1984) discusses the 
construction of knowledge of sexuality within institutions. For Foucault, the body gains 
meaning only in the context of discursive power relations both produced and undermined 
by discourse. Nowadays, many scholars would agree that sexuality and gender are 
historically and socially constructed (e.g., Sullivan 2003). ‘Sex’ can refer both to 
anatomical differences between female and male (as the ‘two sexes’) and to erotic 
relations and practices (as to ‘have sex’). The ambiguous meanings of sex as identity and 
as act become divided into “univocal dimensions” in feminist and lesbian/gay analysis 
(Butler 1994:4). Rubin suggests theorising sexuality as an autonomous realm as she 
argues the two meanings of ‘sex’, whereby to be a sex implies having sex in a given way 
that reflects a heterosexist cultural assumption that “sexuality is reducible to sexual 
intercourse and that it is a function of the relations between women and men” (1984:169). 
Drawing from Rubin’s critique, Butler makes it clear that sexuality cannot be reduced to 
sexual intercourse, and sexual relations cannot be reduced to gender positions. Gender 
and sexuality are “empirically interrelated, but analytically distinct”, with heterosexuality 
as the key site of intersection (Jackson 2005: 17).  
 
Butler (1990) questions the binary of masculinity and femininity and formulates the 
theory of performativity. A central concept of her work is that gender is not a seamlessly 
stable identity but rather an identity tenuously established in time and “instituted in an 
exterior space through a stylized repetition of acts” (1990:179). The social audience and 
the actors themselves both believe in the constructed identity and perform in the modes 
of belief. For Butler, the very concepts of masculinity and femininity are constructed as a 
technique to conceal gender performative attributes and possibilities that might proliferate 
the meaning of gender outside the frames of compulsory heterosexuality and 
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heteronormativity. Thus, people who do their gender ‘wrongly’ are punished by culture 
and laws that have a vested interest in maintaining the strict distinction between 
homosexuality and heterosexuality, masculinity and femininity (2004:93). Butler also 
discusses the relation between polluting status and homophobia as male homosexuality 
implies a kind of body permeability that is unauthorised by the hegemonic heterosexual 
order. A person with AIDS was identified with a polluting status due to not only AIDS’s 
figure as ‘gay disease’, but also the media’s homophobic response to the AIDS crisis in 
the 1980s (Watney 1988). As China experiences an emerging HIV epidemic among men 
who have sex with men (MSM), public health sectors turn specifically to targeting MSM 
testing and detection for HIV intervention (Fan 2017). Despite the low risk of HIV 
infection, female homosexuality is linked with this polluted status, for it is outside the 
hegemonic order. Informed by Hegel (1978)’s dialectics and his conceptions of sublation 
(aufhebung) and negation, Butler (1990) argues that heterosexuality is a complex matrix 
of discourse that requires something to negate and sublate. Hence, in order for 
heterosexuality to remain integral as a distinct social norm, the very notion of 
homosexuality needs to be constructed to remain repressed as a taboo (edited with Salih 
2004). In this sense, heterosexuality, in fact, always presupposes homosexuality to ensure 
its own originality and normativity. Intrinsic is the relationship between sexual 
subjectivities, discourse, and power. Sedgwick suggests prohibition/repression is vital for 
Foucault (1984), obstructing the possibility of understanding human desire as structured 
quite differently from “the heroic, ‘liberatory,’ inescapably dualistic righteousness of 
hunting down and attacking prohibition/repression in all its chameleonic guises” 
(Sedgwick 2003: 10, cited in Boyce 2008:117). To summarise, heterosexuality is a 
“(historically and culturally specific) truth-effect of systems of power/knowledge” and 
“its dominant position and current configuration are contestable and open to change” 
(Sullivan 2003:29). Homosexuality and heterosexuality are constructed in a “reciprocal, 
but hierarchical, relationship” (Jackson 2005:23).  
 
The emergence of queer theory in the early 1990s primarily developed by Judith Butler, 
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and other influential theorists has indeed contributed to the 
denaturalisation of the masculinity/femininity divide and destabilisation of the notions of 
the normal and normative. Heteronormativity is not a fixed term, but a changing set of 
discourses that “is mobilized and reproduced in everyday life not only through talk, but 
also through routine activities in which gender, sexuality and heterosexuality interconnect” 
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(Jackson 2016: 114). Lunsin (1999) points out that homophobia in Japanese society is 
internalised in children at an early age before they know about the existence of 
homosexuality. Such homophobia, then, is not rooted in the knowledge of sexuality but 
in fear of being different. In other words, we cannot reduce heteronormativity to the 
discourses of sexual practice, for it defines “not only a normative sexual practice but also 
a normal way of life” (Jackson 2016: 107). Since heteronormativity itself is constructed 
in contrast to non-normative sexualities, its stability is constantly threatened by queer 
theories and practices. Although heteronormativity has been well-theorised, Traub points 
out that there is “a tendency to use the term ‘heteronormativity’ to describe earlier system 
of sexuality and gender”, which seems to make heterosexuality and heteronormativity 
ahistorical and universal (2008:23). Many scholars thus employ ‘heteronormativity’ and 
‘heterosexuality’ with little reflection on “what they mean for their historical period” 
(ibid). Queer theory should be seen as dynamic and mobilising. In light of such arguments, 
we need to rethink when and how the social ordering of gender, sexuality, and are 
heterosexuality produced and probably transformed in the Chinese context to avoid 
oversimplified preconceptions of what heteronormativity is. Thus, I don’t take 
heteronormativity or the heteronormative family as universally self-explanatory notions. 
I will move to discuss the critiques on universalist and essentialist views of queer cultures 
in non-Euro-American contexts as this research encompasses globalised queer culture 
and Chinese queer practices. 
 
Between global queer culture, modernity, and locality 
If gender, sexuality, and heteronormativity are discursively constructed and culturally 
specific notions, how do we apply queer identities and queer theories to studies in the 
local context? What is the relation between queer theory and China? Altman (1996) 
suggests that, as non-normative sexual subjects in non-Western societies imagine 
themselves in the globalised gay and lesbian communities, their experiences can differ 
from those in the West. The notions of gay and lesbian identities and cultures are 
frequently claimed to be universal in non-Euro-American countries, whereas extensive 
ethnographic research has challenged both the universalist view of gay and lesbian 
identities and the essentialist view of ‘Oriental/Asian cultures’ (Blackwood 2005, Bose 
& Bhattacharyya 2007, Boellstorff 2007a&b, Boyce 2008, Osella 2012, Dave 2012, 
Mizielińska & Stasińska 2017). Boellstorff discusses how nation-states “make 
underwriting normative heterosexuality central to their practices of governance and 
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ideologies of belonging” (2007b: 22). Dave points out the two social facts: “the Western 
imperative to make of queerness a political identity” and “the local reality of the 
incommensurability of queerness with religion or nation” (2012:15). Looking into same-
sex intimacy among Muslim men in South India, Osella argues that “processes that lead 
to the normalization of heterosexuality are neither linear and singular nor predictable in 
their outcomes” (2012:544). Grewal and Kaplan further identify the re-emergence of the 
tradition-modernity split in the public discourse on sexuality, in which “the United States 
and Europe are figured as modern and thus as the sites of progressive social movements, 
while other parts of the world are presumed to be traditional, especially in regard to 
sexuality” (2001:669). Wilson (2006) recognises the conflation of ‘Western’, ‘modern’ 
and ‘globalisation’ as the source of sexual modernity in Asia societies. Under such 
Western hegemony, queer life and practices that don’t correspond to the first-world model 
are described as ‘tradition’. Boyce and Dasgupta (2017) have made visible the relation 
between Indian modernity and queer desires. In short, scholars considering cultural 
universalism or the westernisation of queer cultures argue that the universal imagining of 
being queer tends to place non-normative gender and sexual minorities from the non-West 
in a “forever late arrived” and less developed position. In this sense of West-East dualism, 
the East either rejects or takes up Western queer theories. Yet, the goal is not to put non-
heterosexual people in a West-East binary in order to find differences, since “the very 
language of difference may naturalize and justify the ‘West’ as an indispensable and 
normative point of comparison” (Liu 2010:314). Borrowing from Boyce, Engebretsen, 
and Posocco, queer anthropological work aims to explore “how ethno-theoretical 
approaches to sexual and gender diversity might contribute to rethinking mainstream 
anthropological analysis” (2018:5).  
 
Doing cross-cultural research meets the challenge of dealing with representations of 
terminologies in different cultures. Traub writes: “as sexual categories and epistemologies 
travel across borders, all efforts at cross-cultural translation and comparison are imbued 
with politically loaded significations of tradition and modernity” (2008:9). Khanna (2017) 
points out that the sense of sexuality as an aspect of personhood and the epistemology of 
homosexuality are partial and ultimately unhelpful frames for understanding sexual 
possibilities in non-Euro-American contexts. Rather, we shall develop an understanding 
toward ‘sexualness’ that unsettles the overarching framework of sexuality types (ibid). 
Scholars need not only pay attention to cross-cultural translation but must also be 
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extremely careful with the local cultural meanings of imported vocabularies. The term 
‘lesbian’ and the term ‘dogana’ in Indian society can evoke different ontologies and 
idioms of sexualness (Khanna 2017). Many researchers choose to avoid overusing the 
English terms ‘gay’ and ‘lesbian’ to represent gender and sexual minorities in non-Euro-
American societies. Chou (1997), for example, has argued that the Chinese term ‘tongzhi’ 
(literally meaning ‘comrades’, also referring to LGBT people) is different from the 
English ‘gays and lesbians’ because the concepts of gay and lesbian “have no equivalent 
in the Chinese tradition of same-sex erotic relations, which is characterized by cultural 
tolerance and harmony” (cited in Liu 2010:297). Yet, rejecting terms originated from 
Euro-American contexts entirely and emphasising cultural specificity could also risk 
essentializing both the ‘East’ and the ‘West’. As Bose and Bhattacharyya (2007) contend, 
the meanings of the categories of gender and sexuality “shift according to historical, 
cultural and social context” and the question is “ultimately ethnographic and historic 
rather than purely theoretical” (xxiv). As I stated at the beginning of this thesis, these 
English or Chinese terms shouldn’t be understood as culturally static identities that speak 
for certain ‘types of person’. This research doesn’t conceptualise ‘gay and lesbian’ as a 
globalised modern culture, nor does it conceptualise ‘tongzhi and lala’ as representing an 
authentic Chinese culture. After all, the ‘West’ and the Euro-American sexual 
categorisation are not seamlessly stable, and the purpose is to relativise “Western’ 
paradigmatic knowledge in the study of gender and sexual diversity” (Boyce, Engebretsen, 
& Posocco, 2018:847). In employing the idiom of ‘sexualness’ beyond the framework of 
sexuality types, I wish to problematise the modern-versus-tradition dichotomy and West-
versus-East essentialist comparison. This research employs a standpoint derived from 
Chinese queer relations to critique the heteronormative approach to anthropology as well 
as to decolonise/decentralise the dominant framework of sexuality in queer studies 
(Hendriks 2018, Khanna 2017).  
 
Queer futurity 
The focus of my research is linked to queer relationality, reproduction and ultimately 
debates surrounding the queer anti-social thesis and queer futurity. Is there a future for 
non-heterosexual people? Following Bersani’s definition of sex as “anticommunal, 
antiegalitarian, antinurturing, antiloving” (1986:215) is the anti-social, negative, and anti-
relational turn in queer theories fuelled by Lee Edelman. The conception of politics, as 
Edelman (2004) suggests, is linked to what he calls ‘reproductive futurism’ embodied in 
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the figure of the child. In this sense, future is reduced to repetition. Fighting for the future 
is equated with ‘fighting for children’, while queerness “names the side of those not 
‘fighting for the children,’ the side outside the consensus by which all politics confirms 
the absolute value of reproductive futurism” (2004:3). Then, the queer subject embraces 
a negativity which chafes against normalisation and resists every social form (6). Edelman 
thus says, “there are no non-heterosexual people in that future as there can be no future 
for non-heterosexual people […] what is queerest about us, queerest within us, and 
queerest despite us is this willingness to insist intransitively - to insist that the future stop 
here” (30-31). Edelman articulates an anti-social thesis that frames non-heterosexual 
people as heroic and radical norm-resisters, which Halberstam (2008) argues as incorrect. 
Unfolding tensions between same-sex and gender variant traditions of queer activism and 
identification, Halberstam demonstrates that homosexuality has not always and 
everywhere been negative, resistant, and progressive. He depicts homophile movements 
in the 1920s in Germany which made notable distinctions between male effeminacy and 
female masculinity. In this sense, the masculinist homophile movements in fact 
emphasised male superiority and repressed gender variant men. Halberstam points out 
that Edelman’s version of anti-social theory is apolitical rather than anti-politics. 
 
Responding to the anti-relational stance, Muñoz (2009) suggests that queerness is also 
performative, meaning it is not only being but also doing for and toward future (1). For 
Muñoz, the potentiality of cross-temporal queer relationality promises futurity, and 
queerness should be understood as collectivity. He argues that gay and lesbian’s pursuit 
for traditional straight relationality (such as marriage) is an ideological project rather than 
a pragmatic strategy that tries to naturalise straight relationality. Muñoz criticises the 
conceptualisation of ‘here and now’ of straight present and instead points out the multiple 
temporalities and spatiality of queerness. Queerness’s time is a “stepping out of the 
linearity of straight time” (25). Thus, the notion of straight time should not be naturalised. 
By identifying the web of queer relationality and collective futurism in performances, 
artwork, and his own experience, Muñoz voices a turn to hope, future, and utopia.  
 
Patel (2006) argues that sexuality has too often be considered outside transnational 
27 
 
finance and eco-sustainability. She compares the rate card 14 agreement between the 
middle-class heterosexual family and Aravani (eunuchs) 15 to the technology of risk. 
The rate card mediates a ‘future’ of uncertainty that resonates with insurance in neoliberal 
reform. People who buy into the idea of life insurance also buy into ideas of what kind of 
life they want, strategies for protecting against risk and conceptions of sexuality and 
selfhood. Revealing the advertisements and policies, Patel writes, “as people learn to 
purchase and to want insurance, the form of the implicitly heterosexual, explicitly nuclear 
family that the policy buys and protects is naturalized” (2006:37). Patel suggests that 
through risk pooling, risk becomes “a form of universal arbiter of value”, pitting one kind 
of risk against another kind of risk, one group against another group (52). Through the 
analysis of risk, insurance, and equity, Patel reveals that the good neoliberal citizen, as an 
enterprise, cares for oneself and ensures a good sustainable life against risk by investing 
in future. In neoliberal economies, selfhood is understood through the language of risk, 
credit, and equity. Therefore, Patel suggests a turn to rethink ‘self’ through concepts of 
fullness and care, life and futurity.  
 
Theorists of the future of non-heterosexual people have demonstrated a tension between 
anti-relational and collectivity, risk and sustainability, negativity and hope. The debates 
over queer futures are inspiring for inviting researchers to critically think outside of the 
‘straight present’ and think, instead, of the ‘then and there’ for queerness that are the 
temporality and spatiality of queer lives. It is also helpful for this research to not assume 
queer parenting as the only viable future or risk as the universal arbiter of value.  
 
In the Chinese context, it is worth exploring how the state embeds the notions of risk and 
future into family planning policies such as the one-child policy (1979-2015) and the two-
child policy (2015-present). The figure of the child and the state regulation on 
reproduction are indeed embedded in queer kinship practices. How is the ‘future’ 
produced in China? To what extent does the figure of the child interrelate with the ideals 
of queer futurity? By exploring the practice of conjugal love and (assisted) reproduction 
 
14 The rate card is a familiar feature of an Indian cityscape which lists fixed price for services rendered and 
is considered ‘a gentlemen’s agreement’. On 1 March 2004, a prominent Calcutta newspaper showed a list 
of prices given to Aravani in three ceremonies, “Fixed cost: For birth of a boy: Rs. 3001, for birth of a girl: 
Rs. 1,501 and for a wedding: Rs. 3501” (cited in Patel 2006: 25).  
15 Aravani (eunuchs, also known as third gender or hijras) in India show at ceremonies to sing, dance and 
offer blessings in return for a desirable amount of money.  
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and the image of the perfect queer family in Chinese queer communities, this ethnography 
brings queer kinship and queer futurity together.  
 
‘New’ kinship studies and new reproductive technologies 
Traditionally, anthropologists have tended to focus on the discourse of ‘natural facts’ such 
as lineage systems (biological) and marriage (affinal), which were seen as the root of 
kinship. Also, kinship was studied in small-scale societies, where it seemed to have 
bounded structures. Kinship was the study of reproduction rather than connection 
(Strathern 1992a). The Euro-American tradition of conflating kinship with blood relations 
is criticised by Schneider, as he points out the idea of kinship is not understood in all 
cultures to be the same and is not grounded by ‘natural facts’ everywhere (1984, cited in 
Carsten 2000:25). The biological facts don’t form the ground of social relations in every 
society. Carsten (2000) points out that kinship lost its ground most obviously to gender 
as the naturalisation of gender difference has been challenged (see also Collier & 
Yanagisako 1987, Butler 1990, Butler 1993). As the division of biological and social facts 
appeared in the discussion of kinship, it has become clear that kinship is not reducible to 
biology. Nature, which has been viewed as pre-existing biological facts ‘discovered’ by 
people, seems to be separated from culture, which has been viewed as social knowledge 
‘constructed’ by people. Yet, nature is constructed, though it is claimed to be discovered 
(Latour 1993:31). By exploring the use of new reproductive technologies in the Thatcher 
political era which were seen as both enabling nature and interference with nature, 
Strathern analytically blurs the boundaries of nature and technology and clarifies that 
nature can no longer be taken for granted in modern English society. The very ground for 
nature to be seen as a distinct domain from culture has become questionable as nature 
needs to be protected by technology. Kinship, as Strathern puts it, is the place of overlap, 
the meeting place of nature and culture. In this sense, kinship is no longer a biological 
fact in varying social forms but a “complex, hybrid process of establishing relations of 
proximity not separable from the most general phenomenon of intimacy and relatedness” 
(Brandtstädter & Santos 2008:9). Ultimately, “there is no truly authentic anthropological 
modelling of local cultures and relatedness” (Carsten 2000: 34).  
 
Since the early 20th century, the proliferation of new reproductive technologies has 
complicated the study of kinship and seemingly made English society a “less nature, more 
technology” oriented one (Strathern 1992a). Strathern raises the question of whether the 
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reproduction model leads to the reproduction of relationships as she mentions that, unlike 
maternity, the father’s role is always less visible and has to be symbolically or socially 
constructed (52), yet the very invisibility of parenthood is a social construction (55). She 
clarifies that while individuals reproduce individuals, “relations don’t reproduce relations” 
(1992a: 53). In other words, relations must be constructed. Assisted reproductive 
technologies (ART) such as IUI (intrauterine insemination) and IVF (in-vitro fertilization) 
were initially developed to overcome infertility problems for heterosexual couples 
(Inhorn & Birenbaum-Carmeli 2008). Franklin (2013) offers a rich history and 
ethnographic research on new reproductive technologies especially IVF. According to 
Franklin, IVF discloses “our biological relativity in the form of a technology employed 
to create biological relatives, thus changing how we understand the adjective ‘biological’” 
(2013:28). She points out that the pursuit of IVF as a popular conjugal technology is not 
necessarily driven by the desire to have children but is embodied in the sense of centring 
one’s life around reproduction. In other words, it can be understood as a performance of 
the gender identities aligned within the institutional norms of both heterosexuality and 
marriage. The pursuit of IVF, argues Franklin, “involves the remaking of identities, 
relationships, social grouping, and kinship ties” (2013:220). IVF has become naturalised 
because it belongs to the techniques of normalisation (6). After IVF, in the context of NRT, 
“reproduction has become a matter of technique, and mere biology has become an 
oxymoron” (33).  
 
If ART such as IVF has become normative, what is their position in queer families in 
China? How do non-heterosexual people understand the emerging assisted reproductive 
technologies (ART), and who tends to employ ART? Despite the presence of inequities 
and ethical dilemmas in using ART, LGBTQ people’s inclusion in biological reproduction 
around the world represents hope for the potential of queer reproduction, family forms, 
and kinship (Mamo & Alston-Stepnitz 2015, Cadoret 2009, Inhorn & Birenbaum-Carmeli 
2008, Mamo 2007). Since biology and nature are no longer self-evident notions and 
concepts of kinship and ‘relatedness’ are proliferating, new kinship studies have indeed 
shaped the discussion about family relations and intimacies today. Since the knowledge 
of kinship has been destabilised, we should be careful not to make presuppositions about 
what constitutes kinship or ‘authentic’ forms of kinship in society. In this thesis, I explore 
the practices of family, love, and parenthood without centring the conception of biological 
ties as the basis of kinship. I will argue that queer kinship in China is transforming and 
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elastic and should not be defined as imitative or alternative to blood ties. 
 
Love, intimacy, and individuality 
As kinship has been denaturalised and destabilised, intimacy and romantic love have 
become lynchpins in the study of personal relationships. ‘Intimate relations’ refers to 
social relationships that are “physically and/or emotionally close, personal, sexually 
intimate, private, caring, or loving” (Constable 2009:50). Yet, they are not limited to 
domestic space. Intimate relations often involve the practices of intimate labours that 
embody social orders and, at the same time, enable self-making (Parreñas 2017, Heberer 
2017). Povinelli (2006) discusses the constitution of the discursive divide between the 
autological subject and genealogical society - which she calls imaginaries, involving 
discourses, practices, and fantasies. As Povinelli describes, “to assert a bond of love was 
to assert simultaneously a rejection of social utility” (2002:230). The ‘intimate event’, as 
she uses it, is the way in “which the event of normative love is formed at the intersection 
and crisis” of the autological subject and genealogical society. She points out the problem 
of viewing the intimate event as an actual event, for it is “not a thing but a moving target 
developed in European empire and used to secure power in contemporary world” (181).  
 
Povinelli suggests that individuality and choice have become contested ideas, as 
individual freedom and social constraint are co-constituted. Weston (1991) points out that 
‘choice’ is constituted as an individualistic and bourgeois notion (110). For Povinelli, the 
choice is perceived as if it is the “only real choice available to us” made between these 
discourses of individual freedom and social constraint in our everyday life (2006:6). 
Strathern (1992a) suggests that individualism should not be merely viewed as interfering 
with collective life and tradition; rather, convention is internalised as personal style by 
the exercise of choices. The very idea of individualism is a cultural practice produced in 
Western society. In other words, it would be fruitless to abstract individuality from 
convention as if they are both self-evident. In some situations, they could mean the same 
thing (Povinelli 2006). Therefore, I take the position that love and individuality are not 
universally actual truths but developing discourses. This research investigates queer 
couple’s practice of establishing jiban (mutual burden, mutuality), which encompasses 





Social changes worldwide have shaped the contemporary landscape of queer lives and 
love. The rapid development of ART, the emerging emphasis on intimate recognition and 
the increasing visibility of non-normative families has undoubtedly redefined and 
expanded the sphere of gender, sexualness, kinship, parenthood, and family. Possibilities 
of parenting are increasingly becoming imaginable for queer relationships. Non-
heterosexual people are building families, though their choices are limited, and their 
situations vary. This subsection explores debates on ‘fictive’ kin and the relations between 
state law and queer kinship.   
 
In contrast to biological kin, ‘chosen/fictive’ kin are often used by media to describe kin 
relations that are not based on biology. Public discourses on queer kinship have tended to 
define same-sex couples as ‘pretended family relations’ and ‘so-called family’, suggesting 
their ‘fictive’ and ‘imitative’ non-original status (Weston 1991). In this sense, queer 
intimacy is figured as against ‘family’, and queer love and queer parenthood are figured 
as against ‘nature’ (Folger 2008). Building on the literature on gay families, Povinelli 
(2002) has discussed the relations between the intimacy grid (love) and the genealogical 
grid (family). The saying that “love makes a family” in contemporary mainstream 
America emphasises the value of intimate recognition, while the genealogical imaginary 
hasn’t died, nor has it been replaced by intimacy. Butler points out that homophobic 
arguments are “not only fuelled by homophobic sentiment but often focus on fears about 
reproductive relations” (2002:21). Butler makes the connection between state legislation 
and intimate relations and points out how delegitimization of sexual relations can “de-
realize viable and significant sexual alliances” among people and cause self-doubt (25).  
 
Weston clarifies that she treats gay kinship ideologies “as historical transformations rather 
than derivatives of other sorts of kinship relations” (1991:106). Drawing from in-depth 
interviews and experiences, Weston suggests that gay and lesbian families in the Bay area 
emphasise “choice and creativity” in opposition to “blood and biology”. Here, ‘choice’ is 
understood as an individualistic notion that focuses on the ‘I’, and ‘creativity’ implies a 
utopian ideal that is usually presented as “I create my own tradition”. For Weston, chosen 
families are neither substitutes for blood ties nor pretended family relations. At the same 
time, Weston does not exclude ‘blood and biology’ from queer kinship since chosen 
families are “defined through contrast with biological or blood family, making biology a 
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key feature of the opposing term that conditions the meaning of gay kinship” (211).   
 
Anthropological studies on gay and lesbian parenthood are relatively marginal. 
Mizielińska and Stasińska’s research on families of choice in Poland emphasises the 
importance of considering geo-temporal conditions to avoid false universalism and 
binarism in the non-West (2017:16). Focusing on gay men with children in the United 
States, Goodfellow (2015) highlights the very uncertainty of gay fatherhood and queer 
kinship that lives with the ambiguity of state law and everyday heteronormative family 
norms. It should be noted that most of his informants are ‘out’ and active in gay 
communities. Sorainen (2015) investigates two queer women in a small Finnish city who 
show different attitudes toward queer marriage and motherhood rooted in their cultural 
memories. Significantly, Sorainen questions the queer imaginaries of metropolitan life 
and points out that, in the process of gentrification, urban centres are becoming more 
heteronormative and ‘family-oriented’ (2015:45). She thus suggests the queer life stories 
complicate the metropolitan/small city cultural binary. Likewise, Boyce and Dasgupta 
(2017) link queer future aspirations to modernity and suggest queer intimate lives embody 
complex ideals of utopia and futurity. Hence, I am interested in exploring the relation 
between queer cosmopolitan imaginaries and Chinese modernity through queer intimate 
and family lives. 
 
The uncertainty between state legislation and queer kinship revealed in various studies 
(Borneman 1997, Goodfellow 2015) leads us to critically think about the relation between 
state and culture. In some contexts, the topic of queer parenting becomes the site for 
anxieties about cultural purity. Butler suggests that gay parenting is portrayed as 
challenging the fundamentals of a culture in the French debates on PACS (civil solidarity 
pact). Butler argues that although gay marriage is not the same as gay kinship, they are 
often conflated in the debates that are turned into the sites of displacement for other 
political fears about technology, unity of nation, and ultimately the openness of kinship 
(2002:21). Moreover, arguments against same-sex marriage and queer parenting reveal a 
discourse about what the state should do and what relationships should be recognised by 
the state. As Butler points out, state legitimation can be both the site for laying claim to 
recognisability and the site for articulating cultural fantasy that seeks to deny queer 




In short, literature on queer kinship reveals complex links between ‘biological facts’, 
culture, and legal recognition. Critiques of romantic love and individuality further situate 
queer kinship as in tension between personal choices and social constraint. Since most of 
the concepts above originated from Euro-American scholarship, it is crucial to note the 
transnational turn in queer and kinship theories. Rather than asking whether these theories 
are applicable in the Chinese context, this research aims to track these conceptions with 
geo-temporal attentiveness. To further delineate the objectives of this research, I will turn 
to review the existing literature on Chinese kinship and Chinese non-heterosexual people.  
 
Chinese kinship 
In this section, I review the literature on representations and practices of family, marriage, 
love, and broader relationships in China. Chinese kinship values are rooted in the 
traditions of patrilineal continuity and Confucian philosophy (e.g., Yang 1957, Walker 
1996). Traditional Chinese families consist of a line of male ancestors and descendants, 
while daughters and wives are not considered insiders. The ritual practice of ancestor 
worship and filial piety emphasise the continuation of patrilineal lineage rather than 
intimate relationships when it comes to marriage. The practice of concubines in late 
Imperial China suggests complexity in Chinese kinship, as concubines were neither 
recognised as the wife in the house nor the legal mother of their biological children. 
Concubines’ biological children could only call the legal wife ‘mother’ and were raised 
by the wife; concubines could not address their children by their name, but only with 
appropriate titles. Walker (1996) thus suggests concubines failed to form bonds of kinship 
in the way that legal marriage could. In other words, parenthood could not be created 
through the alleged romance or the biological fact of procreation.  
 
It should be noted that, until the 1970s, few Western social scientists were granted 
permission to enter mainland China to conduct ethnographic research. Many Western 
scholars have conducted fieldwork in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and other overseas Chinese 
communities which reveal distinct regional characteristics. Stafford suggests that the 
classical accounts of Chinese kinship place emphasis on regional and historical analysis 
which has tended to devalue the role of participant observation (2000:49). Watson (1982) 
has suggested a reconsideration of the ‘closeness’ of Chinese kinship groups. Above all, 
the fluid nature of Chinese kinship (Stafford 2000, Yan 2001, Brandtstädter & Santos 




Scholars agree that the concept and forms of family and marriage have changed 
enormously under social changes in rural and urban China (Pimentel 2000, Yan 2003, 
Cohen 2005, Li 2011, Tang & Chen 2012, Xie 2013). Clearly, love and freedom have 
become increasingly important to marriage. Nevertheless, the conceptions of love and 
free choice in contemporary China may differ from the Western version. As Pimentel 
(2000) mentions, what Chinese couples have said about ‘love’ can be viewed as 
‘unromantic’ in Westerners’ eyes and is more similar to the Western conception of 
‘companionship’ (2000:44). Jankowiak and Li (2017) also point out that the one-child 
generation marries for various reasons. The notion of ‘romantic love’ in China is 
constituted through the rejection of arranged marriage and is linked to the sense of 
modernity (Yan 2003, Pan 2015). Since the 1920s, the May Fourth progressives have 
promoted ‘romantic/free love’ as a symbol of freedom, autonomy, and equality against 
Confucian values (Lee 2006). Pan (2015) and Lee (2006) explore ‘love’ in a historical 
and literary context. Arranged marriage, once a social norm, has become a symbol of 
backwardness. The emerging discourses on ‘romantic love’, ‘true love’, and ‘free love’ in 
20th century China symbolise the tensions between tradition and modernity. Whilst these 
works provide nuanced genealogical analysis, ethnographic research in this area remains 
marginal. Recent studies have demonstrated continuing sturdy inter-generational bonds 
in urban China (Xu & Xia 2014). From this perspective, investigating the link between 
romantic love and filial piety in contemporary China is crucial for understanding the 
transformations in kinship.  
 
To summarise, both the quantitative and qualitative data I have discussed suggests that 
the weakening parental authority and the increasing pursuit of individual autonomy do 
not necessarily relate to the decrease in parental involvement and parent-child ties. Again, 
research findings situate contemporary Chinese marriage and family values in tensions 
between the traditional and the modern, Western/global and Oriental/local. Drawing from 
manifold inconsistencies, researchers thus argue that Chinese marriages and families still 
hold some distinctive characteristics that are different from the Western pattern, and the 
Chinese kinship experience has remained recognisably ‘similar to itself’ despite ongoing 
social transformations (Pimentel 2000, see also Riley 1994, Brandtstädter & Santos 2008, 




The fact that national quantitative research has tended to reduce family and kinship to 
blood ties (sometimes excluding marital relations) seems to highlight the very primacy of 
parent-child relations and the privileged position of blood ties. With the turn of new 
kinship studies in recent years, anthropologists have studied broader forms of 
relationships in China. For example, Stafford (2000) argues that the cycles of Yang 
(parent-child relationships) and Laiwang (relationships between friends, neighbours, and 
acquaintances) are equally important. Looking into children raised by grandparents in 
urban cities, Jankowiak (2008) emphasises the emotional bonds in families.  
 
The current discussion about romantic love and Chinese kinship identifies selfhood as a 
contested imaginary. The Chinese ‘self’ today can be “divided by a number of ‘dividers,’ 
such as past versus present, public versus private, moral versus immoral, and so on” 
(Kleinman et al. 2011:5). The divided selfhood of being a Chinese individual who is 
encouraged to pursue freedom, desires and self-interests yet also accept that part of their 
identity is defined by “their loyalty to the party and the state” (Kleinman et al. 2011:9) 
has situated Chinese, particularly non-heterosexual people, on the edge of conflicting 
ethical values and practices. Yan (2017) has furthered the discussion on this divided 
selfhood and suggests a tripartite approach to understanding Chinese personhood. He 
argues that, in the process of ‘doing personhood’ (zuoren), the moralist self is employed 
to control the desiring individual for the purpose of making oneself the proper relational 
person (3). Kleinman and Yan’s arguments regarding Chinese personhood take us back to 
the discussion of sexuality and sexualness, as they powerfully stress the manifold and 
dynamic process of constructing one’s sense of ‘self’. This research adopts this fruitful 
approach to explore Chinese non-heterosexual subjects’ personal desires, social relations, 
and inner struggles as all indispensable features of the self.  
 
An intriguing issue here is the connection between the moral landscape in Chinese society 
and the individual practices of non-heterosexual people. Building on Yan’s argument that 
personhood is a process of becoming, I am interested in how the complexity of 
personhood is associated with the emerging and morally controversial lifestyles and 
practices in queer life-worlds16. As an individual in contemporary China, how do Chinese 
non-heterosexual people morally evaluate their social actions such as ‘performing’ 
 
16 Though filial piety and the notion of ‘being a good son/daughter’ is often mentioned in literature as an 
ethical obligation, I intend to relate the notion of morality to broader dimensions within society. 
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xinghun (contract marriage) and establishing queer families? This question further relates 
to their quest for meaning and future aspirations embodied in every aspect of their social 
life.  
 
Scholars have identified manifold paradoxes in contemporary Chinese intimate and 
familial life. Emerging anthropological studies provide a meaningful way to understand 
the transformations and variations in the making of Chinese kinship, for transformation 
should be theorised as central to human kinship (Brandtstädter & Santos 2008:2). The 
main areas of kinship studies in China have focused on heterosexual relationships and 
natal families. Against this backdrop, this thesis explores the dynamic understandings and 
practices of love, care, selfhood, parenthood, and sociality in queer lives and hence 
transformations in Chinese kinship more generally. 
 
Chinese non-normative sexual identities and relationships 
I now turn to review the existing literature on contemporary Chinese queer identities and 
relationships. Sang (2003) traces the emergence of female homosexual literary writings 
in the public sphere from pre-modern to contemporary China. Wei Wei (2007) provides 
us with vivid ethnographic research into the formation and transformation of local 
homosexual identities in Chengdu. His argument that the tropes of ‘coming out’ and ‘the 
closet’ are problematic in the Chinese context resonates with Kam’s study on queer 
women (lala) in Shanghai. Ho (2010) studies same-sex communities during the opening 
up of China and suggests the public discourse of gay and lesbian identities in China is 
linked to the history of colonialism and modernity. As Sang suggests, modern lesbian 
identities in China are not merely a Western import or a local representation; the 
production of these identities is multi-faceted. Rofel (2007) links the production of desires 
in China to neoliberalism and transnational queer studies. She deliberately problematises 
the homogenising concept of the global gay identity, asking “what kinds of investments 
lead to the assumption that such a subjectivity - a global gay identity - exists?” (88). 
Rather, Rofel argues that the emergence of Chinese gay identities is related to the desires 
for cultural citizenship, a “novel process of subjectification and new modes of inclusion 
and exclusion” (95). Following this idea, Kong (2010) discusses the making of sexual 
citizenship among Chinese gay men in Hong Kong, London, and mainland China, which 
provides insights into Chinese masculinities and sexual citizenships. For Kong, being gay 
in mainland China “has slowly shifted from the medical and deviant discourse of 
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homosexuality” to a new type of cultural and urban citizenship emphasising “quality 
(suzhi), individuality, difference and modernity” (12).  
 
Rofel (2007) and Kong (2010) build on the notions of neoliberalism, individualism, and 
modernity in China in relation to Chinese gay and lesbian cultural citizenship. Bao (2018) 
traces the construction of tongzhi identity during and after the Mao era and uses this 
particular term as an angle to articulate Chinese queer experience. For Bao, tongzhi 
subjectivity and queer politics in contemporary China are both produced by and, at the 
same time, resist the state and capitalism. In this sense, tongzhi and queer are not merely 
indigenous or global, socialist, or neoliberal conceptions. John Wei (2020) points out that 
queer NGOs and film clubs encourage their participants to live an honest and ethical 
lifestyle which again enforces the notion of being a good sexual citizen in contemporary 
China. Rofel, Kong, Bao, and Wei trace the making and self-making of gay and lesbian 
subjectivities in China as a transcultural process rather than emphasising East-West 
differences. It is worth noting that neither the English terms nor the local terms are 
seamlessly fixed. Even the concept of being Chinese no longer involves commonly 
accepted cultural standards (Cohen 2005:59). I understand the terms ‘Chineseness’, 
‘traditional’, ‘patriarchy’, and ‘modernity’ as dynamic discourses. 
 
Ethnographic studies on contemporary Chinese same-sex relationships have focused on 
their subject positions and negotiations with normative cultural norms. Kam (2013) has 
explored lala (queer women) in the public discourse, the marriage pressures they face, 
and their coming-out experience in Shanghai. Engebretsen (2008, 2009 & 2014) has 
studied lalas’ developing subjectivities, everyday practices and strategies in Beijing with 
a nuanced analysis of their sense of national belonging and the desire to be ‘normal’. 
Normative kinship, which usually means living a ‘stable’ (wending) and ‘harmony’ (hexie) 
life within society, is tied to heterosexual marriage and expressed through the language 
of belonging and cultural citizenship. Engebretsen links the concept of ‘chosen kin’ to the 
Chinese filial system by describing the lala couple who take daughters’ role to normalise 
into their lovers’ family. Engebretsen also examinates the gay-lesbian contract marriage 
(xinghun) in relation to patriarchal orders in Chinese society. Zheng (2015) offers an 
ethnographic analysis of male same-sex relations and the intersectionality of sexuality 
and social class based on her fieldwork in Dalian. Wei (2020) develops a paradigm of 
stretched kinship among Chinese queer people, who try not to break from their family but 
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attempt to keep their relationship with their families of origin elastic and resilient in their 
home-leaving and reunion process.   
 
Overall, most ethnographic works on Chinese non-heterosexual people strive to delineate 
the dynamic image of non-normative sexualities under the rapid social transformation 
from state socialism to post-reform China. Since most works focus solely on either queer 
men or women, the effect of gender norms is well analysed. The marriage pressure is 
emphasised as a social norm; yet, marriage and heteronormativity are often left 
unelaborated and conflated with ‘traditional’ Chinese kinship as if they are fixed notions. 
Furthermore, kinship terms are, in many cases, used as ahistorical in Chinese culture, 
while the idea of marriage as well as family in China has changed dramatically. Families 
of origin are often analysed as a central heteronormative family unit. In this sense, blood 
ties are naturalised as taken-for-granted categories, whereas anthropologists argue that 
the nature of Chinese kinship is fluid and malleable (Stafford 2000, Brandtstädter & 
Santos 2008). Moreover, conceptualising the heteronormative family unit as a universal 
category can be invalid in many cultural contexts where there are other significant factors 
such as social class, location, and state intervention. The social policy explanation for 
family pressure shouldn’t be overlooked (Hildebrandt 2018). Not all anti-heteronormative 
sexual relationships are anti-family, and the notion of family is constantly being 
reconstructed (Bose & Bhattacharyya 2007: xxvi).  
 
Above all, we must find out what conjugal relations mean in the shifting Chinese context 
before discussing what marriage and family mean to non-heterosexual people in 
contemporary China. Then, we may ask: How is individual choice understood and 
practiced in China? How are families of origin understood– in relation to other kinds of 
relatedness –in China? How does the law work with intimate relationships? How does 
social practice intersect with moral landscapes in China? The incongruity between studies 
on Chinese non-heterosexual people and on Chinese kinship suggests that scholars 
studying Chinese non-heterosexual people are certainly keeping pace with the 
transnational turn to ‘new queer studies’, whilst they might overlook the turn to ‘new 
kinship studies’, as well as the debate on morality and transnational finance. It is critical 
not to make presumptions about what constitutes kinship in China. Furthermore, kinship 




A major challenge for most researchers is access to ethnographic sites. In many cases, the 
definition of ‘queer space and community’ is narrowed to public areas (bars, parks) and 
local non-profit organisations. Therefore, queer sociality and collective identity are often 
equated with queer activism. Such limitability is partly due to the researcher’s foreign 
status or the timeframe of the fieldwork. Online communities and causal social gatherings 
remain rather untouched areas in ethnographic research. But can the causal offline 
socialising - a dinner in a restaurant with several queer friends from the same online chat 
group - be denied as a form of community-building? The complex dimensions of queer 
sociality and collective community cannot be skimmed. Furthermore, social researchers 
generally use traditional mass media (TV, magazine) as the major recourse for examining 
the public discourse of homosexuality, whereas the rapid growth of new media builds up 
diverse dimensions of ‘public’ that need to be taken into account. Therefore, this 
ethnography explores the multiple dimensions of discourses of queer practices in China.  
 
It should also be noted that most of the ethnographic works mentioned above have neither 
been published in mainland China nor translated into Chinese, thus creating an academic 
gap between domestic Chinese and Euro-American academia. Other than that, gender and 
queer studies generally come from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and overseas Chinese 
communities (e.g., Chou 1997, Kong 2011, Tang 2011) with distinct regional and 
historical contexts. Locally, most research on Chinese non-normative sexualities has 
come from bio-medicine and healthcare subjects; a few come from literature, sociology, 
law, and media studies, none from anthropology17. Domestic research is mainly based on 
quantitative methods with a sole focus on male homosexuality (e.g., Jing, Sun & Zhou 
2012). In recent years, both the private sectors (BuleD, Lesdo) and non-profit 
organisations (Beijing LGBT Center) in mainland China have conducted relevant 
research based on quantitative surveys. Yet, the results need to be carefully scrutinised 
since they often depend on one’s self-representation and self-identification.  
 
Additionally, regional variation is rarely mentioned, despite the fact that living in 
Southeast Coast China can be dramatically different from living in Northwest China in 
many ways. Using a solely urban/rural divide to understand the regional context is 
inconclusive. The remarkable internal differences within China cannot be overlooked, as 
 
17 According to the search result in CNKI.net (the Chinese National Knowledge Infrastructure) in 2017. 
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Beijing, Shanghai, Dalian, and Shenzhen all have their distinctive regional history and 
culture that shape the local queer community and public attitude toward homosexuality 
(Wei 2014).  
 
Despite the emergence of research on Chinese non-heterosexual people, the ethnographic 
data remain sparse, and many areas in queer everyday life remain unreached. The diverse 
modalities of non-heterosexual families and their practice of establishing enduring 
relationships and parenting has not been ethnographically researched. By locating my 
research in the landscape of queer relationships in urban China, I explore broadened forms 
of relatedness without making presuppositions about what constitutes a family and 
without relying on specific distinctions between social ties and biological ties, tradition 
and modernity. 
 
Outline of the Chapters 
The main body of this thesis consists of five intersecting chapters. The following chapter 
on methodology explains the rationale of research design and traces the progress 
throughout my yearlong ethnographic fieldwork in Shenzhen and other urban areas in 
Guangdong, China. I chose participant observation and semi-structured interviews as my 
main research methods to depict the everyday practice of queer relationships. Research 
data was also collected from legal documents, mass media, and online discussion on 
various social media platforms to locate my observation within the wider social and 
political context. I also discuss how my biography connected with my multiple roles and 
queer reflectivity in my home-field. 
 
In Chapter 3, I discuss queer intimate relationships within the shifting landscapes of role 
terms, love, trust, modernity, and heteronormativity. I explore non-heterosexual people’s 
changing attitudes towards different modes of same-sex relationships, as the once 
seemingly-gendered relationship modes have become elastic. As the two of the most 
prominent economic hubs and migrant-attracting cities, Shenzhen and Guangzhou are 
relevant scenes to discuss ideas around career opportunities and urban utopia. Lastly in 
this chapter, I explore queer couples’ existing strategies to sustain their romantic 
cohabitating relationships, as their understanding of intimate love relates to economic 




Chapter 4 deals with the desire to reproduce in relation to the concept of blood ties in 
Chinese queer life-worlds. I explore when and why non-heterosexual people of different 
age groups and backgrounds want to have children or remain childless in urban China. 
Following this, I document the existing practices for Chinese non-heterosexual 
individuals and couples around having children and the moral and legal implications 
raised by them. Queer parents frequently have children through their previous zhihun 
/heterosexual marriages, cooperative xinghun marriages, guoji adoptions (mostly from 
relatives), or the employment of assisted reproductive technologies (ART). I also discuss 
the tendency in online and offline queer communities to evaluate non-heterosexual 
people’s pathways to parenthood through a dichotomous moral-immoral discourse.  
 
Chapter 5 turns the focus to the interplay of queer social networks and the emerging ART 
companies in urban China. I explore how ART has emerged as an ideal way for queer 
subjects to have children. As data collected from legal documents, online discussions, and 
my field observation indicate, the legal and moral debates brought by queer parents’ 
participation in assisted reproduction are perceived dramatically differently among 
diverse gender and sexual groups in Chinese society. This chapter illustrates 
ethnographically how the ART companies and queer organisations sponsored by them 
come together to shape the notions of reproduction and future in queer life-worlds.  
 
In Chapter 6, I delineate how my research participants use their understanding and 
language of blood ties and queer kinship to distinguish between ‘my own children’, ‘my 
partner’s children’, ‘our children’, and how they integrate such distinctions into their 
social worlds. I reveal the complexity of defining the boundaries between blood kin and 
queer kin. The cases of single queer parents and queer couples having children together 
amplify their understanding of blood ties and children’s symbolic position in forming a 
stable relationship and a reproductive future. Also, I explore how demonstrations of 
parental love for their children closely links to their socio-economic capabilities.  
 
Developed from previous ethnographic chapters, Chapter 7 focuses on the changing 
understanding of family in urban China in the context of social changes and how these 
interact with queer relationships. I investigate the concept of ‘jia (family/home)’ for 
Chinese non-heterosexual people through its cultural meanings and socio-legal meanings. 
This chapter unfolds the various modalities of the non-heterosexual family in China. 
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Moreover, I explore how these forms of queer relationality are made visible or hidden in 
different times and spaces and therefore complicate the assimilative-radical, visible-
invisible, public-private dualities in queer everyday life.  
 
Throughout this thesis, the two major types of moral discourse playing out in Chinese 
queer daily life cannot be discounted. The first discourse is arguably constructed by state 
policies and Confucian familism and is often referred to as the ‘traditional’ ideology. It 
suggests that one has no choice but to fulfil family duties through entering into a 
heterosexual marriage, having biological offspring, and cultivating harmonious 
relationships with family elders. The second discourse is arguably constructed by Chinese 
LGBT/tongzhi organisations and Western-originated coming-out politics and is often 
regarded as the ‘modern’ ideology. It asks that one firmly embrace an out and progressive 
lifestyle while being a responsible and good citizen. These two discourses seem to be in 
radical conflict with each other at first glance; however, the ethnographic chapters 
combinedly demonstrate how Chinese citizen-subjects in queer relationships seek to 
navigate these actually compatible moral dilemmas and ultimately unsettle the 
heteronormative Chinese kinship system.    
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Chapter 2 Methodology 
 
In this chapter, I explain the rationale behind the research design and trace my fieldwork 
progression. I conducted one-year ethnographic research mainly in Shenzhen, 
Guangdong Province, China, from June 2018 to July 2019. This research also benefited 
from a series of monthlong follow-up field visits in 2020. Doing ethnographic fieldwork 
allows me to depict the ongoing transformations in queer relationships. I will detail the 
methodological challenges I faced and the strategies I employed at each phase of my 
research. I also discuss how my biography connected with my multiple roles and queer 
reflexivity in the field. 
 
In addition to the major field site, Shenzhen, I travelled to Guangzhou and Dongguan 
multiple times to carry out interviews and participant observations with queer individuals, 
families, and organisations. I also used online platforms to connect with my research 
participants before, during, and after my Shenzhen fieldwork. I chose Shenzhen as my 
main field site not only because of its absence from Chinese queer studies but also because 
of the impressive migrant environment for non-heterosexual people that links to my 
consideration of queer utopias and personal choices. Within an hour’s train trip from 
Shenzhen, Guangzhou is the capital city of Guangdong Province, also attracting 
thousands of migrants each year. Both Shenzhen and Guangzhou belong to the Pearl 
River Delta Metropolitan Region, the largest economic hub in China.  
 
  
Fig. 1 Guangdong Province (left); Shenzhen and Guangzhou (right); from Google Maps 
 
As explained in the introduction, the main research questions are: how is queer kinship 
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recognised and practiced in Chinese society in relations to social policies, cultural 
conventions, and modernisation processes? How do Chinese non-heterosexual people 
deal with the conflicting moral expectations from themselves, queer lovers, families of 
origin, and the nation-state? How do Chinese non-heterosexual subjects imagine their 
future? Here I identify my thesis’s key themes as queer intimate love, queer xinghun 
marriage and parenting, queer family, and queer futurity.  
 
To answer the research questions, I chose participant observation and semi-structured 
interviews as my major research methods, which will be detailed in the following sub-
sections. For numerous social researchers, participant observation represents the heart of 
anthropology and the defining tool for ethnographic fieldwork (Spradley 1980, Schensul 
et al. 1999, Boellstorff 2007a, DeWalt& DeWalt 2010). This open-ended, reciprocal, and 
reflective method is the core of my research, as my goal is to explore my participants’ 
everyday practices and their knowledge-worlds in a coherent context rather than 
conducting selective learning. In other words, conducting participant observation enables 
me to foster conceptual exchange with individuals and to obtain their description of the 
things happening in their world, their explanation of how they know what they know, 
their conceptual points of references, and their key theories (Franklin 2019). 
As Malinowski points out, the ethnographer must study what concerns the research 
participant most intimately, that is, the hold which life has on them (1984 [2006]: 56). In 
this research, the interview is seen “as a part of participant observation and not apart from 
participant observation” (Skinner 2012: 35). The flexibility of the semi-structured 
interview allowed me to stay open to new themes without losing the key research 
questions. The purpose of conducting interviews was not only to collect informants’ 
views of their lived worlds but also to reflect on their engaged interaction with them 
(Hockey & Forsey 2012). Research data was also collected from legal documents, mass 
media, and online discussion on various social media platforms to help me locate my 
observations within the wider social and political context. My life experience as a Chinese 
and queer woman also complements this research. 
 
Locating Participants  
In correspondence with the focus on queer kinship practices, I came to Shenzhen to look 
for same-sex couples, gay and lesbian people in xinghun marriages and non-heterosexual 
parents as the three major groups of participants. There were participants who met more 
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than one criterion, for example, a respondent who was co-parenting with an opposite-sex 
xinghun partner (in a xinghun marriage) and dating a same-sex lover simultaneously.  
 
It should be made clear that firm self-identification with LGBT(QIA) terminology was 
not the key factor for me in locating participants; rather, I let participants freely use any 
term to express their sense of their own sexual desires and gender or not use any term at 
all. As mentioned in the introduction chapter, my research participants have used various 
terms such as gay, bisexual, les, lala, tongzhi, and sometimes zhiren (straight person) to 
describe themselves or their same-sex partners. These terms were often used 
interchangeably with vague meanings. Some participants have experienced changes in 
gender or sexual identity during their lifetime. For example, one respondent, Feng, told 
me that when he learned the definition of ‘transgender’ at an LGBT salon, he realised that 
he fit into the category of a transgender man after presenting himself as a ye (manly) T 
for 30 years. Feng explained that he never felt comfortable with his female body, and he 
desired to be seen as a man. In the meantime, he didn’t completely stop using ye T to 
describe himself and still blended in well in lesbian social circles. According to Feng, this 
change didn’t have any effect on his life, including his work and romantic relationship. 
His peers and his girlfriend, who had lived with him for twelve years, had always called 
him ‘Uncle Feng (Feng shu)’, and that wouldn’t change no matter what his gender and 
sexual identity were. His girlfriend, who used to think herself as totally straight, started 
to introduce herself to others as bisexual/ku’er (queer) after falling in love with him. Feng 
and his girlfriend’s account was just one example where the boundary sense of gender 
and sexual identification was deconstructed. In short, it is not helpful to ascribe the 
diverse forms of genders and sexualness to ‘types of person’ since sexual desire doesn’t 
always inform interiority or the ‘truth’ about someone (Khanna 2017). The dividual, 
relational, and social articulation of selfhood in Chinese and other non-Euro-American 
contexts need to be taken into account when it comes to understanding sexual experiences 
and subjectivities (ibid, see also Yan 2017). 
 
Taking such fluidity and intangibility into account, I didn’t intend to impose ‘queer’ as a 
universal identity category with clear boundaries but, rather, to use it strategically as an 
umbrella term which covers relationships and life choices that fall out of the frame of 
existing heteronormative codes in China. Instead of viewing ‘queer’ as a noun for a 
certain type of human subjects, I employ ‘non-heterosexual people’ as a loose term to 
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refer to my friend-respondents. In most cases, I address individual friend-respondents 
with the term of their choice. In this way, I don’t intend to disavow sexual categories, but 
rather to revalue the prevalence of sexuality-as-personhood in queer ethnographic studies. 
Also, my research includes a diverse group of non-heterosexual parents, including but not 
limited to same-sex couples who use assisted reproductive technologies (ART) to have 
children, gay-lesbian xinghun co-parents, and single and divorced queer parents.  
 
It is worth pointing out that I didn’t use Chinese LGBT organisations as the entry point 
for my field research since I was aware of the visible disparity between queer activists’ 
social networks and non-heterosexual people’s everyday ‘ordinary’ social circles in 
mainland China. For example, few of my friend-informants showed interest in the annual 
LGBT pride parade in Hong Kong despite Shenzhen being less than an hour from Hong 
Kong. Queer couples and parents I have met often claimed that they were ‘ordinary people 
(putong ren)’, and therefore their life experience would be boring for a researcher to study. 
When I talked to queer individuals who actively participated in queer public events and 
those who did not, I often noticed antagonistic sentiments as if the two groups viewed 
themselves as coming from very different worlds. One often felt that a discussion of 
LGBT rights (and civil rights in general) was unwelcome in an online same-sex chat 
group because such topics were considered too ‘serious’ and ‘radical’. On the other hand, 
many queer activists and volunteers despised the practice of xinghun marriage and blamed 
non-heterosexual people who entered heterosexual marriages as damaging the overall 
moral image of Chinese sexual minorities. Although this research benefited from my 
attendance at LGBT events and my connection with employees and volunteers in LGBT 
organisations, the everyday kinship practice which formed the major part of my 
observation was rarely considered activism-related; neither were my friend-informants’ 
practices always encouraged in queer activist communities. In other words, if I limited 
my participants to people who engaged with queer movements, I wouldn’t be able to 





At the beginning of the fieldwork, I posted a recruitment article on my WeChat18 public 
account. In the article, I explained the aim and methods of my research. I also introduced 
myself as a queer woman who aimed to make positive changes for Chinese gender and 
sexual minorities. I made it clear that I would appreciate any form of contact. My friends 
and peers, including those who identify as straight, forwarded this article to their friends 
and chat groups. Eventually, this article was read by hundreds of people. More than 60 
people reached me in the next few months and showed their interest in helping with my 
research. I talked to each of them online and learned they were mostly aged 18 to 28; 
many of them were studying in top universities, and some of them were in international 
high schools. They were all willing to tell me about their personal life histories and to 
meet in person. At the same time, I have been meeting regularly with my queer friends in 
Shenzhen and discussing my research with them. Although many of them joked that they 
were single and childless and not qualified to participate in my research, they introduced 
me to their friends. Thanks to my friends’ referrals, I have had little problem with gaining 
trust and building rapport with respondents whom I came to know in this way.  
 
On the other hand, no queer parents proactively reached out to me. Although I had been 
actively socialising with queer women both online and offline in Shenzhen for years, I 
know few who had children when I started this research. One reason for this is that most 
of my queer friends are in their 20s and had not started to think about having children; to 
find queer parents, I had to reach out to non-heterosexual people older than me. Moreover, 
most queer parents in China were widely believed to live in relatively invisible status and 
were cautious about revealing their private life to unrelated others. Almost all online 
queer parents chat groups are exclusively for non-heterosexual people who are in the 
process of having children or those with children, and the group chat administrators would 
verify each member’s parental status before letting them in. I used a variety of strategies 
to expand my connections to different queer communities. For instance, I attended ten 
LGBT social events to learn about queer parents and IVF/surrogacy companies. I paid 
more attention to the attendees and volunteers rather than event organisers. Besides, 
Chinese mainstream social media platforms and same-sex dating Apps including Sina 
 
18 WeChat, also known as Weixin, is a Chinese multi-purpose messaging, social media and mobile payment 
application owned by Tencent. WeChat Public Account is a marketing platform that can act as a complete 
brand hub, a news portal, or a blog page. I created a WeChat Public account before this research and had 
been using it as a blog page. 
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Weibo, Douban, Lesdo, Rela, and BlueD19 were used to find queer parents and relevant 
social circles. The pattern was repeated during the fieldwork: firstly, I joined a WeChat 
group and attended their group dinner or night out; then, I introduced my research project 
and asked for their consent to participate in my research individually. During the first 
three months, I reached several micro-celebrity gay fathers and lesbian mothers who had 
been actively sharing their personal lives with followers on social media. Through their 
queer networks, I got to know more queer parents who were not ‘out in public’. Many 
respondents over the age of 30 treated me like a junior whom they could give life advice 
to. Most people became warmer with me after knowing that anthropology is not 
journalism, and I was not writing headline stories using their actual names. Through 
repetitions of this pattern, I have found myself entering diverse queer social circles and 
meeting new friends-respondents from diverse backgrounds and age groups that I would 
never have met if I did not do this research. By the end of fieldwork, the number of non-
heterosexual people in my WeChat contact list expanded to 250, aged from 18 to 50 years 
old.  
 
The major group of my research participants is non-heterosexual individuals who have 
migrated to Shenzhen and Guangzhou, the two major cities in Guangdong Province, from 
other parts of mainland China. The fact that they left their hometown is a crucial social 
variable. Their experience migrating to a big city indeed interacted with their intimate 
and familial experiences. Many middle-aged participants in this research had achieved a 
higher social position and settled in Shenzhen or Guangzhou. Drawing from the study on 
queer parents from middle-class and working-class backgrounds, Taylor (2010) reminds 
us of the persistent methodological challenge regarding the interconnection between 
sexuality and class when researching queer subjects. As mentioned above, neither the 
most transgressive queer activist networks nor the everyday ‘ordinary’ in China should 
be described as representative Chinese LGBT experience. The social geography of 
research participants, as Engebretsen mentioned in her study of queer women in Beijing, 
shows us that to understand ethnographically queer culture “requires a willingness to de-
naturalize the primacy of sexuality as a basis of individual identity - both desired and 
practiced versions” (2008:89). Queer lives are not only sexualised and gendered but also 
classed; thus, we must not take queer subjects’ social privileges or disadvantages for 
 




granted. In my master’s fieldwork in Chengdu, China, I noticed that gender and age were 
critical social variables in the study of queer lives as they were tied with one’s social 
status. Likewise, my friend-respondents’ educational levels and social classes will also 
be acknowledged in this thesis. It is important to avoid seeing research participants as 
belonging to a static social category. 
 
Overall, my queer network, which I have had for years, and the various social media 
platforms, have been my major resources for finding research participants. In most 
circumstances, my role as a queer researcher was firstly acknowledged by potential 
participants, which smoothed the progress of introducing my research and asking for 
consent. The multi-layered interplay of social status, gender norms and sexualness are 
taken into consideration, as my friend-respondents’ experience of queer relationships 
intersects with their experience of being in diverse dynamic social groups.  
 
Semi-Structured In-Depth Interviews 
I conducted around thirty semi-structured in-depth interviews with friend-respondents. I 
interviewed most of them on a one-to-one basis, and a few queer couples chose to do the 
interview together. Interviews took place in cafes, restaurants, participants' offices, and 
private apartments at their convenience. Many respondents initially chose to be 
interviewed in a café in their neighbourhood. I used set questions to ask for potentially 
sensitive information such as career path, future financial plans, and family background 
as it was less suspicious when I brought these topics out for research/impersonal purposes. 
All interviews lasted for more than three hours as all respondents came prepared to tell 
their life stories. I usually let the conversation unfold as open-ended as possible. The 
flexible approach prioritised interviewees’ interests and allowed me to notice emerging 
issues raised by them. People treated my research in different ways, and their motivations 
for participating varied. Some respondents working in the IVF/surrogacy industry invited 
me to their offices and, at least in my perception, our interviews were shaped by their 
desire to improve their moral image. Three respondents encouraged me to use a voice 
recorder, and one of them hired two cameramen and recorded the whole interview to put 
on his online portfolio. Other interviewees who hadn’t revealed their queer relationships 
to parents and colleagues made me promise that their real names would not appear on any 




I didn’t use an audio recorder for most interviews and only had a notebook to write down 
shorthand notes. Since the interviews were conducted in Mandarin, I wrote down 
respondents’ exact words in Chinese and translated them into English afterwards. For 
each interview, I wrote a diary as soon as I went back home to reflect on the discussion. 
I sought to not only gather detailed lived experiences but also to explore the interactions, 
especially when interview topics became potentially challenging. For instance, how did 
they choose to present their intimate and familial life to a researcher, and what kind of 
topics remained unspoken? It became crucial to recognise the topics they liked to talk 
about and the topics they avoided in different circumstances and with different people. 
The interview has become a “rehearsal of processes of covering and uncovering” and the 
work for the researcher has only just begun at the end of interview (Strathern 2012:266). 
 
Moreover, recording respondents’ narratives of their life histories was not only an 
essential part of this research but also represented a breakthrough in fostering closeness 
between myself and the respondents. These in-depth interviews often worked 
unexpectedly as an entry point for a growing friendship. During each interview, I 
exchanged a great amount of my life history with respondents, which allowed us to 
develop a rapport in a profoundly short period. There were moments when we found we 
shared similar struggles and exchanged useful information on various topics. Some 
respondents joked, “now you know more about me than my family/friends!” and I often 
replied, “you too,” with laughter. I was not a mere listener. Since many of them are older 
than me, they often treated me to a drink or a meal after the interview. This gave me an 
excuse to ask them out the next time to return the hospitality. More than half of them 
remained in touch with me, and we had follow-up casual meetings that allowed me to 
learn more details about their lives. By this means, they gradually became my long-term 
friend-respondents rather than interviewees. Two respondents agreed to do only a one-off 
interview, while we had each other’s social media accounts and occasionally had small 
talks online. In other words, I did not stop gathering data from a respondent right after an 
interview was completed; rather, the interview was a part of an ongoing participant 
observation for me, which continued to yield ethnographic knowledge. For instance, I 
have heard one of my friend-respondents Tian talking about his son on multiple occasions, 
including our first interview, an LGBT event, and casual get-togethers with his gay 
friends. On each occasion, Tian presented his familial life differently. The data I gathered 
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in semi-structured interviews are therefore not set apart from data collected from other 
approaches.  
 
Participant Observation  
In the last week of my fieldwork, my girlfriend Jin, myself, and two other lala women 
were invited to Joey’s flat for dinner and a get-together. The five of us brought some 
snacks and drinks. Just turned 30, Joey was in a xinghun marriage with a gay man, and 
she had just started a committed relationship with a T-identified lesbian. Joey and the 
other two friends learned and agreed to participate in my research since our first group 
meetup. Just like my many other friends, Joey asked: “When will you be back in China? 
We will miss you terribly.” After I said that I was going back to China in a few months 
for the winter vacation, Joey seemed relieved and reminded me to message her when I 
got back to China. During dinner, we gossiped about her new girlfriend and our mutual 
friends. Our conversation was like any conversation normally occurring among friends, 
and I found no real boundary between social life and research.  
 
Friendship and fieldwork are similar in many ways as we gain entry, negotiate our roles 
and behaviours, participate, observe our involvement, and build reciprocal bonds in the 
world with others (Tillmann-Healy 2003:732). I had been making queer friends long 
before I decided to do doctoral research, while my knowledge and experience with my 
regular friend-making routine became multifaceted since I started this research. To adopt 
friendship as method means that we research with ethics of friendship (ibid). As a friend, 
I shared trust, mutuality, respect, empathy, and support with my friend-respondents. As a 
fieldworker, I aimed to observe our everyday interaction with an analytical lens and 
reflective knowledge.  
 
During fieldwork, I participated in a wide range of formal and casual activities, including 
LGBT talkfests, group dinners, get-togethers, and karaoke nights. The key LGBT 
organisation I focused on was PFLAG China. PFLAG China was founded in 2008 in 
Guangzhou, China and was named after the American organisation called PFLAG. The 
name PFLAG stands for Parents, Families & Friends of Lesbians and Gays. Their 
talkfests and salons were often followed by big group dinners in nearby restaurants. In 
addition, I paid regular visits to assisted reproductive technologies (ART) companies and 
had casual chats with employees during their free time. Eventually, not only queer 
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employees but also the heterosexual-identified employees became acquainted with me. I 
joined numerous online LGBT chat groups and attended their offline meetups. As a result, 
I was seeing new faces at an intensive pace. 
 
The focus of my research is everyday practice; therefore, it is important to build lasting 
relationships with my informants and actively be a participant in their daily activities. 
Specifically, the goal was to observe the ways they address their relatives, reflect on past 
events, employ kin terms, express affection and care for others, how they choose to have 
children (or not), make living arrangements with their families of origin and chosen ties, 
socialise with queer friends, celebrate holidays and festivals, invest in their future life, 
and negotiate their practices with moral values and state law. To address my research 
goals and questions, I made weekly plans to spend time with friend-respondents closely 
by asking if they were interested in any leisure activities in their free time. Sometimes, it 
was the other way around when they asked me to join them or help them with their minor 
tasks. I made myself very flexible during my time in Shenzhen, so many friend-
respondents were aware that I could show up and join them anytime. Having such time 
flexibility was indeed impressive to others in a booming city, where people are often too 
busy to make time for others. I accompanied them to their offices and shops, went 
shopping with them and played with their kids. Moreover, regular online chats with key 
friend-informants were made via WeChat as we gossiped and exchanged complaints 
about ex-lovers, relatives, and house prices.  
 
Before starting my fieldwork, I never thought that being in a relationship was going to be 
my entry ticket in numerous circumstances. The fact that I was not single implies a safe 
signal that I wouldn’t go beyond the friend zone, becoming a potential threat to couples. 
I wouldn’t be able to ask many of my female informants out individually without 
mentioning my girlfriend. One of my respondent’s girlfriends was suspicious about my 
motivations until she saw Jin in person. It also occurred to me that since I “look like a 
zhinv (straight woman)” to some respondents, Jin’s presence somehow assured my 
queerness to them. Furthermore, in most LGBT group meetups, people generally showed 
much more interest in my story with Jin than my research topic. I had to answer questions 
about our relationship with parents and our future repeatedly and became prepared to hear 
any comments or advice. It also became obvious that most queer couples would prefer to 
go out with other couples. I was told more than one time that once a gay/lesbian found a 
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lover, they would both disappear in the same-sex social worlds until they broke up. Quite 
a few queer couples affirmed with me that they only hang out with other queer couples 
because only these couples share mutual topics with them. Thus, Jin always accompanied 
me when I went to meet a couple. At some point, she became as familiar with them as 
me, and we went on a few trips with queer couples.  
 
After making a considerable number of new queer friends in Shenzhen and the 
surrounding areas, I inevitably acquired more roles than I expected. For single non-
heterosexual people, I became a reliable match-maker. Some non-heterosexual people 
asked me to present my findings of queer relationships to persuade their partners to come 
out to their parents. “So, what do they (other non-heterosexual people) do?” was 
frequently asked in casual conversations. Some participants working in the ART industry 
wanted to use my queer network to search for potential clients, as they asked me to 
recommend their IVF/surrogacy service to non-heterosexual people who planned to have 
children. Having so many queer friends also led to issues around trust, as a few potential 
respondents didn’t see me as a stranger-researcher who would keep their secrets but a 
friend who may leak their secrets to mutual social contacts. My solution was to extend 
my social network as broadly as possible and avoid staying in only one social circle. In 
the later phase of fieldwork, I was in more frequent contact with five same-sex couples 
and four single queer parents. 
 
My fieldwork also involves studying ‘up’ as many of my friend-informants are older than 
me and have a considerable income which positioned them in a relatively high social 
position. Our age gap directly affected how we talked to each other since showing respect 
to the senior was considered a moral standard in Chinese society. For non-heterosexual 
people in xinghun marriages and those with children, Jin and I were a younger queer 
couple who would sooner or later be in a similar situation. Being older and more 
experienced in the workplace, they felt obliged to guide Jin and me. Older friend-
informants frequently advised us on how to maintain a long-lasting relationship and how 
to raise children together. On the one hand, I could tell that they felt relatively relaxed 
and talkative with a junior; on the other hand, I found that the linkage between seniority 
and authority could lead to hierarchical relations. Sometimes, their advice could make me 
uncomfortable, and I had to make peace with different opinions. For example, a friend-
respondent tried to persuade me to find a gay man for xinghun (contract marriage) and 
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suggested that I select a xinghun partner after I said I wouldn’t marry a gay man. In 
another case, a queer couple encouraged us to conceive as soon as possible because our 
uteruses “couldn’t wait”. I then realised that they assumed we shared common values 
with them and we must follow their life patterns. In such circumstances, I chose to 
challenge their assumptions and even their authority instead of being an acquiescent 
junior note-taker. In this way, we could enter into a dialogue and step into each other’s 
community space (Gusterson 1997). Therefore, through my effort to negotiate my role as 
both a non-judgmental researcher and a young Chinese queer woman in their social 
worlds, my relationships with them were also shifting. I found a few older non-
heterosexual people started to take my professional status seriously and pay attention to 
my research progress after intense debates.   
 
Key themes and short notes were recorded on my cell phone or notebook when I was with 
friend-informants. I wrote diaries along with field notes to allow myself to reflect on my 
subjective experience and embodied knowledge. Fieldwork calls for one’s attention to the 
ethnographic encounter and the intersubjective relationship between ethnographers and 
informants. Reflexivity “implied a conscious reflection on the interpretative nature of 
fieldwork, the construction of ethnographic authority, the interdependence of 
ethnographer and informant, and the involvement of the ethnographer’s self in fieldwork” 
(Robben 2006: 443). Inspired by the Women’s Liberation Movement in the 1970s, Okely 
also contends that “in an academic context the personal is theoretical” (1992:9). 
Fieldwork is undoubtedly an emotional and (inter)personal experience for the researcher 
and the researched. The lived interactions, participatory experience, and embodied 
knowledge that take place in fieldwork are both personal and theoretical. As Blackwood 
(1995) points out, anthropologists cannot remain alien or undefined in the field. My field 
experience indicates that the relations between me and my friend-respondents were not 
constantly equal and stable but rather shifting; so was my positionality. It is illusionary 
to think of the fieldworker’s position as neutral, stable, detached, and out of cultural 
categories (Okely & Callaway 1992, see also Cohen 1992, Gearing 1995, Altork 1995). 
My ethnicity, gender, age, class, and even relationship status affected the very way I 
viewed my research participants and the way they view me. I understand that if I 
conducted fieldwork as a senior foreign researcher or as a person who identified as 
straight, I would still have done the research, but it would have been different. After my 
fieldwork came to an end, I remain in touch with most of my friend-informants and 
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continue to learn about the major events in their lives via social media. To me, the 
observation is never-ending, only shifting across different contexts.   
 
As A ‘Native’ And as Queer  
As a Chinese queer woman, this research is rooted in my life experience. I am a native 
ethnographer, an insider, and an outsider from many perspectives. Such positions are 
simultaneously beneficial and problematic. Anthropology began as the study of ‘others’. 
An ethnographer, at one time, “was an outsider for whom virtually everything could be 
regarded as ‘different’” (Wolcott 2008: 144). The purpose of ethnography, to “grasp the 
native’s point of view, his relation to life, to realize his version of his world” (Malinowski 
1922:25), is often challenging to non-native anthropologies as they run the risk of never 
developing an intimate and inside understanding of the society. Yet, the easy assumption 
that native anthropologists’ insider status is unproblematic has been overturned (Davies 
2008, Fitzgerald 1999). The native/non-native identity is often compared to an 
insider/outsider dichotomy; nevertheless, an anthropologist's double role is proved 
neither stable nor incompatible in ethnographic works. Narayan calls for work that melts 
down the divides and “acknowledge the hybrid and positioned nature of our identities” 
(1993:682). Also, the emic and etic viewpoints are not necessarily conditioned by one’s 
native identity and insider role; rather, they are dynamically shifting in the fieldwork’s 
subject experience and consequently in the forms of knowledge that ethnographers 
produce. The underlying concept raised by Narayan is that the identity of an 
anthropologist - like any other - is “shifting, multiplex, and situated in specific 
sociological and historical context” (Lewin & Leap 1996:7, see also Altorki & El-Solh 
1988).  
 
My experience of ‘being Chinese’ and ‘being queer’ undoubtedly shapes my role, my 
motivation, and my subjectivity in my research. Growing up in China, I had taken my 
Chineseness for granted. I rarely questioned the norms, as they were ‘natural’ to me. Such 
certainty was destabilised after I went to the United States to obtain my bachelor’s degree. 
Having experienced being a foreigner for years in Euro-American societies, the sense of 
otherness came to my understanding. Due to an increasing interest in the concept of 
‘culture’ and the complexities it opens, I went to study social and cultural anthropology 
for a Master’s degree in the UK and continued to pursue doctoral studies. Those years of 
studying and working abroad have genuinely changed my understanding of ‘nativeness’ 
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and ‘foreignness’ as I moved back and forth between China and other countries. I am 
aware that familiarity with society is neither a privilege nor an obstacle to a native 
researcher. To cite Eriksen, “what is ‘home’ and what is ‘abroad’ is no longer always 
clear” (2010:29).  
 
Despite being in lesbian communities for years, I had struggled with ‘picking’ my 
identities. I cannot count how many times people have tried to put me in a category such 
as a P, bisexual, or lesbian, so they might figure out how to talk with me in an appropriate 
manner. Yet, I recognise that these categories, such as T/P roles, are not seamlessly stable 
and often cause confusion. I will unpack this matter when I explore queer intimate 
relationships in Chapter 3. Over the last years, meeting gender and sexual minorities in 
different cultural spaces and reading queer theory have constantly shaped my subject 
position within queer communities. Noticing how people around me understood and used 
these seeming categorical terms differently also became my motivation to complete this 
research. That is why I use ‘queer’ to unsettle the over-categorisation or false binaries. 
Instead of answering theoretically what these role categories in queer communities are, I 
am more interested in exploring ethnographically what work these categories do in their 
daily practices.  
 
My personal experience indeed intersects with my development as a researcher and my 
objectives for fieldwork. I hope my research will contribute to academic as well as to 
queer politics, and this continues to be my aspiration. On the other hand, the risk of over-
rapport needs to be carefully avoided, and the interconnections between gender, 
sexualness and class in the field should be made visible. Ever since I started fieldwork, I 
have realised that sharing a similar cultural identity doesn’t necessarily mean sharing 
similar experiences and values. Thus, I constantly felt partially an insider and partially an 
outsider. The purpose of including my autobiography is not to strengthen my authorship 
but to inform how my friend-respondents and I relate to each other as both individuals 
and cultural categories in the field. Drawing from gay and lesbian anthropologists’ 
experiences, Lewin and Leap suggest that “in many contexts it is being an anthropologist 
that defines experience and identity even more than particular characteristics such as race, 
gender, or for that matter, sexual orientation” (1996:15). Therefore, my multiple cultural 
identities and the intersubjective relationship between me and my friend-informants were 
taken into reflection at every research stage. I don’t intend to conceal my subjectivity and 
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involvement in fieldwork. To cite Callaway, “her own life was her fieldwork” (1992:42). 
By allowing the ethnographer’s self to investigate my life, I take a position as neither an 
authentic representative of my culture nor a detached observer.  
 
Analysing Fieldwork Data  
Data analysis has been a process since the very beginning of this research. As mentioned 
above, my fieldwork data consist of field notes and diaries, interview transcripts, 
government publications, media reports, personal blogs, online posts, and photos. It 
should be noted that some news reports on governmental affairs and surrogacy have been 
removed from their original websites while being republished/archived by other news 
websites, thus making it difficult to identify the original source and date. The fieldwork 
data is partial and unruly and shouldn’t be interpreted as social truths (Davies 2008, 
Strathern 2004, Tyler 1986). It is often noted that having alleged full participation and 
close relationship with informants doesn’t automatically promise a good ethnography 
(Davies 2008). The questions to address then are how I make sense of the incompleteness 
of data I collected and make visible my theoretical pathway through the data.  
 
Being treated as an ordinary queer woman and being included in my friend-informants’ 
social worlds was part of my fieldwork. At the same time, the academic training I received 
allows me to critically investigate and reflect on my experience with my friend-
informants using a queer anthropologist’s perspective. This means to be sensible about 
the tensions created by multiple taken-for-granted binaries that are not limited to everyday 
practice/theory, researcher/informant, insider/outsider, Western/Oriental. The 
inconsistent use of ‘gay/lesbian’ and ‘queer’ is always a contested topic in the house of 
anthropology. By explaining my biography, my motivation and standpoint in the previous 
section, I have made clear that I don’t intend to use ‘queer’ to label my friend-informants 
as a static social group; rather, this research aims to stress the fluidity and mobility of 
‘queer’ as both a process of doing and a method (Boellstorff 2010), an analytic (Weiss 
2016).   
 
All interview and fieldwork notes were organised and analysed with the assistance of 
Nvivo software. As mentioned earlier, I wrote down the notes and friend-respondents’ 
exact words in Chinese and translated them into English afterwards. Every time I met a 
new friend-informant, I created a folder in Nvivo and continued to add relevant notes to 
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it. I produced a fieldwork report every month. The ethnographic data were linked with 
Nvivo nodes (themes), including queer parenthood, marriage, urban life, and love. During 
fieldwork, I reviewed the data and nodes every month to identify recurring themes and 
keywords.  
 
Fieldwork is a liminal experience, and it is of crucial importance to make sense of 
liminality (Johnson 1984). This involves acknowledging the major barriers to reflective 
subjectivity such as age, gender, and professional status (Fitzgerald 1999). Although I 
have conducted as many interviews with queer men as with queer women, most of my 
key friend-informants were women. I spent a lot more leisure time with queer women 
than men as it was easier for me to build rapport with women and join their daily social 
activities. Besides, I am aware that the fact I don’t have children has restricted my access 
to the social groups of queer parents. Such othering was especially obvious when 
respondents simply put, “you will understand me when you have children”. Most of the 
queer parents willing to participate in this research were entrepreneurs known for being 
‘successful’ and ‘moral’ queer parents, and queer parents from the working class 
remained under-researched in this thesis. These limitations are critically examined along 
with the data. After all, valid ethnographic accounts can be produced “without complete 
participation and total acquisition of local knowledge by ethnographers so long as they 
honestly examine, and make visible in their analysis, the basis of their knowledge claims 
in reflexive experience” (Davies 2008:104). 
 
The data I collected is not interpreted as if it is from a self-contained field site. For me, 
the idea of a physically and temporal bounded field was especially problematic. Did I 
leave my field site when I finished dinner with my friend-informants? Did my fieldwork 
simply exclude the moments when I went out with my straight friends in Shenzhen? This 
confusion arose as once one of my straight female friends mentioned her interest in the 
American TV show Queer Eye and played a short video clip while we were in a foot SPA 
room; the masseurs stared at our screen for a while and abruptly asked, “are these sissy 
guys tongxinglian (homosexual)? Are tongxinglian all like that?” Realising the masseurs 
were making fun of the queer hosts in the show, my friend and I stopped watching it, and 
both felt uncomfortable. After we walked out of the SPA centre, my friend said, “you 
were too nice trying to explain to them; you knew what they were gonna say”. We knew 
that tongxinglian was still stigmatised as a mental disorder in school textbooks and linked 
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with HIV on media platforms. I couldn’t help relating this to my friend-respondents’ 
endorsement of public tolerance toward homosexuality, as these two dramatically 
opposing situations happened in the same city. When my friend-respondents contended 
that urban China is tolerant toward homosexuality, what space and people did they really 
refer to? Our everyday interactions with all other individuals (besides queer participants) 
imply multiple lived realities that cannot be neglected as irrelevant to research. In 
studying how changing social and legal realities shape the personal lives of families of 
choice in Poland, Mizielińska and Stasińska (2017) stress the importance of geo-temporal 
attentiveness to avoiding false universalism. Taking an intersectional approach, I examine 
Chinese social policies, media reports and online posts to situate queer personal life 
within the wider social-economic and political context (Mills 2018, see also Hildebrandt 
2018).  
 
Furthermore, queer theory emerges as a critique that resists not only the normativity of 
heterosexuality but also a wider field including ethnographic methodology. To what 
extent can we say a methodology is queered? On the one hand, we are encouraged to 
study queer theory as radical, transgressive, resistant, and anti-normative. On the other 
hand, what counts as normative and what counts as transgressive in the production of 
queer scholarship might already be normalised (Lewin 2016, Weiss 2016, Wilson 2006, 
Weston 1991). So are the questions with who are the queer people worth studying and 
what is the queer practice worth documenting and theorising. In discussing the writing of 
ethnography, Hastrup (1992) reveals the inherently hierarchical relationship between 
ethnographer and informant. No matter how equal and intimate we are in the field, it is 
me, the anthropologist, who reframes informants’ stories into text with my choice of 
fieldwork materials. As a researcher who decided to study non-heterosexual intimate and 
familial life in urban China, I quickly found my friend-informants to be different from 
the queer activists depicted in most queer scholarship, perhaps in an unexciting way. 
When queer activists quickly responded and took action in most oppressive events, my 
friend-informants seemed silent and accommodating. Even when the ‘les’ and relevant 
topics were being removed from major Chinese social media platforms in April 2019, 
many of my friend-informants didn’t demonstrate any anger or concern. They showed 
little interest in LGBT pride events and online protests. Yet this doesn’t mean that only 
the practices that visibly resist mainstream norms should be defined as ‘queer’. While 
they seem so different from each other, it is problematic to deem one more ‘queer’ and 
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the other more ‘assimilative’/ ‘ordinary’ and erase the possibilities of exploring the 
complexity of their lived realities. Following Lewin’s reminder to “base our conclusions 
on what our informants say and do, rather than using what our informants say and do to 
sustain already formulated ideas” (2016:604), this ethnography is also my effort to realise 
and resist such hierarchies in ethnography that seeks to universalise queerness. 
 
Ethics  
My research is guided by the 2012 Ethics Statement of the American Anthropological 
Association. I have explained the purpose of my research in detail to every respondent 
and obtained their consent before moving to the next stage. I brought a consent form to 
every interview. Although many said that they trusted me and didn’t need the form, I sent 
a digital copy to everyone via email or WeChat. The administrator of each online chat 
group I have joined was informed of my research and made the decision of either letting 
me in or removing me from the group. Furthermore, I frequently update the status of my 
studies on my social media page.  
  
Research participants’ personal information is securely protected and made anonymous 
in all documents. Three informants are queer-identified micro-celebrities themselves and 
acknowledge the use of their actual web names. Although my research involves queer 
parenting, I didn’t interview people under 18 years old. All of my respondents are adults. 
Furthermore, I always consider the possible effects of revealing my research findings. It 
is rooted in my tacit knowledge not to suppress the research participants’ voice or view 
them as generalisable. The goal is not to generalise about Chinese gender and sexual 
minorities or to evaluate their practices as ideal or wrong. As Tyler argues, the point of 





Chapter 3 Practicing Intimate Relationships     
 
This chapter explores the practices of same-sex intimacy in relations to the shifting 
understandings of role terms, romantic love, risk, and moral norms. It articulates non-
heterosexual people’s changing attitude toward different modes of same-sex relationships, 
as the once seeming gendered relationship modes received mixed comments in today’s 
queer communities. It moves to discuss non-heterosexual people’s expectations and 
concerns when they seek same-sex lovers in a big city. It shouldn’t be discounted that 
queer couples in this ethnography were heterogeneous in terms of their age, educational 
background, and social status, and therefore their attitudes and practices need to be 
apprehended within their social context. As one of the most prominent economic hubs 
and migrant-attracting cities, Shenzhen and Guangzhou were the desirable sites to explore 
non-heterosexual people’s migrating experience, Chinese social change and career 
opportunities, and urban utopia. This chapter also documents queer couples’ existing 
strategies for seeking and sustaining their loving relationships. It demonstrates how queer 
couples’ practices of conjugal love relates to existing discourses on class, economic 
capital, and law.  
 
Shifting Modes of Same-Sex Relationships 
It was impossible to neglect the frequent use of role terms ‘1/0/0.5/T/P/H’ in Chinese 
queer social spaces, which I will elucidate the meanings with reflective accounts. When 
I showed up with Jin as a couple in lesbian get-togethers, T/P roles were frequently 
brought out as an ice-breaker topic. During our first dinner with a same-sex couple, 
Zhenzhen and Fei, they started the conversation with T/P roles: 
Zhenzhen: “So, who is the T and who is the P (of you two)?”  
Me: “You are welcome to make a guess.” 
Fei: “It was hard to guess! When Zhan and I first saw you and Jin, we thought you 
were T and Jin were P because you had short hair and Jin had long hair. But Jin seems 
more mature and caring. Neither of you looks like a typical T.” 
Me: “You are right. It would be better to say we are H (bufen/versatile). Let me guess, 
Zhenzhen is T?” 
Zhenzhen: “It is obvious (laugh). You can tell from my sporty clothing style and Fei’s 




The term ‘T’ stands for ‘Tomboy’, and ‘P’ is short for ‘Po (female)’ or ‘pretty girl’. In 
this sense, ‘T’ and ‘P’ appear to be two role terms complementary to each other. Zhenzhen 
and Fei and many other queer women tried to look for personality traits that might reveal 
one’s T/P roles during the first meet. Likewise, 1/0 jargons were widely used in gay 
communities. The term ‘1’ graphically indicates an inserter, and the term ‘0’ graphically 
indicates a circle inserted in bed. ‘1’ is equivalent to ‘gong’ (top, literally meaning 
‘attack’), and ‘0’ is equivalent to ‘shou’ (bottom, literally meaning ‘receive’).  The1-0 
model thus reflects a strong sense of binary opposition of sexual roles both graphically 
and linguistically. 
 
The T-P relationship model and the 1-0 relationship model in same-sex communities 
arose in mainland China years later than the butch-femme in the States and tomboy-
femme structures in Southeast Asia. They first emerged as popular subcultures in Taiwan 
and then rapidly prevailed in the queer communities in mainland China through the 
Internet. They became jargons, sex roles, subcultures, and performative styles in Taiwan 
(Chao 1999) and mainland China (Engebretsen 2008, Kam 2013, Zheng 2015). Kong 
(2010) and Zheng (2015) observe that the 1-0 roles reflect stereotypically gendered 
personalities in gay communities (1 being active and independent, 0 being passive and 
dependent). Broadly speaking, 0s engaged in stereotypically feminine behaviours, 
including wearing make-up, discussing skincare, and calling friends who are also 0 
‘sister’. In queer social space, a man who said he is 0 to others usually implied that he 
was looking for a 1 as his lover. Likewise, a woman in a relationship with a T usually 
refers to herself as P. In other words, role and desire were often mutually exclusive, as a 
1 was expected to date a 0 and a T was expected to date a P when they introduced 
themselves using the terms. T-T couples and 0-0 couples were uncommon. I agree with 
Engebretsen (2008) that same-sex attraction among women was likely sensitised as 
opposite-attraction, and this observation could also be applied to queer men in urban 
China. Likewise, Engebretsen points out that ‘T’ and ‘P’ are used as adjectives in 
conversations to describe stereotypically gendered behaviours. Casual conversations in 
queer social life were preoccupied with the use of T/P and 1/0 jargon. It is crucial to note 
that these terms’ definition varied depending on who used the term. These terms might 
be used to indicate one’s dressing style, sexual preference, temperament, and economic 
dependency in a same-sex relationship. Furthermore, this jargon had different meanings 
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for non-heterosexual people from different educational backgrounds and age groups 
which I will discuss in the following sections. 
 
It is worth noting that the 1/0 roles and the T/P roles in same-sex dating cultures have 
been studied by researchers from both inside and outside China (Zheng 2015, Zhao & 
Wang 2014, Engebretsen 2008, Xiaobai & Xiangqi 2006). Nevertheless, the connection 
between their role differentiation and wider kinship practices hasn’t been explicated. In 
domestic studies, the T/P and 1/0 roles are often reduced to fixed categories and are 
depicted as informed by heterosexuality or Chinese patriarchy (Li 2007, Chen & Chen 
2007, Zheng 2015). Such discourses can be problematic because they oversimplify both 
queer sexualities and heterosexuality by ignoring some foundational discourses on the 
production of gender norms and heteronormativity. Butler (1990) points out that the idea 
of imitation suggests that heterosexual is the ‘origin’ that is copied by the homosexual, 
whereas the originality of heterosexuality is in doubt. Since an origin would require 
derivations to ensure its originality, heterosexual cannot be constructed as origin if 
homosexuality is not constructed as imitation. In this sense, heterosexuality in fact 
presupposes homosexuality to ensure its originality and normativity. Heteronormativity 
itself is constructed in contrast to non-normative sexualities. If the distinction between 
masculinity and femininity, as Butler points out, is constituted to limit the performative 
possibilities outside the restricted frame of gender identities, it is oversimplifying to 
describe the T’s masculine dressing style as an imitation of men or the 0’s stereotypically 
feminine behaviours as an imitation of women. Furthermore, we need to be careful to 
expound on the local and historical context of heterosexuality and gender norms as they 
are not universal (Traub 2008). Chinese gender and family norms changed dramatically 
during and after the Reform era and cannot be viewed as universally static. Although T-
P and 1-0 relationship models were found to be informed by stereotypically hetero-
gendered norms, these terms cannot be reduced to fixed binary identities. The idea of a 
mature, stable, and bounded knowledge of selfhood is problematic, for identities are 
“multiple, ambiguous, shifting locations in matrices of power” (Kondo 1990:26).  
 
What is more, the role categories change over time, with new trends constantly emerging 
in the queer community. For instance, the ‘H/bufen (versatile, not classified)’ role, which 
emerged outside of the T-P role division, has become popular in recent years within 
Chinese lesbian communities. Queer women calling themselves H are those who don’t 
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want to put themselves into the T-P category or those who could fall in love with either 
T or P. Similarly, the term ‘0.5’ appears later than the 1/0 roles and has gained increasing 
recognition. Men who introduce themselves as 0.5 mean that they are versatile in bed and 
might develop an intimate relationship with either 1 or 0. 1-0 and T-P relationship models 
have been losing their predominance in queer communities, especially among youth, 
since the conception of bufen (versatile) showed up. As these role terms in queer intimate 
relationships proliferated from absolute binary to diverse blends, new analysis is needed. 
Borrowing from Povinelli’s analysis of radical fairies, it is not desirable to try to define 
these seeming categorical and gendered terms and then find those who fit the definition. 
Instead, we need to understand the modes of life across which these categories are 
“dispersed, contested, and made sensible” (2006:109). Instead of defining what they are, 
I am more interested in exploring what they do within queer dating and socialising 
cultures and wider kinship practices.  
 
People who called themselves 1/0/0.5/T/P/H included not only self-identified gays and 
lesbians but multiple forms of non-normative genders and sexualness. Until the end of 
my fieldwork, most transgender and bisexual people remained invisible in China as the 
knowledge of transgender and bisexuality weren’t widely recognised. The public 
frequently misconceived transgender people as homosexuals, and transgender people 
themselves would seek intimate relations in the alleged lesbian and gay communities. 
Huang (2015) further complicates the T and transgender identity in Chinese lesbian 
culture and suggests that we understand T beyond the lesbian/transgender binary. Several 
Ts in my lesbian social circles, for instance, have taken the transgender men identity 
without giving up the T identity and continue to be active in their local lesbian social 
circles. Also, bisexual and sexually fluid people were using 1/0/0.5/T/P/H to introduce 
themselves when seeking lovers. It has been a debate on whether we may include the 
local recognised terms ‘tomboy20’ (to refer to women who tend to perform stereotypically 
male activities) and ‘femme’ (to refer to women who tend to be seen as normatively 
gendered) in Southeast Asian countries as part of the globally-recognised ‘lesbian’ 
identity (Boellstorff 2007a&b, Blackwood 2005). Ethnographic studies conducted in non-
Western countries have challenged the universalist assumption of sexual identity 
(Blackwood 2005, Boellstorff 2007a&b, Jackson 2009, Dave 2012). In this sense, it 
 
20 Tombois in Indonesia, tomboy in Malaysia, tom in Thailand, etc 
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would be mistaken to classify the practice of performing 1/0/0.5/T/P/H roles in the 
domain of gay and lesbian subcultures in China. Rather, these terms include a diverse 
range of sexual and gender practices across their ambiguous borders. Thus, I 
conceptualise these terms as flexible epistemologies and social practices that are 
consistently in transformation. 
 
Despite the different understanding of queer role terms among younger and older 
generations, both agreed that T and 0 were a lot more than P and 1. A survey conducted 
by same-sex dating apps Lesdo and Aloha in 2017 clearly demonstrated the disproportion 
of T to P and 1 to 0. 44% of gay men surveyed claimed to be 0, 19% to be 1, and 37% to 
be 0.5. Likewise, 42% of lesbians surveyed said they were T, 21% were P, and 37% were 
H. The belief that 1 in the gay community and P in the lesbian community were more 
popular and had an easier life prevailed in everyday conversation. Every time I joined a 
local lesbian chatting group, the members asked, “Any new Ps? We need Ps! There is too 
little meat for so many wolves!” On the one hand, Ts showed passion for chasing good-
looking Ps and celebrated Ps’ feminine characteristics. On the other hand, most Ts 
believed P was not as reliable as T, often due to P’s presumed economic dependency. Ts 
often assumed that the feminine-looking P had the choice to be straight and enter a 
heterosexual marriage whenever she wanted to do so, although I met more than a few 
middle-aged Ts who entered heterosexual marriages and had children with their husbands. 
In WeChat group chats, members often made jokes about the 1-0 ration, such as “I am 
probably the only 1 in this group chat for you 0s”. Many T and 0 tended to describe 
themselves in disadvantaged positions in same-sex intimate relationships.   
 
For those who recognised the proliferating T/P/H/1/0/0.5 roles and their mouldability in 
same-sex relationships, interactions with people who still understood T/P and 1/0 roles in 
a binary and stereotypically gendered logic became problematic. People who employed 
‘H’, ‘0.5’, and ‘bufen’ were relatively younger, usually born after 1990. Many post-90s 
friend-informants were familiar with Euro-American LGBT movies and television 
dramas. Some young respondents further told me that they disfavoured the whole role 
categories, including the Chinese words lala and tongzhi, and would only refer to 
themselves as ‘les’ or ‘gay’. Simultaneously, many non-heterosexual people born before 
1990 didn’t recognise any role term out of the T-P/1-0 binary system. The idea that one 
was either T or P like one was either male or female was still held by many non-
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heterosexual people, while other young urbanites felt offended to be positioned in such 
fixed binaries. This matter was further problematised when same-sex relationships were 
involved. For some non-heterosexual people, the alleged role of another potential date 
firmly expressed what kind of gender style this person desired, what kind of financial role 
this person wanted to have, and how dominant this person wanted to be as essential 
characteristics. For other non-heterosexual people, the roles were simply sexual 
preferences. 
 
In recent years, an increasing number of gay men and lesbians have viewed the 1-0 and 
T-P as outdated and undesirable relationship models and tried to abandon them to a 
certain extent: 
“Though I dislike such simple categorisation, I need to use it at some point when I 
am about to go to bed with someone who only acknowledges the 1-0 logic. If you 
don’t specify your roles in the gay dating APP, you simply get filtered by other users. 
Unless you don’t want a sex life, you cannot avoid using 1-0 terms as gay. However, 
I try to leave 1-0 roles to sexual life and avoid bringing them to everyday life. You 
know, even if I were a heterosexual man, I would not want my wife to stay at home 
without a job.” (Eric, age 24) 
Eric’s words reflect many young respondents’ attitudes toward the roles terms, as they 
found them disturbing but had to adopt them when using same-sex dating apps 
 
Moreover, shifting attitudes toward female masculinity and male femininity in recent 
years are observable. Ye (manly)/tie (literally meaning iron, referring to queer women 
who don’t like to be touched erotically) T and mu (effeminate) 0 were not only regarded 
as unpopular in the dating pool, obvious female masculinity and male femininity were 
further stigmatised as lowbrow, linked to the Chinese discourse of low quality (suzhi). By 
contrast, lesbian femininity and gay masculinity occupied a more accepted and favourable 
position (Wang 2019, Kong 2019). A lesbian respondent claimed: 
“We are lesbians because we love women and we accept our gender. I feel those Ts 
don’t appreciate their female body. How can I be with a woman who looks and 
behaves like a man? We should date each other as lesbians, not as heterosexuals.” 
(Yina, age 28) 
In her words, female masculinity, similar to male effeminacy, was described as gender 
unconformity and therefore degraded to lesbian inauthenticity. The argument that the 
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rigid T-P relationship was just the same-sex version of the traditional heterosexual 
relationship was used by many young queer women who spoke against the T-P model. 
The trend for seeing T/P roles as more traditional and lower class didn’t just occur in 
Chinese society, but in other Asian societies as well (Blackwood 2005, Boellstorff 2007a). 
 
Some of my friend-informants changed their clothing and performative styles following 
changing preferences in queer communities. I have known Billy since high school. She 
was a typical ye T as a teenager, chose a typical male English name as her nickname, 
performed a visibly masculine gender style, and only dated zhinv21 (straight girls). She 
didn’t need to find girlfriends via online communities since her masculine look attracted 
girls at school regardless of their sexual identities. In other words, her strong T-ness made 
her interest in women obvious. Although she was proud to have had so many ‘straight 
(zhinv)’ girlfriends, she also criticised the instability of such relationships, saying, “No 
matter how generous I am, they will abandon me and find a man sooner or later”. In other 
words, Billy saw her zhinv girlfriends as women who lived normative lives and thus 
wouldn’t develop long-lasting relationships with a T. During her study in the U.S., she 
developed an intimate relationship with a queer woman, who was also the first one who 
took an active sex role in bed with her. After graduating from university, Billy started to 
introduce herself as a niang (feminine/sissy) T to others and started wearing light make-
up. She also grew her hair from a short crew cut to her shoulders. When we met again in 
Shenzhen, Billy half-joked, “niang (feminine) T is popular these days”.  
 
Billy’s choice regarding her performative style and role in same-sex relationships was 
both individual and socially contextual. During high school, Billy dressed as masculine 
as she could, mainly to impress straight girls. In the early 2000s, T-style female singers 
such as Li Yuchun emerged in popular music, and their styles were deemed fashionable 
among both queer and straight women (Kam 2013). Dating a T-style girl was considered 
fashionable among girls at our high school, while such relationships were also considered 
unserious and playful. At the time Billy graduated from university and entered the lesbian 
social circle in Shenzhen, she realised that breast-binding and having crew cut hair were 
understood as backward practices among young middle-class lesbians. The shifting 
 
21 Many Ts referred their girlfriends and ex-girlfriends as straight women if they had dated men before or 
started intimate relationship with men after breaking up with them; they rarely used ‘bisexual’ to describe 
their girlfriends and ex-girlfriends’ sexuality. 
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attitude towards the masculine T-style was visible as female masculinity became 
increasing linked to low quality (suzhi) and lesbian inauthenticity (Wang 2019). Rather, 
lesbian femininity was considered to be the ‘true’ model of lesbianism. A T respondent 
mobilised T-ness beyond a visible masculine gender performance when interviewed:  
“I used to have short hair and an obvious manly T style as I felt I had to be like men 
to date women. My ex-girlfriend made me realised that she liked me even if I dressed 
feminine. I have long hair now and still attract Ps. As I grew older and got into a 
serious relationship, the T-P binary became too biaomian (superficial, ostensible) for 
me.” (Danny, age 29) 
 
Danny’s description of T/P roles as biaomian could be interpreted in two ways. Biaomian 
literally means surface or superficial, which implies that T/P roles are not linked with 
one’s inner feeling of self. Also, biaomian indicates the T/P roles only seem to be fixed 
truths, while they can be easily broken or adjusted. Danny used the discourse of biaomian 
to mobilise the T/P roles beyond an observable masculinity/femininity binary as she chose 
to make her T-ness less obvious without it affecting her lesbianism. Although Billy 
changed her dressing style and sexual role, she still saw herself as T (rather than H) due 
to her preference for a T-P relationship mode and her financial independence. Billy and 
her P-girlfriend lived in Billy’s apartment with Billy’s parents. Billy had her own business 
and didn’t require her girlfriend to earn an income. Instead, she was satisfied that her 
girlfriend was more than willing to cook for her. In other words, for Billy and Danny, the 
fundamental trait of being a desirable T had shifted away from observable masculine 
styles to more delicate and flexible practices which could be negotiated in conjugal 
relationships. Therefore, Billy and Danny’s accounts suggest that T/P roles are 
relationally apprehended and practiced in queer relationships. 
 
The innovative use of 1/0/0.5/T/P/H-related slang in queer communities further shows 
their elasticity. Ben, a self-identified gay man studying sociology at a university in 
Guangzhou, told me he would rather say he was 0.75. He explained: 
“Although I like to be 1(top) in bed, I don’t want to miss good guys just because they 
are not 0. After all, dating is not just about sex.” 
Ben introduced himself as 0.75 in the gay community because it would expand the range 
of his potential dates. In this case, the 1/0 roles were not interpreted as a binary system of 
sexual roles but a spectrum where one could adjust one’s position from 0 to 1. Ben also 
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described his ex-boyfriends as positioned somewhere between 0 and 0.5. In Ben’s case, 
the 1-0 binary was merely an issue in bed, and he needed to mobilise such a binary 
because he desired a life partner rather than a sex partner.  
 
In short, queer subjects’ attitudes toward same-sex relationship modes and their use of 
role terms are diverse and elastic. The emergence of H and 0.5 roles as versatile, as well 
as the shifting attitude toward male femininity and female masculinity in same-sex dating 
cultures across different generations have inevitably produced hierarchy of same-sex 
relationships models. Younger non-heterosexual people emphasised that same-sex 
relationships should be equal and inter-dependent in terms of emotional, sexual, and 
economic roles. They also showed a tendency to delink their sexual roles from division 
of labour in their domestic life. Many criticised the T-P and 1-0 relationships as being 
informed by traditional Chinese gender culture while celebrating the versatile (bufen) 
couples as being infused with modern gay and lesbian culture. Yet, such arguments also 
revealed that non-heterosexual people tended to perceive heterosexual relationships in a 
timeless and fixed model in which the man/husband was dominant and caring and the 
woman/wife was submissive and dependent. In this sense, heterosexual relationships, like 
T-P and 1-0 relationships, were reduced to abstract discourses similar to what Danny 
described as biaomian (superficial, ostensible). Regardless of roles they identify with, 
queer couples in this ethnography have demonstrated a capacity to be fluid in practicing 
conjugal relations, xinghun (contract) marriages, coming out, and parenting. 
 
Seeking Reliable Lovers, Avoiding Risks 
“Things are different today. There are so many more platforms for us to find a same-
sex lover compared to old times, but these are all unreliable (bu kaopu).” (Sally, age 
33) 
I repeatedly heard this statement from respondents in meetups. Many respondents showed 
their concerns about the extended same-sex social sites in today’s LGBT world.  
 
The emergence of queer social spaces and communities in urban China as a result of the 
wide access to the Internet and rapid economic reform in recent decades have been 
recognised in various research (Rofel 2007, Wei 2007, Ho 2010, Kam 2013, Engebretsen 
2014, Fu 2015, Zheng 2015, Bao 2018). Nowadays, one could locate other non-
heterosexual people online through either mainstream Chinese social media platforms 
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such as Weibo, Tieba, Douban or same-sex exclusive dating apps such as BlueD and Rela. 
There were more than five gay bars and four lesbian bars in Shenzhen by 2018. How did 
these social sites, from cyberspace to consumerist semi-public spaces, transform non-
heterosexual people’s perceptions and experiences of same-sex relationships?  
 
According to my friend-respondents, meeting someone randomly at a bar or nightclub 
was undoubtedly the least reliable way to find true love. This conception prevailed not 
only in Chinese queer communities but in Chinese society more generally. Most 
respondents said they never or rarely consumed drinks at exclusively gay and lesbian bars. 
Some of them had visited these bars out of curiosity and were disappointed to find the 
music and performances to be in poor taste and the atmosphere licentious. According to 
many respondents, bars and nightclubs were places exclusively for people looking for 
casual sex rather than serious relationships. Some complained about the poor-mannered 
waiters or waitresses whom they perceived as uneducated. In this sense, gay and lesbian 
bars became consumer spaces gated by erotic desires and economic capital, while cultural 
indicators of artistic taste, education, and the etiquette of middle-class status in these 
spaces were absent (Wei 2020). Distinct from gay bars, queer film clubs and tongzhi 
activist groups emerged as cultural spaces that genuinely exclude non-heterosexual 
people who lack cultural capital and are recognised as neither middle class nor good 
cultural citizens within the community (Wei 2020, see also Bao 2018, Kong 2010, Rofel 
2007).  
 
Among the 20 same-sex couples I interviewed and spent a great deal of time with, more 
than half of them met their partners through social media. Meeting new friends and lovers 
within online sociality modes has become increasingly common for non-heterosexual 
people in first-tier cities like Shenzhen. Online interactions became an important element 
in people’s offline lives. The online world should not be seen as a self-contained sphere 
separate from everyday offline activities (Miller & Slater 2003, Miller et al. 2016). The 
prevailing online mode of sociality among both heterosexual and non-heterosexual people 
in China not only signified the blurred boundary between online and offline life but also 
signified the increasing interactions between strangers in contemporary China.  
 
Before the analysis of same-sex dating practices, I will briefly introduce the context of 
personal interactions and social trust between strangers in Chinese society. Traditionally, 
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Chinese society was organised through different types of social circles where the 
individual’s moral duties were specifically identified in accordance with their 
positionality in each social relation (Fei 1992 [1947]). In such a world of acquaintances, 
people relied on personal trust cultivated from long term interactions within the same 
social circles. In this sense, one’s reputation and moral worth were relationally defined 
mainly through kin ties and work networks. The rapid modernisation and urbanisation in 
China resulted in increasing interactions among strangers who shared no past (Yan 2011, 
Lee 2014). As Yan (2011) points out, the rapid changes in Chinese social life cannot be 
perceived alone without considering the shifting ethical discourse and moral practice. I 
would further add that we mustn’t exclude non-heterosexual people’s everyday life when 
disclosing such transformations in Chinese social life.  
 
“You thought you knew the person as you talked with each other for so long, but you 
would find out she was faking her personality and background once you were in a 
relationship”. (Sally, age 33)  
At a dinner with other lala friends, Sally complained about her recent ex-girlfriend, whom 
she met via a lala WeChat group chat. It is common for a regionally-themed gay or lala 
chat group to organise an offline get-together on a regular basis for members to meet each 
other in person. The primary (and unspoken) purpose of these offline social activities was 
to find a date. The get-together usually took the form of a casual dinner and might 
progress to a bar or a KTV night with alcohol. According to Sally, she was purposefully 
‘picked up’ by her ex-girlfriend among all in that group chat because of her decent job 
and house ownership in the city centre. In their first offline group meetup, Sally was 
kissed by her. They became girlfriends and frequented each other’s flats. It didn’t take 
too long for Sally to discover that her pretty girlfriend was conducting ambiguous 
relationships with several other lesbians. Furthermore, Sally believed she was taken 
advantage of by her ex-girlfriend financially. After telling this story, Sally also talked 
about her puppy love in high school. Sally and her first girlfriend were classmates, and 
they fell in love when Sally didn’t even know the meaning of the word lesbian. Their 
romantic relationship lasted for 6 years until they graduated from university and moved 
to different cities to work. Sally’s second girlfriend was her colleague and their 
cohabitating relationship lasted for 2 years. Both Sally’s first and second girlfriends were 
married to heterosexual men in recent years, and Sally called them ‘zhinv’ (straight 
women). Although Sally referred to her earlier relationships with her first and second 
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girlfriends as pure love with a nostalgic undertone, she admitted that she didn’t want to 
be hurt by zhinv anymore, and her only option was to use the online social media 
platforms to find a lesbian-identified lover. 
 
I met Sally in April 2019, only shortly after she ended her 3-month relationship with her 
ex and came back to the lesbian social circles to seek a potential girlfriend. Sally remained 
critical of same-sex dating Apps and online forums. During another get-together, Sally 
warned others not to reveal their real names and jobs when they started dating someone 
on the Internet. Many agreed with Sally and revealed their fears of being cheated or 
swindled. The conversation continued as we discussed when it was appropriate to disclose 
personal details. Someone argued it would be fine to talk about one’s background after a 
few dates, and someone said she and her girlfriend never see each other’s IDs until they 
were together for a year. There was no clear line between being too naive and being too 
suspicious of the other. At that time, we were all using nicknames, and I was the only one 
who disclosed my job position and affiliated institute. I had queer friends whose legal 
names I knew, went to their flats and workplaces, and met their colleagues while building 
such rapport from online relations could take months and even years. The second time I 
met Sally, I asked her if she would participate in my research. Like many other 
respondents, she gave me her consent but never her full legal name. I never asked for 
respondents’ full names, either. The tendency for queer women to use nicknames and 
only talk about their love life without giving details about their family and job in T-bars 
in Taiwan has been described as ‘fictive real’ (Chao 1999) and can be extended to 
emerging queer social spaces in urban China.  
 
Sally’s attitude towards online dating was neither representative nor rare. For many 
respondents, especially those born before 1990, there was a sharp distinction between 
meeting a person in ‘real life’ and meeting a person through the ‘virtual web’. Real-life 
encounters happened in school, workplace, volunteer groups and other established social 
organisations where people at least shared certain mutual networks and memberships. On 
the other hand, people without pre-existing social relations were strangers. This was 
further pronounced in online interactions which were often anonymous in the beginning. 
While non-heterosexual people like Sally preferred to develop intimate relationships with 
people from established offline social webs, they were aware of the small dating pool in 
‘real life’. The idea of seeking lovers from online platforms evoked manifold uncertainties 
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and risks in Chinese society, heterosexuals and non-heterosexuals alike. One could not 
consult any mutual acquaintance or authority member about another stranger’s socio-
economic background and moral worth.  
 
During my fieldwork, this was a story spreading in the major online lesbian communities. 
A woman who claimed to be P and working in Shenzhen met several Ts from a lesbian-
themed forum and became girlfriends with them after they met offline. This woman then 
pretended to suffer serious family crises and borrowed money from these Ts from time to 
time. Eventually, one T found out that her job title had been falsified and exposed her to 
multiple online forums. The story became heated as other T victims of fraud showed up 
one by one to expose the P swindler’s personal details. Other than borrowing money, 
there were a lot more examples of fraud. Some lesbians claimed the swindlers persuaded 
them to invest in their fictitious commodities or play the lottery in made-up websites. One 
of my friends, who identified as T, was once contacted by a P via the lesbian socialising 
app Rela; it turned out the P tried to ask my friend to purchase a gym membership. At the 
same time, I saw a growing number of posts warning single queer people about swindlers. 
“Of course we are the target of fraud. We are lonely and desperate for love and pretty 
girls! All swindlers need to do is to post a fake photo!” a T concluded. It appeared that 
the T was more frequently the victim of fraud, taking on the financial provider role. In 
such narratives, the victim T was often portrayed by themselves and others as like the 
male victim who was fooled by a pretty woman through online dating.  
 
Fu (2015) has explored the gay social sites in Shenyang which changed from urban public 
spaces in the 1980s to consumer-driven spaces in the 21st century. Same-sex desires in 
the old days were characterised as ‘simple’ and ‘nice’ when one didn’t have to worry 
about property safety or health risks. Same-sex desire in the recent decade was regarded 
as dangerous when male-male sex consumption, swindling activities, and HIV risks 
visibly increased. While Fu’s research doesn’t focus on gay social media platforms, 
online interactions and offline interactions are inseparable and equally valid in queer daily 
life. Like Fu’s respondents, my respondents have blamed the capitalist system as the main 
reason behind the lowering of the moral bottom line and loss of trust among strangers. 
Economic reform has contributed to the growth of individual mobility and simultaneously 
formed unequal social stratums. As a result, most Chinese individuals “had to internalize 
the negative impacts of individualization by assuming more responsibilities, experiencing 
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greater uncertainty and risk, and working harder” (Kleinman et al. 2011:15). Non-
heterosexual people seeking lovers, in this case, had to learn to recognise suspicious 
behaviour in dates.  
 
Being involved in fraud or extortion when dating was understood as an example of 
extreme immoral behaviour by most Chinese people but, unfortunately, it had a great 
negative impact on personal trust in the social world. Moreover, encountering swindlers 
was just one of the worries non-heterosexual people had. In the case of same-sex online 
dating, one might easily justify their moral values and behavioural norms as they were 
interacting with people completely outside their circle of social relations. Guan, a 29-
year-old lesbian mother in a gay-lesbian xinghun marriage, told me that she didn’t 
understand why some lesbian WeChat groups required every new member to provide her 
photo on the group chat: 
“What is the point of knowing other group members’ faces? I don’t feel comfortable 
letting strangers know what I look like before we meet in person. Their rules make 
me feel that I am wrong to value my privacy! Anyway, I have my solution. Every 
time they requested my photo, I just sent a photo of a random woman downloaded 
from the Internet. I will never reveal my details on the Internet.”  
Guan’s argument revealed the conflicting moral norms in the lesbian community. Guan 
framed her behaviour of sending fake photos to other lesbians as a good habit not to trust 
strangers. Yet, such behaviour would be characterised as cheating and cowardly by many 
other gay men and lesbians, especially those born after 1990, under the rhetoric of coming 
out politics:  
“If they don’t even dare to show their faces on same-sex socialising sites and come 
out to us, how can you count on them to come out to straight people?” (Yina, age 28).  
 
Later during the dinner, Guan mentioned she was also hiding her married and parental 
status in online lesbian groups because she wanted to increase her opportunity for finding 
a girlfriend: 
“Lesbians like me who got married and have children have little chance to find a 
girlfriend. Other lesbians heard you are married, no matter xinghun (contract 
marriage) or zhihun (marriage with heterosexual people), they stop replying to your 
message and run away without giving you a second chance. When they can find an 




Although in my research there were several queer couples who didn’t see each other’s 
married status as essentially troubling, Guan’s prior experience discouraged her from 
revealing her status as married and a mother co-parenting with a gay man. Indeed, my 
other post-90s friend-respondents have blamed gay men and lesbians who chose to enter 
heterosexual marriages as being dependent and lacking negotiating power with their 
parents, thus having no right to enter same-sex conjugal relations. According to Guan, 
her situation left her no other choice but to get married. Guan’s parents in her hometown 
had been expecting her to have offspring. Guan had a stable job in a state-
owned enterprise and enjoyed well-off life, but not well-off enough to raise a child by 
herself. Yet bisexual and lesbian women like Guan who were in heterosexual marriages 
and in the meantime presented themselves as single were regarded as a negative example 
in today’s online queer communities. For most young non-heterosexual people in first-
tier cities like Shenzhen, hiding one’s married status to same-sex lovers was morally 
intolerable. Nevertheless, one must be observant of such behaviours because others might 
easily pretend their status without feeling what they did were immoral.  
 
I suggest the uncertain path from unrelated intimate stranger to real-life partner 
symbolises the uncertainty in the Chinese moral standards as they are relationally defined 
in accordance with one’s positionality in a given social relation. When non-heterosexual 
people develop an intimate relationship with an individual completed outside their 
established social webs, their sentiments, health, and money are all at potential risks that 
they must internalise by themselves. Such a shift in same-sex relationships in recent 
decades needs to be understood within both the context of global queer politics and the 
rapid modernisation and ethical shifts in urban China. 
 
In mainstream culture, heterosexual dating apps such as Momo22 are often characterised 
as hook-up sites which serve the purpose of yuepao (getting laid with strangers). The 
reputation of being a yuepao app is linked with the low possibility of finding a good 
‘quality (suzhi)’ partner that one may develop a serious relationship with (Liu 2016). I 
intend to employ Wei (2020)’s metaphor of queer gated communities to understand the 
shifting social sites. Gated communities, as Wei describes, deal with social inclusion and 
 
22 Momo is a popular Chinese dating/hook-up social media. 
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exclusion of non-heterosexual people in the wider society and within queer communities 
(2020: 132). For most of my respondents who were not interested in queer films and 
activist activities, cyberspace has become an essential cultural space for them to identify 
other potential queer lovers with similar artistic tastes, educational backgrounds, and 
social status. At the same time, the anonymity and practices of faking cultural capital have 
called online communities’ role as queer cultural spaces into question. In this sense, same-
sex dating sites were not only situated between ‘radical’ and ‘conservative’ sexual 
attitudes/lifestyles but also situated between casual/temporal and serious/stable 
relationships. I suggest the same-sex socialising apps serve ambiguous social functions. 
Most respondents didn’t want to use same-sex themed forums and apps as they argued 
these, once ‘pure’, online same-sex socialising platforms were ‘contaminated’ by people 
who just wanted to hook up. These criticisms of non-heterosexual people seeking causal 
sex often went further to damaging the overall image of sexual minorities. To further 
problematise this matter, many of my friends-respondents referred to online dating as a 
less preferred, less effective method but the only option for them to extend their dating 
pools. Rong, a 26-year-old single gay man, explained: 
“Every time I opened BlueD, I got messages from strangers asking for one-night 
stands. Well, I care for my body and am afraid to be infected (by HIV), so I never 
reply to this kind of message. I went out to date several 0s from the site, but these 
guys just never took their wallets out when we were out for dinner or something. Just 
because I was the 1(top) and rich in their eyes doesn’t mean I was supposed to pay 
for everything. To be honest, I am tired of the freaks all over the gay apps. You must 
be very lucky to find true love from these sites.”  
 
Rong’s words demonstrated that one couldn’t learn the other’s sexual habit and financial 
capability from the profile photo and role term put on the app profile. While Rong’s 
previous dates assumed Rong’s role as 1 implied his sex role as top and his dominant 
economic role, Rong felt he was taken advantage of by these 0s. Rong explained later that 
he didn’t like the 0s who constrained themselves through a stereotypically gendered 1-0 
binary, believing that being a 0 meant being dependent and effeminate in various ways. 
He further commented that “those 0s were usually stupid and couldn’t achieve anything”. 
What he didn’t explicitly point out was the importance of dating someone with a 




To conclude, the anonymity on the Internet was double-edged. Cyberspace not only 
satisfied the need for some non-heterosexual people to remain anonymous, but also 
complicated the matter of trust and behavioural norms for many others. When some non-
heterosexual people felt like hiding their personal information as they looked for intimate 
relations, other non-heterosexual people felt the need to know more information 
especially about the other’s cultural capital in order to develop a committed relationship. 
To put it another way, the emerging modes of online and stranger sociality have both 
enabled and constrained non-heterosexual people’s practice of seeking loving 
relationships. Same-sex dating apps were scarcely considered a secure space in which one 
could find reliable and serious long-lasting relationships besides casual sex, as online 
interactions were often seen as revealing limited and even untrustworthy social cues about 
individuals.  
 
Again, different generations of non-heterosexual people expressed inconsistent moral 
values with regards to online dating, namely, how visible and how frank one should be in 
order to develop a trusting intimate relationship. While many believed that exchanging 
photos, income status, and educational backgrounds were the entry point for turning 
virtual stranger encounters into a real-life romantic relationship, other people, especially 
older gay and lesbian and bisexual people with less negotiating power could make the 
opposite claim. Generationally, concerns around trust have increasingly shifted from 
exposing oneself in public to being taken advantage of emotionally and financially. In 
this sense, reliability and companionship were highlighted when seeking same-sex 
relationships. The practices of seeking same-sex lovers in emerging online space play a 
crucial role in understanding the concept of conjugal love. I now turn my attention to the 
practice of maintaining same-sex conjugal relationships. 
 
Maintaining Love: Forming Jiban (Mutual Burden) Without the Marriage 
Certificate 
In our interviews and daily conversations, my friend-respondents stressed the importance 
for a loving couple of sharing similar interests, values (sanguan) and life objectives. 
During an interview, a middle-aged gay couple said that “the key for two people to make 
a relationship durable is to desire the same lifestyle and life pattern”. I was a junior queer 
woman merely in the early stage of a loving relationship in their eyes. I was still a student 
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who needed support from my parents, didn’t know where to live in the future, and my 
girlfriend the same. In the couple’s understanding of it, I was far from a stable relationship.  
 
Before examining same-sex cohabitating relationships, a few words need to be said to re-
address the shifting legal context and understanding of cohabitation as a non-marital 
intimate relationship in Chinese society in the last decades. During the socialist period, 
cohabitation outside marriage was regarded as an immoral and illegal practice. The 
Chinese Marriage Law of 1980 referred to cohabitation as ‘illegal cohabitation,’ while a 
2001 amendment to the law changed the wording to ‘non-marital cohabitation’ (Yu & 
Xie 2015). The premarital cohabitation rates had increased from nearly absent before the 
1980s to one-third in 2010-2012 (Xie 2013). On the other hand, the seemingly tolerant 
social attitude toward premarital cohabitation might be within the marriage territory, for 
heterosexual cohabitation in China was viewed as only a temporal and transitional status 
that led to marriage. Non-heterosexual cohabitating couples, according to the lawyers I 
talked with, could only be at a disadvantage. In a word, the Chinese state was “far from 
realizing equal citizen’s rights on specific issues such as marriage, housing, and so on” 
(Zhang 2011:123). In a sharing session held by the LGBT non-profit organisation PFLAG 
China, the lawyer speaker, who introduced herself as a lesbian, concluded:  
“Legally, our (queer couples) cohabitating relationships don’t even qualify as feifa 
tongju (illegal cohabitation) even though we have to deal with the issues like joint 
ownership.” 
 
Against this background, the relatively well-off queer couples had employed several 
major strategies to make their relationship last a long time and were admired by other 
queer couples as ‘solid as marriage’. I have borrowed the term jiban 23(mutual burden) 
from many of my friend-informants to demonstrate their strategies for forming mutuality 
in various aspects of their lives. Buying housing property together was frequently 
mentioned in queer communities as one of the most desired strategies to secure a same-
sex relationship since this could enable a couple to cohabitate independently and made 
them mutual owners of immovable property. Similar strategies included registering a 
 
23 Jiban literally means constrains and nets/strings/ropes that tie up horses and cattle, to become entangled 
in nets. This word didn’t have a positive meaning. Some argue that it has become influenced by the Japanese 
word ‘kizuna’. Jiban is frequently used to refer to an unbreakable bond between people nowadays. 
79 
 
company jointly and buying insurance for each other. The purpose of these strategies was 
to obtain mutual ownership or partnership recognised by existing private law.  
 
An, who was 33 years old and had been with his partner Ye since 2008, gave a narrative 
that demonstrates the complexities of mutual property ownership, love, and feeling of 
security in a same-sex relationship: 
“In 2010, Ye quit his job in a foreign trade company and joined my company. Ye’s 
parents are richer than mine. I am from Fuyang; his family is from Shenzhen. He 
suffered from depression and didn’t enjoy his former job, so I told him that he could 
quit. I bought apartments in Shenzhen for myself and for Ye as well. Ye felt insecure, 
so I bought several apartments in Shenzhen under his name. Also, our cooperative 
relationship is stated in the company policy. If something terrible happened to me, 
Ye would receive my capital.” 
In our interview, An didn’t explain why Ye would feel insecure because he assumed that 
I, as a Chinese person, didn’t need such an explanation. Based on An’s narrative, Ye’s 
feelings of insecurity toward their relationship was due to his economic dependence and 
the lack of legal recognition of same-sex relationship, and An solved this by forming 
mutual partnership and ownership with Ye. They also have three sons together, which I 
shall discuss in Chapter 4. 
 
Tommy, who was a 50-year-old gay who had been together with his partner Joe and their 
son Jack for more than 20 years, told me about the time that transformed their relationship:  
“I worked so hard and bought an apartment in Guangzhou in December 1990 for us 
(Tommy, Joe and Jack) to live together. We have entered the family mode since then. 
Because Jack was so young, Joe has been staying at home as a ‘househusband’ 
(jiatingzhufu). I look after the outside, and Joe looks after the inside (wo zhu wai, ta 
zhu nei).”  
Indeed, living together in an owned apartment symbolised stability and family for Tommy 
and Joe. In 2012, Tommy and Joe’s 15th anniversary, they signed a heritage claim 
notarised by their friends. In this claim, Tommy wrote that if anything happened to him, 
his godson Jack would inherit his property, and Joe, as Jack’s legal father, could handle 
his property. Tommy also bought insurance and changed the insurance beneficiary to Jack 
once the insurance becomes effective. He explained that insurance companies usually 
wouldn’t let the insurer choose people other than the legal spouse, children, and parents 
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to be beneficiary when buying the insurance. I will return to detail their family lives in 
the following chapters. 
 
Xie and Hong, a lesbian couple living in Shenzhen with a son, told me: 
“We have consulted the lawyer about securing our relationship as a same-sex couple, 
and the lawyer told us the law has no safeguard for us same-sex couples at all, so 
we’ve decided that we would buy properties and put our names on the properties one 
by one.” 
Xie was 44 years old and Hong was 34 years old and their relationship started in 2009. 
Hong once said, “Xie puts her heart into our relationship.” To explain this, Hong told me 
that after Xie found out she liked the bread from a local bakery, Xie went to buy every 
kind of bread from the bakery and brought the bread to her workplace every day. Hong 
and Xie’s friends commented, “Isn’t Xie romantic?” More of their life histories will be 
detailed in later chapters. 
 
The three same-sex couples mentioned above were all middle-aged and had few resources 
when they migrated to Shenzhen/Guangzhou. They, and other respondents who bought 
one or more houses in Shenzhen, highly appreciated the potential for upward mobility in 
this fast-developing city. Some extended their gratitude to the state for the economic 
opportunities they grasped during market reform. Moreover, An, Tommy, and Xie 
highlighted their love for their same-sex partners by linking their economic capital 
together under private law (property, contract, company law). They understood that 
forming mutual ownership was key to maintaining their loving relationship. Such 
narratives arguably embraced consumer culture since buying goods for the loved one was 
highly encouraged.  
 
Due to the rising real estate prices, younger same-sex couples in Shenzhen and other first-
tier cities generally couldn’t afford to buy an apartment unless their parents provided 
financial support. It is the case that parents in urban China nowadays must pay a lot more 
to purchase housing property for their children to secure their future. The house that 
parents bought for sons traditionally served the purpose of the matrimonial home, and 
such a practice was extended to the only daughter after the one-child policy was 
introduced. Legally and ethically speaking, non-heterosexual people couldn’t add the 
same-sex lover’s name to the property that their parents bought for them. The successful 
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cases of middle-aged same-sex couples who bought houses by themselves might be even 
rarer among young generations. Unlike the three queer couples mentioned above, most 
young non-heterosexual people didn’t see themselves as successfully settled in Shenzhen 
because they lived in rented shared flats and thus couldn’t envision a long-lasting 
relationship in the big city. Private house in post-reform China is bonded with notions of 
marriage, family, and middle-class lifestyle (Zhang 2008). An increasing number of 
same-sex couples born after 1990 showed an interest in learning the process of notarising 
their cohabitating relationship and testaments during my fieldwork, as it wouldn’t require 
one to own a house or company to be eligible. Still, many young respondents displayed 
strong desires for “owning an apartment and living with a partner in our little world”. I 
will now detail the cases of two same-sex couples that reveal the complex 
interconnections between economic, legal, and cultural domains in queer intimate lives. 
 
Mo & Lin: “we are in a stable relationship.”  
Mo was born in 1989 in Chengdu. She was living in Shenzhen with her girlfriend, Lin, 
and two cats. They have been living together for two years when I started my fieldwork 
in 2018. Mo’s main job was as a designer, and her girlfriend Lin’s main job was in sales. 
Later in 2018, Mo and Lin took over an alcohol and tobacco store with Lin’s colleague 
in a mall as a side occupation.  
 
Mo received her master’s degree in graphic design from an Italian university. She came 
back to China in 2013 and started working in Shenzhen. After a year, she tried to start her 
own company in Chengdu but failed in the early stages. Mo explained that she couldn’t 
handle the complex social relationships in Chinese society. She came back to Shenzhen 
since there were few decent job opportunities for designers in Chengdu. Being the only 
child, Mo told me her parents almost spoiled her when she grew up. She came out to her 
parents when she was studying in Italy. Just like other lesbians from middle-class families 
I met in second/third-tier cities, Mo’s parents had already bought an apartment for their 
only daughter in Chengdu. Mo’s parents also came to Shenzhen occasionally to visit Mo. 
 
Mo’s girlfriend, Lin, obtained her education from junior high school. Lin was born in 
1986 in a rural town in Anhui Province. Lin came to Shenzhen when she was 16 years 
old as a migrant worker. The mobilised economic market in Shenzhen allowed Lin to 
move from being a factory worker to a salesperson in a beverage company. When I saw 
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Mo and Lin for the first time, I could easily tell that Lin was a ye T as she had a masculine 
appearance style. Also, Lin had a lot of male and T ‘brothers (xiongdi)’ and social 
resources. Mo told me that Lin could be friends with business partners and got benefits 
from that. For example, Lin and her colleague had the opportunity to open the alcohol 
and tobacco store and secured the prime costs with the mall and supplier. All Mo did was 
to pay for the major costs, and Lin was responsible for the operation.  
 
Mo’s salary was 15,000 RMB, and Lin’s salary depended on her sales commission. Mo 
paid for the rent of their two-bedroom apartments (4,000 RMB/ month), and Lin regularly 
bought household goods and food. I asked Mo whether their backgrounds and economic 
conditions have had any effect on their relationship, and she smiled 
“Well, I knew we were different at the very first time we met. We started a chat on 
Rela through its ‘Searching Other Users in the Vicinity’ feature. The app showed our 
physical distance was just a mile, so we decided to have a casual hang out. It turned 
out that we certainly lived in the same area, but I was living in an apartment, and she 
was living in a cheap nongmin fang24. It didn’t bother me. She was the one dithering 
over our backgrounds. None of her ex-girlfriends earned more than she. We had been 
friends for half a year until we confirmed our affection for each other. We are 
complementary to each other in terms of personal characteristics.”  
 
Based on Mo’s narrative, Lin had viewed her T role as a financial provider in an intimate 
relationship. On the other hand, Mo didn’t see herself as a P nor dependent even though 
she was attracted to T’s gender style. It took Mo and Lin months to mediate their different 
understanding of their roles in the relationship. For Mo, Lin had the social ability she 
lacked. Furthermore, Lin gave Mo the feeling of home. Since Lin’s working hours were 
flexible, she cooked for Mo every day. Even after they opened the alcohol and tobacco 
store, Lin would still prepare bento meals to take to the store during weekends. Ever since 
Lin moved to her apartment to live together, Mo always felt like going back home after 
work when she knew her girlfriend would welcome her with a warm meal.  
 
I was shocked when I heard Lin was in a marriage with a straight man. When Lin reached 
20, Lin’s family arranged a marriage between Lin and a man she never met. At that time, 
 
24 ‘Nongmin’ literally means farmer and ‘fang’ means room. Nongmin fang was used to describe the house 
built by locals for rent without legal permission. Nongmin fang was a budget option for rent.  
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Lin couldn't do anything except going back to her hometown and get married. The next 
year, Lin gave birth to a son. Lin thought she had fulfilled her duty and “no one can say 
anything anymore”. She left her husband and son in Anhui and went back to Shenzhen 
for work. Since then, Lin started dating women. In the last ten years, Lin only came back 
to her hometown once a year. Lin also sent money and toys back to her parents and her 
son. Mo didn’t mind Lin’s married status as she said, “anyway, she hasn’t slept with that 
guy for years, and I understand her family background”. Mo warned me about using kin 
terms in front of Lin. Lin was angry at Mo when Mo referred ‘that guy’ as Lin’s ‘husband’.  
 
In 2018, Lin wanted to divorce. The man refused to divorce and told Lin that Lin must 
take their son with her if they got divorced. Although I never met the man who married 
Lin, I could tell that the man is unpopular from Mo’s words. For a middle-aged divorced 
man staying in a village, it would be difficult to marry again, especially with a child. The 
man’s parents clearly couldn’t afford to arrange another marriage for their son again. Also, 
Mo refused to live with Lin’s son. Eventually, the marriage didn’t end and Lin’s son 
stayed in Anhui with the grandparents. Both Lin and the man have their reasons to keep 
their marriage even though they barely knew each other and had no affective bonds. As a 
solution to this continuing marriage, Lin never kept any property under her name to avoid 
potential disputes. Since Mo owned an apartment in Chengdu, she and Lin planned to go 
back to Chengdu in a few years and start a company together. 
 
The first time I met Mo and Lin, they introduced themselves with “we are in a stable 
(wending) relationship”. This statement gave me many assumptions about them that were 
toppled later. As I learned more and more details about their life experiences, I noticed 
the concept of a ‘stable relationship’ could be as elastic and as consolidated among my 
respondents’ minds. When I posted a recruitment article saying I was looking for queer 
couples to participate in my research, my friends and a lot of other people who read my 
post asked: “I have a girlfriend/boyfriend now, but our relationship is not wending yet. 
Do I qualify to participate in your research?” Some of them didn’t live with their lovers, 
some didn’t come out to parents, and some didn’t think they had the financial 
independence to “live like a married couple” (meaning making their own decisions 
without parental interference). On the other hand, Lin had arranged to disconnect herself 




What then shall a married couple be like? Lin’s account has proven that even the living 
arrangements of heterosexual married couples might vary. Furthermore, Mo and Lin’s 
detailed plan for their future was easily imaginable. 
 
Zhao & Ma: “I wished to escape from a stable life.” 
I had an in-depth interview with Zhao and we encountered each other multiple times in 
formal and informal queer social gatherings. “I have been together with my partner since 
2004” was the unchanged opening sentence every time Zhao introduced himself to other 
non-heterosexual people, and it always impressed everyone in the room.  
 
Zhao was born in 1980 in Jiujiang, Jiangxi. He started teaching at an elementary school 
after graduating from teacher-training college. He had worked at the school for 13 years. 
He told me he was working at one of the best elementary schools in the Jiangxi Province. 
His position at public school is considered extremely wending (stable). Thus, Zhao’s 
resignation was surprising for others:  
“When I quit my job in 2012, my resignation was the only ‘naked resignation (luoci, 
meaning quitting one’s job without securing another job)’ in the school’s history! 
You know my position is quite stable and with all the retirement benefits. People 
worked hard to get the position and they wouldn’t leave it so easily. They couldn’t 
believe that I didn’t have a better job lined up! But I didn’t think that way. Imagine 
yourself sitting in an office with the same crew for decades until you retire! Too 
boring for me. In fact, I was ready to work in McDonald's in Guangzhou when I 
decided to leave that elementary school and leave Jiangxi.”  
 
Zhao felt his work routine in hometown was getting dull and found ‘no hope’ in his 
hometown. Zhao realised he liked men at a very early age. In his 20s, he started using 
online forums to meet other non-heterosexual men, who were often older than him and 
married. “I don’t judge them, but I don’t want to live a counterfeit life like this,” Zhao 
said. He always desired life in Guangzhou where he could be himself openly. Zhao also 
joked that that is why he only makes friends with people from big cities.  
 
Zhao met his boyfriend Ma in 2004 at an online Euro-American pop music forum. Ma 
was born and raised in Guangzhou and was 2 years younger than Zhao. They soon became 
web friends with similar music tastes. Subsequently, Zhao went on a business trip to Hong 
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Kong, and they had an opportunity to meet face-to-face in Guangzhou. Later, they spent 
a holiday in Zhao’s hometown together and expressed their affection for each other: 
“Ma asked me to be his ‘xiongdi” (brother) to tighten our relationship. I replied that 
I didn’t want us to be brothers because I liked him; I wanted us to be lovers.”  
Since then, they became boyfriends and started a long-distance relationship from 2004 to 
2012. Zhao and Ma visited each other and stayed in their apartments for a few days 
whenever they are free. Zhao had vacations as a school teacher, and Ma worked at his 
family shop. Both of them were living with their parents during these years. After years 
of a long-distance relationship, Ma’s mother sensed the relationship between her son and 
Zhao. One day, Zhao received a phone call from Ma’s mother, who euphemistically 
pointed out that Zhao had come to Guangzhou to visit her son “too many times”. After 
the phone call, Zhao told Ma that he wouldn’t come to Guangzhou anymore and wanted 
to break up with Ma. Shortly afterwards, Zhao learned that Ma was on the brink of 
collapse and came out to his mother. The next day, Zhao took the train to Guangzhou and 
had a 4-hour talk with Ma’s mother. At the end of the talk, Ma’s mother had nearly 
accepted their relationship.  
 
After Ma came out to his parents, Zhao thought it was time for him to come out to his 
parents and live with Ma. His parents were working at a local textile factory. He thought 
his mother would accept the fact faster than his father, but his prediction was wrong: 
“My mother is gentle, and my dad is strict. Somehow, I assumed that my dad was 
conservative. However, my mom cried hard for days, and my dad was the one 
comforting her. My mom even asked my dad, ‘Aren’t you sad that no grandchildren 
will sweep our graves in the future?’ My dad answered, ‘Our son’s generation already 
stopped sweeping graves every year. Even though we have grandchildren and so forth, 
it’s doubtful that they would sweep our graves. You cannot make the next generations 
your business’. My dad even called a meeting to tell his relatives not to worry about 
my marriage.”  
Zhao’s father also came to Guangzhou to visit Zhao and Ma’s parents. During their first 
meeting, Zhao’s father said to Ma’s mother, “think like we have one more son. As long 
as they are happy, let them be”.  
 
Ma’s parents bought Ma an apartment in the same housing estate as Ma’s matrimonial 
home before Ma came out. After learning that Ma was not going to marry a woman, Ma’s 
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parents left the apartment to Ma and Zhao. Ma and Zhao insisted that Ma’s parents move 
to the new larger apartment and they stayed at the older apartment. They have been living 
in the older apartment closely with Ma’s parents since then. In 2019, Zhao bought a flat 
in Guangzhou. 
 
Zhao still returned to Jiujiang to visit his parents every year during Spring Festivals, 
sometimes with Ma. Both being migrants in a first-tier city, we exchanged our views 
briefly:  
Me: “How is your hometown right now?” 
Zhao: “No change at all. If you open the BlueD app in Jiujiang, you see lots of blank 
profile pictures or fake photos. Those gay men are scared to show their actual face to 
others. Here (in Guangzhou), you see real faces when you use the app.”  
 Me: “So, does Guangzhou meet your expectation of the big city?”  
 Zhao: “It’s even better than my imagination! There are many more resources here.” 
Me: “I agree with you, but it has changed. My friends and I are suffering from the 
dramatic housing prices right now”. 
Zhao: “But I bet you will stay here. You all will. I know you can’t go back to your 
hometown. You simply no longer share the same topic with people in your 
hometown.”  
 
It appeared that Zhao disliked the practices of social relations in his hometown. This 
conversation reflected many non-heterosexual migrants’ conflicting attitudes towards 
living in big cities. Zhao acknowledged the fact that he and his partner were not worried 
about their elderly life as they were living a financially abundant life in Guangzhou. It 
could easily be observed that Zhao went to cafes regularly, regularly purchased decent 
kitchen appliances and kept a dog with Ma. Zhao’s parents never let Zhao send them 
money. Zhao was aware that his parents didn’t need his financial support. He told me that 
his parents went travelling every year and his mom had made many new friends. Zhao 
endorsed coming out in an ethical manner, linking it to filial piety: 
“I remember that on a recent day, my mom suddenly blamed me for coming out to 
her too late. She said that I was heartless especially when I saw her knitting. Before 
knowing my sexual orientation, my mom believed I would marry and have children, 
so she spent significant time knitting kid’s clothing and did much preparation for me. 
It turned out that her efforts were just pointless. She accused me of keeping my 
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secrets and wasting her time. She could have more spare time making friends if I 
came out to her earlier.” 
 
Conclusion: Queer Love in a Chinese First-tier City  
In conclusion, I have discussed the elastic use of 1/0/0.5/T/P/H- related slang in queer 
dating practices and how are these role terms perceived through comparison with 
heterosexual relationships and gender norms. Overall, the 1-0, T-P relationship modes 
have proliferated into a diverse range of relationship modes and role terms, especially 
among urban young queer couples. Meanwhile, 1-0 and T-P were often reduced to 
traditional heterosexual relationships in which the man was dominant and caring and the 
woman was submissive and dependent. This was based on the understanding that T-P and 
1-0 modes were informed by traditional Chinese gender culture and created unequal 
relations between couples. The tendency to reduce female masculinity and male 
femininity to gender unconformity has further produced a hierarchy of same-sex 
relationships modes. Younger non-heterosexual people emphasised that same-sex 
relationships should be equal and inter-dependent in terms of emotional, sexual, and 
economic roles. On the other hand, my observation indicates that these role terms are 
rather biaomian (superficial) in queer relationships, and they might or might not be 
understood as gendered styles. Those who contended that modern same-sex relationships 
should be different from heterosexual relationships risked understating heterosexual 
relationships as an eternally static object for comparison. As researchers, it is vital to 
carefully examine non-heterosexual people’s expressions of modern/traditional, 
masculine/feminine, same-sex/heterosexual binaries. The debate on “what a modern and 
authentic same-sex relationship should be” in queer communities is constantly being 
shaped by notions of modernity, lesbian/gay authenticity, and heterosexual relationships.  
 
Non-heterosexual people’s practices of seeking same-sex lovers have also changed 
dramatically, and emerging online dating sites have become an important cultural space 
for non-heterosexual people to locate potential dates who share similar cultural tastes, 
backgrounds, and social status. Yet, online dating with strangers symbolises risk and 
uncertainty, as my respondents expressed inconsistent moral standards and judgements 
regarding dating practices. Young queer urbanites frequently expressed their worries 
about being taken advantage of emotionally and financially. The rhetoric of morality, 
suzhi (quality), and taste/interests have played a central role in non-heterosexual people’s 
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dating practices. Some non-heterosexual people have tended to conceal their personal 
details, such as marital status and income, when they look for same-sex dates, while other 
people consider them to be deciding factors. To understand the split in moral judgments, 
we must acknowledge that the ability to be completely honest and out in online and offline 
worlds remains a class-specific privilege for Chinese non-heterosexual people. In this 
sense, the practice of seeking lovers for non-heterosexual people is inseparable from class 
stratification. Overall, what my friend-respondents desired from romantic relationships in 
many ways looks like conjugal relations, characterised by reliability and companionship. 
The strategies adopted by queer couples to maintain their relationships further echoes 
with this meaning.   
 
At this point, it is important to apprehend queer intimate relationship through the very 
idea of romantic and conjugal love in wider society. The conception of ‘love’ in Chinese 
society has never been fixed. Borrowing from Povinelli (2006), love is not a set of 
universally actual truths but, rather, a developing discourse. In Confucian China, marriage 
was arranged by family elders primarily for the purpose of having male offspring, 
exchanging resources, increasing manpower, and forming alliances. Marriage was viewed 
as a corporate relation between two families rather than an individual matter. Pan suggests 
that “while marriage was one of life’s central experiences in China, the ideal of the 
primacy of love never was” (2015: 280). In other words, the basis of marriage was 
patrilineal lineage rather than affection or ‘love’. The youth, especially young women, 
had little autonomy. It is necessary to recall Povinelli’s argument and take the position 
that the idea of love cannot be taken for granted as an ‘actual’ event. There is a rich 
collection of poetry and folk songs about ‘love’ in Imperial China, which is neither related 
to sexual desire nor freedom in marriage25. The ideology of ‘romantic love’ in China is 
constituted through the rejection of arranged marriage and is linked to the sense of 
modernity and individual autonomy (Yan 2003, Pan 2015). Since the 1920s, May Fourth 
progressives have promoted ‘romantic/free love’ as a symbol of freedom, autonomy, and 
equality against Confucian values (Lee 2006). Arranged marriage, once a social norm, 
has become a symbol of backwardness. The idea of true love “became so under Western 
influence,” and “new foreign ideas on the nature of love not only entered the Chinese 
conception but became constitutive of it” (Pan 2015:7). The emerging discourses on 
 
25 Some argue that ‘love' poetry in imperial China is often a political metaphor. 
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‘romantic love’, ‘true love’, and ‘free love’ in 20th century China symbolises the 
contradictions between tradition and modernity. Pan and Lee’s literature again contribute 
to the denaturalisation of love in Chinese society. 
 
Mo and Zhao’s narratives of their love stories and coming-out experience cannot be 
articulated alone without acknowledging their family backgrounds, career paths, and 
migrating experiences to the ‘big cities’ in Guangdong, China. Mo and Zhao emphasised 
their similar cultural tastes and complementary personal characteristics as the main factor 
they fell for their same-sex partners. In other words, they perceive and describe their 
relationships as soulmates instead of erotic lovers or a couple ‘matched for marriage’ 
(mendanghudui). When Zhao compared lives in his hometown and Guangzhou, his 
description of same-sex dating practices in the two places resonated with queer urban 
utopian imaginaries countering normative lifestyles (Huang 2017). Zhao couldn’t stand 
wending (stable) life in his hometown, especially after realising the gay men in his 
hometown were likely to enter heterosexual marriage and heteronormative lifestyles. The 
urban atmosphere of Guangzhou allowed Zhao to grasp his queer affective needs and 
pursue romantic relationships.  
 
Yet this doesn’t mean my friend-informants’ loving relationships are ‘socially 
exfoliating’; rather, they have constantly negotiated with economic, cultural, and legal 
factors that constrained their life status and intimate relationships. For instance, Mo and 
Lin are concerned with possible financial disputes with Lin’s legal husband. Likewise, 
Zhao and Ma address their parents’ worries for their childless future life. Big cities 
became sites for them to gain upward mobility and material recourses, keep a manageable 
distance from their families of origin in their hometowns and escape from marriage 
pressure. Most importantly, they attempt to find ways to secure their cohabiting 
relationship like the middle-aged queer couples mentioned in this chapter. Without the 
housing properties bought by parents which ensured their stable life status, they would 
need to find alternative ways to form mutuality and maintain their relationships. In this 
sense, queer subjects’ practices of seeking and maintaining their loving relationships 
encompass the blurred discourses on romantic/free love and conjugal/companionate love, 
and their expression of intimate love is beyond the tradition-modernity binary. Having 
children together was another key strategy queer couples used to secure their loving 
relationship, which I will elucidate in more details in the next chapter.   
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Chapter 4 Desiring Children  
 
This chapter deals with reproduction and parenthood in relations to the conceptions of 
blood ties and social policies in Chinese queer life-worlds. In this chapter, I explore how 
non-heterosexual people of different age groups and backgrounds understood having 
offspring in the contexts of filial duty and care for the elderly in a southern Chinese first-
tier city. When and why do Chinese non-heterosexual people want children? How do 
Chinese non-heterosexual people cope with the existing family-planning policy? What 
are the desirable tactics for non-heterosexual people to have children? To unpack this 
topic, I investigate decision-making processes that moved queer individuals or couples 
towards parenthood and those who chose not to pursue parenthood. I will document the 
existing practices for Chinese non-heterosexual people around having children and the 
moral and legal issues raised by these practices. This is followed by an elucidation of 
which practices were believed to be better in queer communities and how queer parents 
made their decisions to have children accordingly. The life stories and narratives of single 
queer parents and queer couples having children stress their understanding of blood ties 
and children’s symbolic position in forming stable relationships and reproductive futures 
that would be approved by their parents and the state. Also, I elaborate here on how queer 
parents demonstrations of love for their children links to materiality.  
 
Moving to Parenthood 
“You and your same-sex partner need to share a common bond for your relationship, 
and a child is the best bond!” 
This argument was held by a middle-aged representative speaker of a private assisted 
reproductive technologies (ART) agency specialising at an LGBT-themed talkfest. The 
speaker then used his own experience as a gay father to validate his argument. The 
speaker summarised that having a baby with his boyfriend was beneficial for their 
relationship. His speech received a mixed response, as some young attendees murmured 
about the high cost of using ART and some joked, “first we need a partner to do it 
together”.  
 
As the recent survey by the United Nations Development Programme (2016) indicates, 
nearly two-thirds of LGBT respondents felt under great pressure from their families to 
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enter heterosexual marriages and have children. The survey results are revealing, while it 
would be abridging for researchers to understand Chinese LGBT people’ motivation for 
having children exclusively in the context of family pressure. Therefore, I investigate why 
and when my respondents have children without assuming their motivations.  
 
Some respondents highlighted that they had always wanted to be a parent. An, a gay father 
of three sons, said, “since I was young, I knew I wanted children and I had made plans. I 
planned to have mixed-race babies.” Many lesbian respondents stressed that they loved 
children very much and desired their company in their life. One of my lesbian friends 
said, “raising a child will give me the feeling of accomplishment”. In this kind of 
description, queer wannabe parents didn’t mention their parents’ expectations, but rather 
concentrating on their own desires. A few queer (wannabe) parents mentioned that they 
would want children to support them in their elderly life, while they also stressed that it 
was not the key factor for them to have children.  
 
Like the speaker mentioned at the beginning of this section, many queer parents described 
children as the most effective mutual bond between a couple. Tommy, a 50-year-old gay 
man who has been with his partner Joe for more than 20 years, once said, “Honestly, I 
don't know if I would still be with Joe without our son Jack.” According to Tommy, it 
was the moment that they brought the little Jack to his flat in Guangzhou when he felt at 
home. He emphasised that having a mutual life goal was what made a relationship long-
lasting. For Tommy and Joe, raising their son Jack is their mutual goal.  
 
Same-sex couples in this ethnography also described parenting as entering a more 
intimate and promising stage of their relationship. Pam, a 28-year-old lesbian friend-
respondent, explained the reason for her and her partner, Danny, to have their child 
through A luan (egg) B huai (pregnancy), meaning Pam was going to give birth to the 
child using Danny’s egg:  
“We have been enjoying time together. Naturally, we want our connection to be 
tighter. I can’t think of anything else to bond us more tightly.” 
Sitting with Pam, Danny added: 
“It is important to have a mutual jiban (burden, liability) to make a relationship last. 
You must plan a future together, otherwise it’s just a repetition of eating and sleeping 
without the sense of a future life. When I was with my ex-girlfriend, she didn’t have 
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any clue about our future. I asked her whether she wanted to immigrate to foreign 
countries or stay in China and whether she wanted to marry me or have children; she 
just didn’t know. I felt so insecure back then.” 
 
Likewise, having children was frequently suggested as a strategy that increased the cost 
of separation (fenshou chengben), as a lesbian mother illustrated:   
“When you have children together, your girlfriend can’t just take the luggage and 
leave the house when you have a fight. You won’t break up easily. She becomes the 
mother of your kid! It will be like an actual marriage.” (Yazi, age 32) 
 
It must be noted that the child as a mutual bond/burden (jiban) between a same-sex couple 
only worked in certain situations. In other circumstances, it worked the opposite way. I 
will illustrate this with further individual accounts later in this chapter and chapter 6. 
 
Parental expectations continued to be an important factor for some respondents in having 
children, though they emphasised that their parents did not compel them; rather, they 
wanted their parents to be happy and satisfied. When I firstly met Zhenzhen, who was 24 
years old, she was already preparing for IVF treatment. I was surprised and said, “you are 
so young to have children!” Zhenzhen said,  
“I agree with you, but my womb is not in good condition. My body can't wait. Besides, 
my parents are paying for all the IVF expenses. They are bored of their life in the 
small town, you know, they need a kid.”  
Zhenzhen has come out to her parents, while her parents neither accepted her relationship 
with Fei nor objected to it. Zhenzhen and her 23-year-old girlfriend Fei were living in a 
flat purchased by Zhenzhen’s parents. Zhenzhen’s parents didn’t ask Zhenzhen to marry 
a man but instead asked her to have offspring after she was diagnosed with premature 
ovarian failure. Zhenzhen thought that, after her child was born, she could leave her child 
with her parents and continue to pursue her career. For Zhenzhen, having children was a 
win-win move.  
 
Zhenzhen’s situation was by no means unique. Zhenzhen and another middle-aged 
respondent clarified that they voluntarily chose to have children for their parents’ good. 
Especially for those who were the only child, not having offspring usually meant the 
discontinuity of the family line. Having offspring had always been a vital topic in 
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premodern China which was invested with the patrilineal order of tracing ancestors and 
the Confucian philosophy of family relations (Yang 1957, Walker 1996, Xie 2013). One 
characteristic of the traditional Chinese kinship system was the patrilineal continuity that 
traces the family lineage through men, linking men with both their male ancestors (zuxian) 
and descendants (houdai). It was believed that ancestors without male descendants to 
offer tributes would be hungry ghosts wandering in the living world. Thus, the living men 
were obligated to worship and offer tributes such as mingbi (nether money) to their 
ancestors. In this context, family is a closed and unitary group consisting of living and 
deceased men sharing the same origin and surname. Yang has suggested the function of 
ancestor worship is “to cultivate kinship values like filial piety, family loyalty, and 
continuity of the family lineage (1957:278)”. Confucianism has been regarded as the most 
influential ideology in China for over two millennia. Filial duty (xiao), as the moral 
standard in Confucian ideology, focuses on the continuation of the family line and the 
support, subordination and obedience to the elders (Ikels 2004). Once more, the 
Confucian conception of filial duty stressed the importance of chuanzongjiedai (carry on 
the family line) and strengthened parental authority. Borrowing the discourse on 
Confucian familism and ancestor worship, many non-heterosexual people held the 
opinion that not fulfilling one’s family responsibility was a selfish thing to do. Commonly, 
I was told that, after children were born, they would have fulfilled family expectations 
and could then do all the things they wanted, including dating same-sex lovers. Similarly, 
heterosexual marriages for queer women were phrased as not merely family pressure but 
a tactic for leaving families of origin to gain personal autonomy (Kam 2013, Engebretsen 
2014). Having children, in Zhenzhen’s narrative, became a moral accomplishment and a 
path to individual freedom.  
 
Chen, the manager of a private assisted reproductive technologies (ART) agency, said she 
could tell if it was the clients themselves who wanted to be parents or the clients’ parents 
who wanted to be grandparents. Contrary to Zhenzhen, Chen argued that fulfilling 
parental expectations through heterosexual marriage and having children was an act of 
cowardice and selfishness: 
“Usually, if the clients’ parents talk to us and pay for all the fees, I know the parents 
want a grandchild. These clients are irresponsible, like big kids, because they don’t 
have their own motivation to be parents. They are just doing what their parents want 
so they can be free of family pressure. These kinds of clients probably leave the baby 
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to their parents for babysitting after the child is born and continue to play around. I 
think it is not fair to the child coming to the world since the parent doesn’t desire it.” 
Chen felt that, in this context, the expected baby was merely a tool for the client to escape 
family pressure. To put it another way, Chen didn’t think people who had children for 
fulfilling parental expectations would be responsible parents themselves. Chen’s opinion 
has become prevalent in online social media platforms like Douban and Weibo, which 
young users dominate.  
 
In short, non-heterosexual people’s drive for having children cannot be reduced to family 
pressure. They can also desire parenting as a lifestyle. Fulfilling parental expectations 
through entering marriages and having offspring is no longer the dominant factor in 
understanding one’s moral worth, as Zhenzhen’s account increasingly encounters 
criticism from other non-heterosexual people in Chinese cities. On the other hand, non-
heterosexual people’s motivations for having children are often unconsolidated and 
represented in both an individualistic sense as self-desire and relational rhetoric as a 
conjugal technique. There is a generational tendency to present the desire for parenthood 
as an individualistic and voluntary choice free from traditional family pressure. Moreover, 
the changing pattern of parent-child relations in urban China has shaped young non-




“Having Children Is Not Worth It” 
I never discussed parenting with my peers before I began this research. Some of them 
didn’t like the idea of having children at all. Claire, a 27-year-old lesbian who was 
working as a financial consultant in Shenzhen, said:  
“Getting married and having children is not a reliable option anymore. Nowadays, 
you must spend all your money on your children – buying imported milk powder, 
paying for school and tutorial lessons, supporting them financially for years after 
graduation - and they might not grow up as you hope. It is gambling. I’d rather save 
all these expenses for raising a child and go to a nice nursing home when I get old”.  
 
Without mentioning the legal constraints of same-sex parenting or whether they liked kids 
or not, my peers concluded that they couldn’t afford to parent and it was not a reliable 
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investment for their future life. Raising a child in China, especially in first-tier cities, had 
increasingly become expensive and difficult, demonstrated by the continually falling 
fertility rate26. Claire told me she calculated how much parents need to spend on housing, 
healthcare and education, and parenting for her was simply not worth it.  
 
Parenting was often framed as exclusively for financially capable people. Same-sex 
couples considering becoming parents as a long-term goal usually complained that they 
had to earn a crazy amount of money to have children. For instance, they listed the 
prerequisites for childrearing, such as owning a school district apartment (xuequ fang)27, 
which was unthinkable for those who had just worked for a few years. According to the 
Statistics Bureau of Shenzhen Municipality, the average annual income of 2018 in 
Shenzhen was 110,304 RMB for people working at non-private enterprises and 63,635 
RMB for people working at private enterprises. In the meantime, the Shenzhen Real 
Estate Information Platform showed the average transaction price for housing property in 
2018 was around 54,000 RMB per square meter28. The average housing price of a central 
and school district apartment was noticeably higher, usually exceeding 100,000 RMB per 
square metre. I frequently saw the following statement on online forums,  
“If I didn’t eat and didn’t consume anything for a year, I might be able to afford to 
buy 1 square metre in Shenzhen. If I want to buy a flat by myself, I need to work for 
several decades without consuming anything. Do the math and think about it.”  
 
Most respondents believed that, in order to raise a child, one had to own a property. For 
many Chinese people, raising a child in a rented flat often implied instability and risk. 
Therefore, they had no choice but to postpone their plans to have children, just like many 
straight married couples. As mentioned earlier, young people preferred to settle in big 
cities, and therefore they had to deal with the high housing prices. In Shenzhen, I heard 
many young people in their late 20s saying, “it is too early for me to think about having 
children”. The overall trend of postponing childbirth among young Chinese urbanites also 
 
26 In 2018, the official birth rate in China fell to 12%, which was the lowest since 1949. 
27 It can also be translated as ‘elite school properties’, meaning a home inside a good school district. 
Because the ‘nearby school’ educational policy enabled the child living in school district to be enrolled in 
that school, the housing price near elite school was raised to sky-high.  
28 Since 2019, the Shenzhen Real Estate Information Platform stopped providing official data of average 
transaction price for housing property. 
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provided young non-heterosexual people with a convincing excuse to tell their parents 
whenever they were asked about their plans for having children.  
 
Other than the rising expense of having children, Claire’s statement further implied 
changes around the idea of filial piety and elderly support. Various studies show that 
Chinese society has been experiencing rapid transformations in family structures and 
consumer culture (Ying 2003, Fong 2004, Li 2011, Lin 2019). During the Mao era (1949-
1976), parental authority had been weakened by the state (Yan 2003, Cohen 2005). Cohen 
(2005) points out that the de-collectivisation of interests caused rural families to lose 
much of their economic autonomy, while family (jia) remained an essential social unit. 
Women’s social and economic status has significantly improved since 1949, shown in the 
rapidly growing percentages of women receiving postsecondary education (Xie 2013). 
The traditional disadvantaged positions, women and youth, have gained increased 
individual mobility. Li (2011) has noticed the trend toward nuclear families in urban cities 
illustrated by an increasing percentage of young married couples living apart from their 
parents. Filial piety remains as an essential moral practice, while we must not forget the 
actual practice of it is “situationally dependent and shaped by local circumstances of 
history, economics, social organization, and demography and by personal circumstances 
of wealth, gender, and family configuration” (Ikels 2004:2). 
 
Since the one-child policy was introduced in 1979, reproduction has been strictly 
regulated and tied to legal marriage by the state. Children’s education became an 
imperative type of family investment and expression of parental affection (Lin 2019). 
Children's consumption has increased dramatically; at the same time, children bear their 
parents’ hopes for financial support and class mobility (Fong 2004). Although there has 
been a trend towards the nuclear family, a high percentage of elders co-residing/living 
closely with their children is still remarkable in urban China (Li 2011, Tang & Chen 2012, 
Xie 2013). Xie provides two explanations for the high percentage of elders co-residing 
with their children - the patrilocal tradition and the lack of public support (2013:7). 
Moreover, the one-child policy has placed familial pressure solely on the only child, who 
is expected to excel in school, have a decent job, get married, continue the family line, 
and take the primary responsibility for supporting the family elders. The current 
generation of non-heterosexual people born from the 1980s to 2010s under the one-child 
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policy is often only children who have no siblings to share the burden of care for their 
parents (Hildebrandt 2018).  
 
Since elderly care was strongly dependent on kinship norms under the existing Chinese 
welfare system, not having children could represent a profound concern for one’s future 
life. On the other hand, an increasing number of young urbanites like Claire didn’t have 
faith in the Chinese common saying “raise children for the purpose of being looked after 
in old age (yang’erfanglao)”. Relying on the notion of filial piety for one’s care when 
elderly sounded unrealistic for them, as they have witnessed numerous urban Chinese 
parents spending all their life savings to buy apartments for children which their children 
could never repay. In this context, the parent-child relation looked like the parents giving 
their resources out without receiving them back. 
 
Perhaps another reason for her feelings was that Claire didn’t believe she successfully 
fulfilled her parents’ expectations as an obedient daughter. When Claire came out to her 
mother, the latter ignored her. Claire rarely returned to her hometown in Yunnan Province. 
Whenever she talked with her parents through WeChat, they quarrelled about her life 
choices and her ‘failure’ in Shenzhen. As a haigui (overseas returnee) who spent years 
studying in Europe and returned to Shenzhen to work, Claire was anxious about returning 
her parents’ investment in her education. After 3 years working in Shenzhen, her monthly 
salary had not exceeded 10,000 RMB. Living in the central district of Futian, half of her 
salary was spent on rent. Claire’s primary goal was to use her own money to purchase an 
apartment for herself in Shenzhen, yet this goal sounded like daydreaming. When we 
walked by residential areas in Nanshan and Futian districts in Shenzhen, Claire often used 
her cell phone to check the housing prices. All her dream apartments were priced over 
100,000 RMB per square metre, which made her dissatisfied with her current earnings. 
She also mentioned that, if her parents ever tried to understand her and respect her, their 
relationship would be better and her parents might support her to pay the down payment 
on an apartment in Shenzhen. Claire’s argument resonated with Li (2011)’s research on 
urban young Chinese families, which suggests that the urban youth understand filial piety 
as ‘mutual respect’ and ‘equal relations’ rather than ‘obedience’.  
 
When Claire complained that her parents were responsible for their tense relationship, 
she repeatedly said, “we should be more selfish and care for ourselves rather than listening 
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to our parents”. Conceptualising caring for one’s own needs as opposite to parental 
authority, Claire made it clear that she didn’t intend to be a model daughter in her parents’ 
eyes. Not only did she think she could not afford childrearing, she did not envision 
offspring as reliable support for parents’ elderly life. Neither buying a house and 
education for her children nor showing filial love to her parents was unconditional for 
Claire, as she employed the rhetoric of financial investment and payback to think about 
parent-child relations.  
 
Furthering the discourse on filial duty, many respondents in their twenties criticised the 
notion of seeing the continuation of the family line as one’s moral responsibility. They 
frequently quoted a widespread statement from the Internet:  
“Why is having offspring so important for some people? Must they have an inheritor 
to receive their throne or something?”  
By questioning the importance of continuing the family line, these young urbanites 
created a distinction between modern and traditional values regarding having children. In 
this sense, only a person with outdated values would place importance on the family line 
(chuanzongjiedai) and blame others for not having children. This prevailing statement on 
online forums suggests young urbanites’ tendency to disconnect the purpose for entering 
marriage and having children from the notions of family line and filial piety. 
 
While many young non-heterosexual people didn’t see parenting as an economically 
rewarding option and didn’t expect the coming generation of children to be fully obedient 
to their parents, some of my respondents who were planning to or already had children 
also used a similar logic to validate their motivation for being parents. By stressing that 
they wanted no material return from their children, they described their motivation as 
pure and modern. Not a single queer parent in my research acknowledged continuing the 
family line or supporting their elderly life as their key motivation for being parents, even 
though these were often assumed to be the major reasons for having offspring in China.  
 
The personal stories from non-heterosexual people not wanting children suggested the 
symbolic feature of children as resources of elder support was shaken under the changing 
notion of parent-child relations. Still, not having children implied the need to have at least 
an alternative solution for elderly care and maintaining loving relationships. Claire hoped 
to earn enough money to support herself after retirement, as she spent most of her energy 
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on excelling at work. When Zhao told me that he didn’t intend to have children, he added 
that he and his partner Ma were not worried about their elderly life as they were 
economically well-off. Zhao’s parents were also living decently and never let Zhao send 
them money. Zhao and his boyfriend Ma kept a dog together, whom they referred to as 
their child.  
 
The Vanishing and Emerging Practices: The Best Way to Have Children  
As mentioned in the methodology, my research includes a diverse group of queer parents, 
including but not limited to single and divorced queer parents, same-sex couples who use 
assisted reproductive technologies (ART) to have children, and gay-lesbian xinghun co-
parents. Although the pathways to parenthood almost always implied moral judgment for 
my friend-respondents, I don’t intend to make rigid classifications of Chinese queer 
parents, nor do I intend to rank the moral worth of these practices. Rather, by exploring 
how Chinese non-heterosexual people made choices in having children, I articulate a 
dynamic understanding of kinship and moral landscape in recent years. Undeniably, there 
is more than one way to become a parent for Chinese non-heterosexual people, but they 
may not be recognised equally in the contexts of feasibility and morality.   
 
Zhihun (marrying a straight person)  
It was very easy to tell Xie was a ye(manly) T from her appearance and behaviour. Xie 
was born in 1975. Xie’s same-sex partner, Hong, identified as a P and was eleven years 
younger than Xie. They were both from Hunan Province and later became Shenzhen 
citizens. We became familiar with each other as laoxiang (people from the same town). 
Many non-heterosexual people saw them as a model couple as they have been together 
for nearly 10 years and recently had a baby son, called Doudou. After having two dinners 
together, I learned about Xie’s previous heterosexual marriage with a straight man and 
her older son who was already an adult. Not long after Xie graduated from junior high 
school, she was pressured by her father to get married and gave birth to a son in her early 
20s. After that, she came out to her parents and divorced her former husband. Xie let her 
former husband take custody, which further irritated her father. Disappointed by her 
family of origin, Xie left home and started her business step by step. Xie’s parents 
couldn’t accept her life choices and refused to talk to her since she left. Similar to some 
other middle-aged gay men and lesbians I have met, Xie had a ‘normative past’ in 
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hometown and a ‘queer present’ in Shenzhen. There was no way for me to tell their former 
kin relations if they didn’t mention it.  
 
Several respondents over 40 years old explained that they didn’t even realise their same-
sex desires when they got married. In Chinese queer communities, zhihun (zhi literally 
means straight and hun means marriage) is a commonly used slang term to describe non-
heterosexual people marrying straight people. Joe got married in 1996 when he was 22 
years old. Growing up in a rural area, Joe went to work at a factory in Guangdong 
Province after he finished junior high school. In 1996, Joe’s relatives introduced him to a 
woman from his hometown. After the wedding, Joe came back to the factory and his wife 
stayed in hometown. While being married, Joe was confused about his desire for men. 
After he read a journal article on LGBT issues, he was eager to talk to the author, Tommy. 
Tommy and Joe exchanged emails in the following months and they met in person in the 
winter of 1997. They both realised they liked each other, and Joe told Tommy everything 
about his family, including his pregnant wife in his hometown. The day after their meeting, 
Joe came back to his hometown and told his wife he liked men. Joe's wife was calm and 
they “divorced in peace”. According to Joe, there was no romantic love between Joe and 
his ex-wife since their marriage was close to being an arranged marriage and they rarely 
spent any time with each other. After that, Joe’s ex-wife gave birth to Jack. Tommy and 
Joe took Jack to Guangzhou when Jack was 2 years old and the three of them started 
living together. 
 
During interviews and daily conversations, gay fathers and lesbian mothers often 
described their choice to enter conventional heterosexual marriage as the only way they 
could fulfil their parents’ expectations. Non-heterosexual people born around the 1970s 
and 1980s considered heterosexual marriage a family obligation that must be fulfilled. It 
was further clarified that staying in a heterosexual marriage was not the final solution to 
their parents’ expectation; having offspring (sons, in some cases) was their parents’ 
ultimate hope. We mustn’t forget that both marriage and reproduction were central life 
experiences in Confucianist China. Some middle-aged queer parents who entered a 
normative life pattern expressed mixed and even painful feelings. Mellow, a 43-year-old 
lesbian mother, had two ex-girlfriends before she intentionally married her male friend: 
“I was 30 years old when I left the factory to open a flower shop. My ex-girlfriend 
generously supported me. However, the shop turned out to be a failure and I lost all 
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our savings. My parents didn’t push me to marry, but I knew they were worried about 
my situation. Back in the early 2000s there was no advanced technology like IVF. 
Even if there was IVF, I didn’t know if I could afford it. At that time, I made a terrible 
choice. I asked my best male friend from the factory to marry me, and we got married. 
My family was happy, but my ex-girlfriend was suffering and so was I. After two 
months, I found out I was pregnant. I couldn’t pretend it anymore, so I came out to 
him and asked for a divorce. He didn’t agree, and we went to court. The next year, 
we reached divorce by agreement. I felt very guilty and therefore didn’t take any of 
his money. After I gave birth to a son, he wanted to take my son from me, and I 
eventually gave up the custody. Until my son turned 5 years old, he got married again 
and we (Mellow and her current girlfriend) took our son back to live with us.” 
 
Countless debates were elevated regarding this practice in recent years. While a same-sex 
desiring person might claim that they got married without realising their sexual 
orientation one or two decades ago, this kind of explanation would not be accepted 
anymore. Non-heterosexual people born after the late 1980s had the opportunity to learn 
of the terms such as ‘tongxinglian’, ‘tongzhi’, ‘lala’, ‘gay’ and ‘lesbian’ on the Internet. 
Therefore, it was becoming rare that one could enter a conventional heterosexual marriage 
before realising one’s same-sex desires. Furthermore, emerging practices to deal with 
parental expectation such as xinghun/contract marriage have gradually made a young 
non-heterosexual individual sound unconvincing when they claimed they had no other 
choice. Mellow’s practice to intentionally marry a straight man to have children was 
termed as pianhun (lying about one’s same-sex desires to marry a straight person) in 
online discussions. The word ‘pian (lie)’ signified that it was fundamentally an immoral 
practice. Almost all respondents made it clear that they wouldn’t develop friendship and 
intimate relationships with someone who pianhun nowadays, as a lesbian reasoned: 
“People who pianhun nowadays are either coward or selfish. I don’t believe they 
have no other choice. Why must they listen to their parents? Why must they marry 
an innocent person to have offspring? They not only lie to their parents, they hurt 
their straight spouse and eventually hurt our community!” (Saisai, age 29) 
 
Pianhun was even more pronounced with the emerging issue of tongqi (literally meaning 
the wife of a homosexual man). At a PFLAG event in 2018, a guest speaker, Weichen, 
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gave a speech about her experience as a tongqi. Weichen said she was shocked when she 
found out about her ex-husband’s affairs with men as she thought homosexual people 
wouldn’t enter a heterosexual marriage. There are roughly 10 million straight women 
married to closeted gay men in China (Li et al. 2017). According to Weichen, her ex-
husband not only lied about his sexual desires to marry Weichen, but also borrowed a 
large amount of money without telling her. As a legally married couple, Weichen was 
responsible for paying her husband’s debts. Consequently, Weichen had to go to court 
with her ex-husband to solve the financial dispute. According to numerous online 
discussions, tongqi women have been lied to and taken advantage of by their gay 
husbands in various ways, including “being used as a shield against discrimination and a 
free surrogate mother for the gay husband”. Many tongqi experienced physical and 
emotional domestic violence and lost custody of their children when they asked for 
divorce. Despite tongfu (husbands of homosexual women) being much less visible on 
mass media, Mellow’s narrative proves that queer women are also involved in the practice 
of pianhun. Still, tongqi face much worse gender discrimination and sexual health 
problems.  
 
It should be noted that Xie, Joe, and Mellow are older than the majority of the respondents 
in this research. Moreover, they chose to come out to their ex-spouses and parents at some 
point in their lives, while many other middle-aged non-heterosexual people remained 
closeted and married in a heteronormative family unit. Relationships with children from 
zhihun marriages, former marriage spouses and same-sex partners varied. Xie stressed 
that her older son, who was already studying at university, visited Xie and Hong 
frequently. “Gege (the older brother) accepts us quite well. I am even unhappy about the 
fact that gege is always on Hong’s side!” Xie joked. Xie did a good job of balancing her 
multiple kinship roles as a mother to her older son and as a partner to her girlfriend. Xie 
was not a caring daughter in her relatives’ eyes, while she didn’t think her father deserved 
her care as well. Tommy and Joe maintained regular contact with Joe’s ex-wife, who later 
moved to Guangzhou as well. Tommy called Joe’s ex-wife ‘Jack’s Mama’ and regularly 
posted photos of Jack’s Mama with them at their home. On the other hand, Lin (previously 
mentioned in Chapter 3) had rather divisive relationships with her separated husband, her 
son, and her girlfriend Mo, since she couldn’t bring her school-aged son to Shenzhen to 




It became apparent that being able to maintain harmonious relationships with one’s 
former spouse, children, and current same-sex lover would make one sound more 
responsible and honest and less like pianhun. In most circumstances, zhihun could be a 
neutral term, while pianhun was always negative in moral discourse. Tommy and Joe 
shared their story with thousands of blog readers because they believed that Joe’s previous 
heterosexual marriage was unlike pianhun. Xie and Lin didn’t tell me a lot about their 
relationships with ex-husbands while they implied that their ex-husbands didn’t marry 
them for love, so both parties were married with a purpose. In this sense, pianhun came 
into existence when someone not only lied about sexual desires and practices, but also 
pretended to fall in love with a straight person. Xie and Lin further emphasised that they 
visited their children as much as they could. Mellow was aware of the criticisms about 
pianhun. When sharing her experience, Mellow repeated several times that she felt guilty 
and she didn’t take advantage of her ex-husband to smooth the moral conflict. They also 
highlighted that they were honest with their same-sex partners. It would be accurate to 
suggest that pianhun was a vanishing practice among younger generations in big cities 
like Shenzhen due to the transforming attitudes towards entering heterosexual marriages 
and having children in queer communities.   
 
Gay-lesbian Xinghun (contract marriage) 
I met Ei and her best friend Ju in 2015 in Chengdu when I was doing my Master’s 
fieldwork. After that, we regularly chatted via WeChat. Ei was born in 1982 and always 
saw herself as a T. When we met again in 2019, Ei was single and was a divorced mother 
of twins. Ei has worked in many major cities including Tianjin, Shanghai, Guangzhou, 
and Shenzhen before moving back to Chengdu to be self-employed. She bought an 
apartment by herself and has been enjoying Chengdu’s relaxed atmosphere. Her social 
circles were full of non-heterosexual people and almost all her friends were in xinghun 
(contract marriages). Xinghun, short for xingshi hunyin, is also translated as nominal 
marriage, performative marriage, quasi-marriage, or a marriage of convenience between 
a gay man and a lesbian. 
 
Ei married a gay man who was working in the army in 2012. They met each other through 
a xinghun-themed QQ group chat. At that time, like other non-heterosexual people when 
they reached 30 years old, Ei’s parents expected her to marry and Ei chose xinghun to 
ease the pressure. I asked if her xinghun partner offered the apartment as bride-price, she 
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laughed and said “my mother didn’t ask for that. She was so happy that someone wanted 
to marry her old daughter!” Later, Ei made a difference between the ‘just like real family’ 
type of xinghun and the ‘business/nominal’ type of xinghun. According to Ei, her xinghun 
was more like the ‘nominal’ kind because there was no real exchange of bride-price and 
dowry, and they didn’t live together. 
 
They were a lot of local xinghun-themed groups and some of them charged a membership 
fee. The group leaders were like matchmakers who would check every member’s social 
background and parenting plans and organise match meetings for members accordingly. 
Ei and her friends mentioned that these groups were popular as “they are safe and 
convenient”. Lesbian/gay bars in Chinese cities occasionally hosted xinghun-themed 
parties. Generally, the lesbian and the gay man would negotiate over how to pay betrothal 
gifts, how to behave in front of each other’s parents, whether to get a marriage certificate 
and have children, and so on. They might have a written xinghun contract which 
confirmed further details such as property and living arrangements, the length of the 
marriage, and parenting costs. Yet, they knew that such informal contracts had no legal 
force and they could only count on each other’s moral accountability. Even if both parties 
in a xinghun marriage signed a contract agreeing to not provide care for each other and to 
not share fostering rights, the agreements were legally invalid once they obtained a 
marriage certificate. In other words, non-heterosexual people in xinghun couldn’t make a 
legally enforcing contract regarding personal issues including custody rights when such 
terms were against Chinese marriage law. Xinghun couples who chose to obtain marriage 
certificates in recent years preferred to sign a prenuptial property agreement and get it 
notarised, as they learned that the property agreement was the only legally valid contract 
in the case of xinghun marriage.   
 
For many non-heterosexual people desiring children, entering xinghun marriage was a 
necessary step towards being parents. Based on China’s planned birth policy, it was 
illegitimate to have out-of-wedlock children. Having children with the xinghun partner 
meant that one needed to be even more choosy, since the xinghun partner would be the 
other biological parent and they might remain married for an extended period. Further to 
the process of selection, a ‘suitable’ and desirable xinghun partner for a socially 
recognised normative marriage were that they be gender-conforming and hold a 
cosmopolitan middle-class status (Engebretsen 2017). My friend-respondents often joked 
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that finding an ideal xinghun partner was even harder than finding a good same-sex lover. 
Furthermore, Ei’s case suggested that financial capability sometimes was not the major 
reason non-heterosexual people chose to have children through xinghun. Assisted 
reproductive technologies such as IUI (intrauterine insemination) and IVF (in-vitro 
fertilization) in China were only available to married couples. Otherwise, unmarried 
people had to go overseas or choose private medical institutions in mainland China which 
were situated in legally grey areas. Several middle-class non-heterosexual people told me 
that they chose xinghun even though they could afford all the parenting costs. They were 
worried that if their children didn’t grow up with a father and a mother, they would suffer 
discrimination at school and enjoy a less accomplished childhood.  
 
Ei and her xinghun partner obtained a marriage certificate once they agreed to co-parent. 
Yet their plan to have children was postponed for several years until Ei broke up with her 
ex-girlfriend in 2015. Ei and her xinghun partner went to the hospital to do IUI in 2016. 
In 2017, she gave birth to a son and a daughter and started showing photos of her children 
on social media. Ei always complained it was too late for her to decide to be a mother: 
“I was already 34 when I did IUI. When I was 7-month pregnant, it was already hard 
for me to turn around. One day, I was just stretching my arm to reach the bookshelf, 
my water suddenly broke and Ju drove me to hospital”.  
When Ei was with her ex-girlfriend from 2009 to 2015, Ei had helped her ex-girlfriend to 
find a xinghun partner. After her ex-girlfriend gave birth to a son, Ei felt like an outsider 
to her ex-girlfriend’s xinghun family. Ei couldn’t see her ex-girlfriend, who stayed at 
home with her baby since childbirth, and this became a major cause for them to break up. 
According to Ei, her ex-girlfriend was too cowardly and dependent to make her own 
decision, which made her eventually like a ‘real wife’ to the xinghun husband. It was at 
this point that Ei determined she would have biological children instead of counting on 
lesbian co-motherhood. 
 
I went over our chat history and found Ei’s commentary on xinghun changed dramatically. 
When we met in 2015, Ei and Ju asserted that “xinghun is the most suitable tactic and 
perhaps the only tactic for Chinese sexual minorities now”. What they implied was that 
xinghun could be a pragmatic solution for them to fulfil parental expectations and to enjoy 
freedom to date same-sex lovers. In the next few years, I repeatedly heard this sentence 




Soon after Ei’s twins were born in 2017, she warned me:  
“If you can raise your children by your own or with your girlfriend, don’t find a 
xinghun partner! Xinghun brings too many troubles and who knows if the kid really 
needs a father!”  
At that time, Ei regretted that she chose to have children with her xinghun husband. She 
complained that her xinghun partner was not economically well-off and was stingy with 
children. They also had an unpleasant argument when her xinghun partner proposed to 
take the children to the army with him. For Ei, co-parenting with her xinghun partner 
became unexpectedly problematic, and she wished she could raise children on her own 
even if it meant that she had to bear all the parenting costs and be recognised as a divorced 
single mother in public. 
 
Since Ei bought a bigger apartment herself last year, she got divorced from her xinghun 
partner to avoid future property disputes (or we can say Ei used it as an excuse to get rid 
of the marriage certificate). Ei has been taking care of the newborn twins with her mum 
since the divorce. Her former legal husband had to stay in the army during weekdays and 
his parents were not healthy enough to take care of the children. Ei showed me the divorce 
agreement which indicated that she had full custody and her legal ex-husband needed to 
pay the stated alimony every month.  
 
When we met in person in 2019, Ei didn’t complain about anything. Instead, she 
mentioned that her xinghun partner came to her apartment every Saturday. Since her 
xinghun partner didn’t want to sleep at her home, he usually arrived before 8 am and left 
when the children fell asleep: 
“My friends all told me I am lucky because not every father is willing to see his kid 
every weekend. My xinghun partner is a quiet person who doesn’t like to play around 
with other gay men. He’d rather come to see his kids.”  
Ei’s co-parenting experience with her xinghun partner reveals the complex interplay of 
legal policies, economic considerations, and moral values. Although Ei said her xinghun 
was rather ‘nominal’ as she made effort to avoid possible property disputes, she still had 
moral expectations of her xinghun partner based on their kin roles. In the later stage, Ei 




Various social research reveals that xinghun was often used by non-heterosexual people 
as a pragmatic coping strategy to meet parental expectations (Choi & Luo 2016, 
Engebretsen 2017, Wang 2019). It should be noted that entering a heterosexual marriage 
was never the ultimate hope of non-heterosexual people’s families of origin as parental 
expectations would always involve having offspring. Therefore, xinghun shouldn’t be 
understood as merely a solution to ease marriage pressure from families of origin. By 
discussing xinghun in the context of queer parenting, I want to create a wider 
understanding of the practices of gay-lesbian xinghun and co-parenting. My research has 
suggested non-heterosexual people’s motivation for choosing xinghun could be linked 
not only to parental expectations but also to their desires to be ‘legitimate’ parents that 
complied with the image of the heteronormative family.  
 
Wen, a 34-year-old lesbian working in a furniture company, didn’t consider her xinghun 
marriage to be the result of parental pressure. Also, she didn’t equate getting xinghun-
married with being blindly obedient to her parents. 
“I don’t like to be pushed. If I felt I was being pushed to do something, I would fight. 
My parents never gave me any pressure to marry. I chose xinghun marriage two years 
ago not because I must do it, but because I thought I could do it. Being married makes 
things convenient. I could use it as excuse to avoid the after-work social activities 
with my boss and colleague. Maybe it sounds like a huge sacrifice to many others, 
but it was an easy task for me. Also, I want to have children now because it was not 
a difficult thing for me to do.”  
Wen spent some time emphasising that she chose xinghun out of her own free will, and 
she was not being used by her xinghun husband, nor did she ever use him. Another 
respondent contended, “xinghun is just a lifestyle one chooses.” Their narratives indicated 
that they refused to victimise themselves, but rather to mobilise themselves as moral 
subjects who could fulfil their filial piety and manage their own life choices (see also 
Wang 2019). Yet, after learning of other xinghun divorce cases in which the lesbian lost 
the custody of children, Wen was hesitating and thinking about having children by herself 
instead of co-parenting with her xinghun husband. 
 
Young non-heterosexual people, especially queer activists, contended that xinghun 
marriage fundamentally cheated parents and the queer community. Several LGBT 
organisation workers said,  
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“These people who choose xinghun won’t be interested in doing anything to support 
our community. Do you know why it is so hard for us to come out? It is because of 
them.”  
 
Whether one approved of the practice of xinghun or not, it was widely agreed in queer 
communities that xinghun was much more complicated than business deals; just like the 
saying frequently quoted when discussing xinghun: “marriage is never between two 
people, but between two families”. People in xinghun marriages often had to comfort their 
parents-in-law, and both parties might feel wronged during such processes (Tao 2015). 
In recent years, I witnessed an increasing number of helplines and sharing sessions hosted 
by LGBT organisations to deal with the legal dispute raised by xinghun. Xie kept warning 
every queer friend, “Xinghun will only solve the current problem and leave more 
problems for later.”  
 
As Ei has specified, there are many forms of xinghun marriage; some were more ‘nominal’ 
and some were more ‘like real family’. Danny planned to only have a wedding with her 
xinghun partner. As a lawyer, Danny didn’t want to get a marriage certificate because “it 
(legal marriage) involves property”. Moreover, she didn’t want to use her xinghun 
partner’s sperm to have children because “we may scramble for children in the future”. 
In other words, Danny didn’t want her child to be biologically linked to her xinghun 
partner. What Danny looked for was an essentially ‘nominal’ xinghun as she wanted no 
legal nor parenting bonds with her xinghun partner. The only reason she wanted a xinghun 
husband was because she didn’t want her parents and colleagues to suspect that she was 
a lesbian. It should be noted that Danny’s job as a lawyer allowed her to bear all the costs 
of the IVF procedure and childrearing. Both Danny and Ei were well-off and have bought 
their own apartment. Some of their friends had what they called a ‘like a real marriage’ 
process: the xinghun bridegroom’s parents provided an apartment as bride-price and the 
xinghun bride’s parents provided a car as a dowry, and the xinghun couple obtained an 
official marriage certificate and lived together in the matrimonial home. For queer women 
who were not economically independent enough to raise children on their own and queer 
men who wanted biological children but could not afford surrogacy, the division of labour 
in parenting could be ‘like a real family’. The xinghun husband paid for the necessary 





To sum up, having children through the practice of xinghun and IUI/IVF technology was 
often considered a pragmatic option as the parenting costs were shared by the xinghun 
husband and wife. Also, holding a marriage certificate permitted the xinghun couple to 
use ART such as IUI at hospitals and ensured that the childbirth was lawful in mainland 
China. In this sense, xinghun was not seen as merely a solution to marriage pressure, but 
also a solution to complying with the state regulation which tightly linked parenting to 
legal heterosexual marriage. The difference non-heterosexual people drew between 
‘nominal’ and ‘like real family’ in the practice of xinghun was crucial for understanding 
marriage and parenting in Chinese society. The terms ‘nominal’ and ‘like real’ were used 
by my respondents to compare different types of xinghun marriage and demonstrated their 
understanding of a normative family in public eyes. For them, the essence of marriage 
that made it ‘real’ was the gendered division of work rather than an affectionate and 
sexual relationship between husband and wife.  
 
While Wen and Danny framed xinghun as a personal choice that could be adjusted to 
resemble business cooperation, they neglected the roles of their financial capability and 
social status that enabled them for such a negotiation. The traditional patriarchal values 
had a significant influence on xinghun arrangements. Engebretsen (2009) suggests that, 
even in xinghun, men and women’s life trajectories are conditioned by gender norms. 
While men could continue to pursue their careers, women’s choices were limited as they 
were expected to focus on kids and chores. In the case of gay-lesbian co-parenting, the 
lesbians’ living arrangements could be further limited if they lacked financial capability. 
This is illustrated in Ei and her ex-girlfriend’s different experiences during xinghun 
marriage. While Ei argued that xinghun could be completely nominal, her ex-girlfriend 
was not economically independent and thus lacked negotiating power with her xinghun 
husband and xinghun parents-in-law. As a result, Ei’s ex-girlfriend’s living arrangement 
was significantly restricted. Although xinghun was seemingly a cooperative and 
manageable relationship between two individuals, the xinghun couple had to deal with 
their multiple kinship roles with their parents, xinghun partner, parents-in-law, children, 




Guoji (adopting from a family relative)  
I firstly met Tian at a Shenzhen PFLAG talkfest in 2019. He was with his 5-year-old son 
Xiaoyu and the father-son combination was admired by other attendees with comments 
like “your son is so cute!” His son was wearing a rainbow name tag and playing with 
rainbow colour crayons. We had a brief talk when his son drew a rainbow line on my arm. 
No attendee asked how he ‘had’ his son, neither did I.  
 
Tian was living in Dongguan, an industrial city close to both Shenzhen and Guangzhou. 
Tian was born in 1980 in rural Yongzhou. Located in the south of Hunan, Yongzhou 
borders Guangxi and Guangdong. Tian came to Guangdong after graduating from high 
school as a migrant worker and stayed in multiple places in Guangdong including 
Dongguan, Guangzhou, and Zhuhai. He has worked at different factories and companies 
within the clothing industry. In 2008, he settled in Dongguan and his family, including 
his brother, sister, and parents moved to Dongguan to live in the same neighbourhood. 
His business mainly sold branded clothes on e-commerce sites since he had connections 
with clothing factories in Dongguan. 
 
In 2014, Tian found a lesbian in a QQ chat group under marriage pressure and got married 
in a rush. They obtained a legal marriage certificate as they initially planned to co-parent. 
Tian’s xinghun partner, a young lesbian who identified as P, wanted to marry urgently 
because she wanted to leave her family of origin and live with her girlfriend. The day 
after the wedding, she flew to Nanning to live with her girlfriend. Tian and his xinghun 
partner rarely met afterwards. They had an oral agreement on having children before the 
wedding, while Tian’s partner decided not to have children two years after. Tian 
explained, 
“I am not sure why she changed her mind. Maybe she was afraid that having children 
with me would affect her relationship with her girlfriend. I have heard many women 
will focus on their children rather than spouses after childbirth.”  
This was a story that I frequently heard from both queer men and women. Tian’s 
speculation revealed the gendered expectation placed on his wife by wider society. As 
detailed in the last section, xinghun could be much more complicated than cooperative 
relationships and have an influence on the xinghun couple’s intimate relationship with 
their same-sex lovers. In 2016, Tian’s xinghun partner flew to Dongguan to sign the 




When Tian mentioned his experience of xinghun, I felt confused. If his 5-year-old son 
was not from his former xinghun marriage, how did he ‘get’ a son? Who is Xiaoyu’s 
mother? I asked this question and Tian explained: 
“My son Xiaoyu is my blood (xueyuan). My little brother has two sons. He and his 
ex-wife got divorced after their second son Xiaoyu was born. My little brother is with 
the older son, and I am with the little one now. My brother can’t take care of two 
sons, so one is guoji (adopted from a family relative) by me.”  
Tian’s younger brother was a doctor and rarely had vacation time to be with his children. 
They reached an agreement that Tian could adopt Xiaoyu as his son. In this way, guoji 
transferred Tian’s kin role from being the uncle to the father of Xiaoyu. Guoji adoption 
has had a long history since Confucian China and it was a desirable option for families 
without sons until the late 1960s (Cohen 2005).  
 
I didn’t mention adoption from social welfare institutions in this research because it was 
generally recognised by Chinese non-heterosexual people as impractical and undesirable 
for several reasons. Although unmarried, childless Chinese citizens over 30 years old 
were permitted to adopt children by the 1991 Adoption Law, most applicants wouldn’t 
be able to achieve the economic prerequisites set by adoption centres. Furthermore, the 
China Centre for Children’s Welfare and Adoption clearly stated on its official website 
that same-sex couples were not legally recognised as married couples and thus were not 
allowed to adopt from welfare organisations. Where this kind of adoption happened in 
Children’s Welfare centres, the state was highly involved, investigating the adoptive 
parents’ economic, health and family status. This further suggested that queer people’s 
moral qualification as parents were held in question by state institutions. In short, formal 
adoption from orphanages was not desired by queer people who wanted to be parents for 
economic, moral, and legal reasons. In the case of guoji adoption, the legal process is 
shortened since the adoptive parent and the adoptive child are already relatives.  
 
Several clarifications need to be made here. Guoji was far from an often-mentioned 
pathway to parenthood in queer life-worlds, especially among lesbians. No respondents 
ever talked about lingyang (a general word for adoption) as a desirable option for having 
children. There were two other gay respondents who guoji adopted sons from their 
siblings in my research. No lesbian respondents mentioned guoji adoption, and it 
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appeared that few daughters were guoji adopted. Besides, blood ties remained the 
dominating factor in apprehending parent-child relations here. We mustn’t ignore the fact 
that the men in late Imperial China who adopted sons to maintain the continuity of the 
family line strongly preferred to select heirs from their closest male siblings with the same 
surname (Walker 1996). Guoji could be translated as ‘agnatic adoption’, while its 
traditional aim was to ensure the adopted male heir to care for his adoptive parents and 
worship them after their death (Cohen 2005: 116). Thus, the adopted heir should be old 
enough to know what was going on and be aware of his filial obligation to his adoptive 
parents. For Tian and the other two respondents, the main purpose of guoji was not to 
ensure the continuity of family line, but to have a companion in their life. What Tian and 
other respondents meant by ‘guoji’ was not the same as its traditional meaning. Tian also 
stated that he didn’t adopt Xiaoyu for elder support and his brother could take Xiaoyu 
back in the future if he wanted. 
 
The process of formally adopting Xiaoyu did not go smoothly. To be legally recognised 
as Xiaoyu’s father, Tian had to obtain the signature of Xiaoyu’s biological parents (Tian’s 
brother and former sister-in-law). However, Xiaoyu’s mother refused to sign the adoption 
document. Because of that, Tian hadn’t completed the legal process yet, which meant 
Xiaoyu was not legally recognised as his son. Tian seemed to not be worried about that. 
He simply said,  
“Well, if my younger brother or Xiaoyu’s mother want to have Xiaoyu as their son 
in the future, I will return Xiaoyu; but I believe Xiaoyu’s qinsheng(biological/own) 
parents would want to give the child a better life, wouldn’t they?” 
Xiaoyu calls Tian ‘baba (dad)’ and call Xiaoyu’s little brother ‘xiao baba (little dad)’. 
Xiaoyu was aware that he has two dads and a big brother. Tian undoubtedly had spent the 
most father-son time with Xiaoyu. He held all the financial responsibilities as a father, 
such as paying for Xiaoyu’s education. Also, Tian had the authority to take Xiaoyu to 
different LGBT events. 
 
According to Tian, Xiaoyu’s mother had a bad temper and was not economically well-
off. As Xiaoyu was going to elementary school, his hukou(residence/household) was still 
with Tian’s brother in Yongzhou, Hunan. This meant he couldn’t register with the public 
elementary school in Dongguan. If Xiaoyu was Tian’s legal son, Xiaoyu wouldn’t have 
any problem since Tian had already obtained Dongguan hukou. At that point, I understood 
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what Tian meant by a ‘better’ life. Dongguan certainly had better educational resources 
than rural areas in Youngzhou, Hunan. Therefore, Tian displayed disappointment that 
Xiaoyu’s mother didn’t give her son the opportunity to receive a better education. 
Moreover, taking Xiaoyu to travel each summer was also something Xiaoyu’s mother 
couldn’t do. In fact, Xiaoyu’s mother rarely visited Xiaoyu. Tian’s statement implied that 
Xiaoyu’s mother was selfish because she refused to let Xiaoyu gain better qualifications 
to give Xiaoyu a decent life.  
 
In the case of non-heterosexual people adopting children, biological ties with these 
children could still be essentially important, as the legal policy of adoption didn’t 
recognise non-heterosexual people as suitable parents. The practice of guoji adoption had 
skipped the first stage of gaining the permission of the child welfare centre as a state 
institution and it eliminated public moral dispute. Tian was Xiaoyu’s uncle in genetic and 
conventional kinship terminology. The adoption negotiations happened between relatives 
instead of strangers. When Tian explained that Xiaoyu was his brother’s son, he used the 
specific term guoji instead of the general word adoption/lingyang to legitimate his 
fatherhood through the conception of xueyuan (blood tie). In this way, he also mobilised 
the kinship terminology, transforming her kin role from uncle to father. Even with the 
guoji adoption, legal procedures might still produce discomfort and confusion around 
parenthood for queer parents. The other gay father I interviewed had also described that, 
as an unmarried man, he couldn’t risk his gay identity being found out by the Department 
of Civil Affairs during the adoption process. 
 
Assisted reproductive technologies alone without entering heterosexual marriage 
(out of wedlock childbirth) 
I messaged An through Weibo (a Chinese microblogging website). An was the owner of 
an investment company. He and his partner Ye have mixed-race triplets and their story of 
having children through surrogacy overseas has been reported by several news websites, 
which made them known to the online gay community. An’s Weibo was full of admiring 
comments by other gay men. Many commenters said they would follow An’s path to 
having children. A month later, An replied to me and said I could interview him with 
another sociology researcher. When the other researcher and I arrived at An’s company, 
we found two cameramen with professional video equipment waiting for us. Minutes later, 
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An showed up with his three mixed-race sons and his mother. An’s mother was looking 
after the children during our interview. 
 
An was born in 1985 in Fuyang, a prefecture-level city in the north-western Anhui 
province. An emphasised that his father was a policeman and his mother was a teacher, 
both regarded as decent jobs. An’s first job was in human resources. He came to Shenzhen 
for leisure travel in 2008 and immediately fell in love with the green and humid city. He 
then moved to Shenzhen, borrowed 30,000 RMB and opened a company. An alleged that 
his company had grown to being worth a hundred million RMB. 
 
Two months after An moved to Shenzhen, he met Ye on an online tongzhi live chatting 
room. They met in person a week later and moved together. They started to plan for 
having children in 2011. At that time, Ye was diagnosed with depression. They agreed to 
use An’s sperm since they were concerned Ye’s depression might pass on to the next 
generation. An did research on surrogacy and IVF legal policies and visited hospitals in 
Thailand, Russia, and China. He even invested in a hospital specialising in IVF in Russia. 
An has put a lot of effort into ensuring they would have ‘good’ children. According to 
An, he carefully selected a good-looking Russian model to be the egg donor since he 
always wanted to have mixed-race babies. Moreover, he lost 15 kilograms to achieve his 
best health condition: “I kept tracking my semen quality. In 2013, my sperm vitality had 
improved to 78%, so I started the process.” From 2011 to 2014, An spent more than 4 
million RMB (approximately 586 thousand dollars) towards having children. In 2014, 
three babies were born in a private hospital in Hong Kong. An explained that he has Hong 
Kong citizenship and mentioned that they stayed in the Hyatt Hotel in Hong Kong for 3 
months during this time. An ended his description with an emotional sentence, 
 “After they were born, I was very excited! They are exactly what I imagined!”  
 
An gave precise narratives on how he had children overseas. Since all procedures were 
done outside mainland China, An didn’t need a marriage certificate. On the other hand, 
the costs were significantly higher than the previously mentioned strategies, especially 
when it came to surrogacy. Another gay couple living in Shenzhen spent 1.8 million Hong 
Kong dollars in total to have two children. For queer women who wanted to do IUI or 
IVF procedures without getting married, they might either go to an overseas hospital (with 
or without a Chinese agency) or choose a private medical centre in mainland China which 
115 
 
usually charged higher amounts than the public hospital. Although buying sperm from a 
sperm bank and doing IUI/IVF were lawful in China, these were not available to 
unmarried women. In other words, if Chinese non-heterosexual people wanted to have 
children without getting married and without getting into legally grey areas, they had to 
do so overseas. An was aware that his description of having children was a powerful proof 
of his privileged social class. As I will further explore in chapter 5, the emerging ART 
such as IVF and surrogacy remains a privilege of the global elite class. 
 
Despite the sky-high costs of ART, especially surrogacy, it was undoubtedly the most 
recent and most desirable option among Chinese non-heterosexual people. For An and 
many other queer parents, not only could ART be done without the fuss raised by 
heterosexual marriage, being able to freely choose the egg/sperm donors was a vital point 
many respondents made. Most importantly, this was often considered the ideal practice 
for a same-sex couple to have children ‘together’ as their mutual bond, while the 
previously mentioned practices always involved another heterosexual marriage and 
another opposite-sex parent outside their queer intimate relationships. As discussed 
earlier, even the claimed-to-be-nominal xinghun could produce unequal relations based 
on given kinship roles and pose restrictions to living arrangements unless both parties had 
equal negotiating power.  
 
A luan (egg) B huai (conceive) had been the most-talked-about Chinese lesbian couples 
since the 2010s. The process of A luan B huai is practically the same as what is termed 
reciprocal IVF in Euro-American societies, in which one partner supplies the eggs to the 
other, who becomes the gestational carrier of the pregnancy. I choose to use the term A 
luan B huai in this research since it is the exact term used in Chinese queer communities. 
The arrangement of A luan B huai was sometimes regarded as T luan P huai since, in 
most cases, the P conceived the baby with the egg from the T. In some cases, one might 
bear two children using both of their eggs, referred to as AB luan B huai. This required 
the assistance of IVF-EF technology, which was far more expensive than doing IUI. I 
asked many desiring lesbian mothers why they didn’t choose to bear the child on their 
own, and they explained that A luan B huai process would make the lesbian couple feel 
that the child was consanguineously bonded to both. According to them, the child carried 
the T’s DNA and was in the P’s uterus to absorb nutrients from P’s body. For example, 
Pam described A luan B huai thus: “imagine a baby comes out from my body and looks 
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like Danny, isn’t it wonderful?” In this sense, Pam felt that having children through A 
luan B huai optimally strengthened her relationship with Danny.  
 
Among gay couples, surrogacy was the desired option, as an emerging number of gay 
icons in China publicly posted their children online and didn’t hide how they had their 
children overseas. Min desired children as he wanted to bring new life into their 
relationship. Min convinced his partner, and they decided to have two babies through 
surrogacy using both their sperm and the egg from the same egg donor. As a result, their 
children would be blood brothers with different fathers but the same mother. By these 
means, Min and his partner have two sons together. They quickly signed a contract with 
an agency in California. The egg donor they chose was a Chinese student studying in the 
States. Min emphasised that the surrogate mother chose this job not because she needed 
money, but because she wanted to help gay parents like him. In this way, Min felt the 
choice hurt no one as the surrogate mother enjoyed her job. Gay fathers who had children 
through surrogacy overseas all stressed that the surrogate mothers were not being 
exploited and enjoyed freedom during their pregnancy. Surrogacy was illegal in China, 
though there was an increasing number of private reproductive medical centres and ART 
agencies associated with the underground market in surrogacy. 
 
Compared to going overseas, some non-heterosexual people decided to do ART in 
mainland China since it was cheaper and less time-consuming. For most people, they 
simply couldn’t get enough vacation time to do it overseas. Yet these private businesses 
were not legitimate in China and thus could raise legal issues and even human rights 
debates. I will discuss further the use of ART and ART business in the next chapter.  
 
Besides financial capability, gender norms often came to shape queer parents’ decision-
making process when it came to employing ART. In explaining unmarried births to others, 
lesbian mothers showed different concerns from gay fathers. Although IUI and IVF 
costed less than surrogacy and raised less moral dispute, being recognised as an unmarried 
parent in the workplace and in general public could be more troublesome for women. Gay 
fathers I met didn’t think it was an immensely difficult task to explain where the child 
came from to others. When Tian signed a surrogacy contract with a Thai agency to have 
his second child, I asked him how he was going to present his newborn son to his parents 
since he hadn’t come out to them at that stage. Tian seemed not to be worried and said 
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maybe he would just tell others that he had had an affair with a foreign woman (he chose 
a Thai egg donor). Either way, his parents would be joyful to see their new grandchild. 
We went on to discuss the difference between men and women and Tian smiled, saying 
“(as a woman) you may not use the same strategy.” Truly, lesbian mothers I know tended 
to worry much more about explaining their pregnancy and newborn child to others as an 
unmarried woman. Moreover, the concern was not merely about social opinion, but also 
about the social policy regarding unmarried childbirth. Pam was working in a private 
company, and she explained her worries about doing IVF as a single mom: 
“My colleagues don’t know I am ‘les’ and they never see my ‘boyfriend’. I can’t 
imagine them seeing me pregnant. I am sure they will be puzzled when I apply for 
pregnancy leave but not eligible to apply for maternity allowance29.”  
 
These respondents’ personal narratives have demonstrated that this seeming ideal practice 
was only available to the upper-middle-class subject who could afford the high cost of 
childbirth and parenting and whose career was unlikely to be affected by employer and 
social policies. Furthermore, in the case of same-sex couples desiring children together, 
the children could only be legally bonded to one of them based on the law, which they 
had to strategically overcome to address their needs.  
 
Conclusion: New Moral Dilemmas for Queer (Wannabe) Parents 
In short, there are several implications non-heterosexual people emphasised when 
discussing their motivations for and approaches to having children. The first one is 
morality. As non-heterosexual people living in a society where having offspring has been 
a significant aspect of filial piety and only heterosexual married couples are granted legal 
rights to have children, their desires and pathways to parenthood are central to moral 
discourse. In pre-modern China, the ritual practice of ancestor worship and the Confucian 
conceptions of filial piety both placed emphasis on the continuation of patrilineal lineage. 
Five kinds of relations were put in descending order: ruler-minister, father-son, elder 
brother-younger brother, husband-wife, and friend-friend. While some queer parents, 
especially the post-80s and post-70s, explained that they had no choice but to have 
children to please their parents or to expect elderly support as return from children, many 
non-heterosexual people disconnected their purpose for having children from the notions 
 
29 The social security departments in most Chinese cities didn’t issue birth insurance to unmarried mothers 
since they were against ‘planned birth’. 
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of traditional familial duty and instead framed their motivation for being parents as a 
positive and voluntary act. Also, a generational shift in understanding filial piety from 
‘obedience’ and ‘duty’ to ‘mutual respect’ and ‘equal relations’ is emerging. In addition, 
the increasing housing and living costs have discouraged the urban youth from being 
parents and inevitably shaped how they envision their future care relationships. It should 
also be noted that parental authority has been weakening. For these reasons, fewer and 
fewer queer urbanites mention having children as an ultimate solution to fulfil family 
obligations and to ensure one’s elderly support. In this sense, Chinese young non-
heterosexual people stressed a moral-immoral divide as well as a modern-tradition divide. 
By deeming the Confucian tradition of continuing family line as no longer economically 
rewarding and morally praiseworthy, the young generation in urban China has created a 
new discourse on morality and immorality. On the other hand, non-heterosexual people’s 
investment in parenting shouldn’t be interpreted as being exclusively traditional or 
modern as their practices don’t occupy such a binary. Sorainen’s research on queer 
personal lives in a small Finnish city shows that investment in queer parenting can be 
“both intimately connected to the family form and very queer” (Monk 2014, cited in 
Sorainen 2015:48). Following this, I suggest that non-heterosexual people’s moves to 
parenthood can be both linked to traditional Confucian values and queer modernity. 
 
Moreover, the tendency in online and offline queer communities to morally evaluate non-
heterosexual people’s pathways to parenthood is notable. There are many ways to become 
a parent for Chinese non-heterosexual people, but they may not be recognised equally in 
terms of feasibility and moral values. When making their decisions to have children and 
when reflecting on such decisions, queer parents need to measure their self-interests and 
interpret their actions in a proper relational manner with other people involved, so they 
may maintain a moral accountability in their social circles. The discourse of the moral-
immoral divide is vital for understanding selfhood in the transforming Chinese society. 
The Chinese ‘self’ can be “divided by a number of ‘dividers,’ such as past versus present, 
public versus private, moral versus immoral, and so on” (Kleinman et al 2011:5). Yan 
(2017) has furthered the discussion on the divided selfhood and suggests a tripartite 
approach to understanding Chinese personhood as both a statement and an action. He 
argues that, in the dynamic process of ‘doing personhood’ (zuoren), the moralist self is 
employed to control the desiring individual for the purpose of making oneself the proper 
relational person (3). A person’s moral accountability and reputation are achieved through 
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cultivating good relations with other people. In this sense, personhood is also a social 
action, a process of becoming embedded through the three components (ibid). A rather 
intriguing topic here is the connection between the moral landscape in Chinese society 
and individual practices of non-heterosexual people. This chapter’s ethnographic 
accounts have demonstrated that there is no one consistent moral stand for Chinese non-
heterosexual people to maintain. Building on Yan’s argument that personhood is a 
process of becoming, I suggest that we take all three components - the moralist self, 
desiring individual, and relational person - to unpack Chinese queer (wannabe) parents’ 
changing moral dilemmas. As a Chinese queer person, the moral worth of one’s action is 
relationally evaluated by their parents, their lovers, their colleagues, their friends, and 
themselves in a temporal and spatial context. In this context, the discourse on moral-
immoral divide is always manifold and dynamic. For instance, Zhenzhen used the 
prevalent discourse on filial piety to explain her intention to have children as reasonable 
and morally good, whereas Danny and Pam would blame Zhenzhen for being a selfish 
person and claim that they would never have children for that purpose. Xie had a son from 
her previous heterosexual marriage almost two decades ago, so her choice to get married 
would receive fewer moral criticisms than same-sex desiring people who marry straight 
people today. When xinghun marriages were morally unacceptable in some young non-
heterosexual people’s eyes, some queer parents like Ei describe xinghun as a practical 
tactic to raise children and to form a socially recognisable normative family. The 
emerging online and offline queer social circles have also played an increasingly 
remarkable role in apprehending Chinese non-heterosexual people’s personhood. For the 
younger generation of non-heterosexual people in urban China, being an honest person in 
intimate relationships and queer friend circles can be as significant as being a virtuous 
child in their parents’ eyes. 
 
The other two factors that arise here within the moral-immoral discourse are law and 
finance, which I will take up again in the next chapters. In addition to moral measurements, 
queer individuals' ability to cope with state policy and the rising costs of being parents 
undoubtedly shaped their decision regarding parenthood. On the other hand, rather than 
hoping for the existing marriage and adoption law to change, most queer respondents 
hoped to gain personal agency and purchasing power. In a word, having children is a 
morally, legally, and financially charged process. This is particularly evident in xinghun 
partners who co-parent. Co-parenting with one’s xinghun partner reveals the complex 
120 
 
interplay of legal policies, gender norms, and moral values, as non-heterosexual people 
in xinghun marriage struggle to walk the blurred line between ‘nominal’ and ‘real’ 
marriage. When zhihun or xinghun marriages came to an end, the custody of children 
often became the major divorce dispute, according to countless testimonials from my 
respondents and online discussion forums. The existing policy regarding adoption in 
Chinese child welfare centres doesn’t recognise non-heterosexual people as qualified 
parents. The practice of guoji adoption from family relatives saves non-heterosexual 
people from the first step of gaining permission from the child welfare centre as a state 
institution and eliminates moral dispute. Nevertheless, going through the relevant legal 
procedures can still produce discomfort and confusion around parenthood for queer 
parents. Against this backdrop, using ART alone without entering any form of 
heterosexual marriage has been constructed as the seeming ideal option for queer 
wannabe parents, especially same-sex couples, when it comes to having children of their 
own. For non-heterosexual people who plan to have children without entering a 
heterosexual marriage, the legal challenges they face are, in many ways, similar to people 
who have ‘out-of-wedlock childbirth’ during the processes of registering birth certificate 
and hukou for their babies, obtaining proper pregnancy leave and maternity insurance, 
and getting their kids in to a public school. As we shall see in the next chapter, the use of 
ART has raised further debates on gender and class inequalities. 
 
Finally, this chapter suggests that we re-examine the figure of the child in urban Chinese 
society. Although family support remains the main resource for old age support in China 
due to the patrilocal tradition and the lack of public support (Xie 2013), the transforming 
family structure and parent-child relation appear to challenge the symbolic importance of 
offspring, and this is especially visualised among young non-heterosexual people who 
refuse to have children. Do Chinese non-heterosexual people’s reproductive choices 
resonate with what Edelman (2004) has called ‘reproductive futurism’? If reproduction is 
no longer seen as a significant feature of filial duty and one’s reliable investment for 
elderly support, what about its importance in forming family and mutuality/jiban for non-
heterosexual people? Again, I will discuss this further in moving to Chinese non-





Chapter 5 Embracing Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART) 
 
This chapter focuses on the interplay of queer social networks and the emerging private 
assisted reproductive technologies (ART) companies in urban China. It also provides 
detailed narratives regarding how Chinese queer (wannabe) parents employ ART services 
to have children. But first, I want to clarify the meaning of ‘Chinese ART companies’ in 
my research. These could roughly be divided into two groups. One type of Chinese ART 
company is the ultimate service provider that owns direct access to a complete 
(underground) industry chain, including doctors and medical centres inside mainland 
China. Another type is intermediary agencies that have office space and some salespeople 
who take clients to the actual service providers in either mainland China or overseas. The 
latter comprises the majority of Chinese ART businesses. Franklin (2013) points out that 
the pursuit of IVF as a popular conjugal technology is not essentially driven by the desire 
to have children but is embodied in a sense of centring one’s life around reproduction. To 
put it another way, the pursuit of reproductive technologies involves not only the desire 
to reproduce, but also the desire to belong to certain social groups, such as groups of 
mothers. In this chapter, I will also investigate ART as a conjugal technology between 
queer couples. 
 
I use data from government websites, mass media, and online discussions on ART to 
articulate the legal and moral context of ART in Chinese society. My friend-informants 
from different genders, ages, and classes interpreted the legal and moral issues regarding 
human gametes selling and surrogacy in diverse ways. This reflects the tensions between 
law, morality, and socio-economic class that are a theme throughout this research. 
Furthermore, this chapter illustrates how ART companies and queer organisations 
sponsored by them continued to shape the notion of reproduction and the future in queer 
life-worlds.   
 
IVF, Human Gamete Donation and Surrogacy in China 
The first baby conceived from in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer (IVF-ET) was 
born at the Third Hospital of Peking University in Beijing in 1988, which marked the 
beginning of the history of ART in Chinese society (Ding 2015, Klein 2017). In the last 
decades, assisted reproduction has increasingly become an area of high-tech expertise. 
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The use of ART in China is strongly connected with its unique birth planning policy and 
socio-cultural emphasis on reproduction. Reproduction has been a significant aspect of 
filial piety in Chinese society for thousands of years, and childlessness was a failure of 
filial duty to the family (Klein 2017). As a result, alternative methods such as guoji 
adoption from close relatives to deal with childlessness have been documented 
throughout Chinese history. China’s one-child policy was established in 1979 and 
remained in effect until 2015. In 1991, the state promulgated the Adoption Law of the 
People's Republic of China to regulate the practice of adoption. Based on this law, 
adopters must be childless and over 30 years old and have proven themselves to be 
capable of rearing. This meant a qualified adopter often needed to have a stable and well-
paid job, a considerable amount of savings, a house they owned, and a flawless credit 
report. On the other hand, the ongoing decline in fertility rates in the last decades resulted 
in fewer children available for adoption than there were before the birth planning policy 
(ibid). The strict regulation of adoption and the shortage of extra children (especially male 
children) made adoption a difficult option for people who wanted heirs. In this context, 
ART has become a vital alternative to deal with infertility.  
 
In 2001, the Ministry of Health30 of the People’s Republic of China issued Order No.14, 
the Management Measures of Human Assisted Reproduction Technology, and No.15, the 
Regulations for the Administration of Sperm Banks. They came in line with the national 
family planning policy, meaning that ART, including IUI (intrauterine insemination, also 
known as artificial insemination), and IVF-ET (In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo 
Transfer), were only available to married infertile couples. Order No.14 states that 
medical facilities and medical personnel must not perform any surrogacy procedures31. 
Meanwhile, the two orders prohibit any form of buying and selling of human sperm, eggs, 
and embryos. In 2003, the Ministry of Health issued a notice concerning the revision of 
the norms, standards, and ethical principles for ART and sperm banks. The notice 
stipulates that medical personnel must not apply ART to couples and single women who 
do not comply with the National Population and Family Planning Law, and must not 
 
30 The Ministry of Health is superseded in 2013 by the National Health and Family Planning Commission 
(NHFPC). In March 2018, the National Health Commission (NHC) replaced the NHFPC and the official 
domain name changed to http://www.nhc.gov.cn.  




choose the sex of the child32 . In 2006, the Ministry of Health issued order No. 44 
regarding the regulation of ART and accreditation of human sperm banks, which requires 
that every infertility centre’s licence be renewed every two years. If requirements are not 
met, the service is suspended. In other words, although IUI and IVF are lawful practices 
and available in over a hundred accredited medical facilities, unmarried Chinese citizens 
are not legally permitted to undertake ART or obtain human gametes from these 
accredited medical facilities. The existing state regulation on the use of ART thus denied 
parenthood to single and non-heterosexual people and further limited their ability to 
produce families. 
 
The National Health and Family Planning Commission has reiterated that surrogacy is an 
illegal practice and has launched special procedures to punish the practice of commercial 
surrogacy more than once. On the other hand, surrogacy is not literally mentioned in the 
National Population and Family Planning Law, which has created ambiguity among the 
public. When the Population and Family Planning Law was amended in 2015, the draft 
of amendment included a clause banning any form of surrogacy. The members of the NPC 
(National People’s Congress) Standing Committee disputed the drafted clause. Some 
members of the NPC argued that the primary purpose of amending the National 
Population and Family Planning Law was to replace the two-child policy with a one-child 
policy, and that the matter of surrogacy needed further consideration. Consequently, the 
revised version of the Population and Family Planning Law did not adopt the earlier 
drafted clause banning surrogacy.  
 
Performing surgery for surrogacy is certainly unlawful in China. Nevertheless, people 
working for private ART companies have argued that the surrogacy business is in the 
‘grey area’ rather than completely banned by state law. Many salespeople at ART 
companies used the 2015-revised Population and Family Planning Law as evidence to tell 
me that “there is no state legislation prohibiting surrogacy”. Although the National Health 
and Family Planning Commission prescribed administrative penalties for surrogacy, the 
criminal sanction for surrogacy was not specified and was not associated with criminal 
law charges in China. In this sense, the law existed in a complex relation to surrogacy, as 
 





it did not simply regulate the practice of surrogacy, but caused more ambiguities within 
it. Based on observations in India and the global surrogacy market, Rudrappa (2018) 
argues that the 2016 ban against commercial surrogacy was brought forward to protect 
surrogacy, but it would deepen working-class women's exploitation in India and other 
countries, especially in Southeast Asia. Some private ART agencies in Guangzhou and 
Shenzhen even stressed to their clients that the Ministry of Health only restrained the 
practices of public hospitals and medical personnel and thus did not apply to private 
clinics. Legal Daily China released an ‘Investigation on the Surrogacy Black Industry 
Chain’ on 17 July 2019, which argues that the underground surrogacy industry chain in 
China was relatively complete, including the entrusting party, the surrogacy intermediary, 
the surrogacy mother, the medical personnel or clinics implementing the surrogacy 
technology, and the device providers of the surrogacy. 
 
Ongoing Debates Over ART in Chinese Online Communities: The Image of a 
Wealthy Gay Couple and a Poor Surrogate Mother? 
Commercial surrogacy and the selling of human gametes have long been disputed within 
the mass media and internet communities. Since the appearance of surrogacy in China, 
major online journals have reported on women losing their uteruses and even lives during 
egg retrieval or surrogacy. On 27 March 2017, Sohu.com published a news article entitled 
‘Renting out the Womb: The Underground Production Line of Chinese Surrogacy 
Market’33. This article detailed the story of a 27-year-old woman, Wang Jialan, who 
became a surrogate mother to ease her family’s financial pressure. Before becoming a 
surrogate, Wang Jialan was an apprentice at a beauty salon. For Jialan, working as a 
surrogate mother was a way to make quick money and was unlike prostitution. Wang 
Jialan received a total paycheck of 150,000 RMB from a private ART agency after she 
gave birth to a child, which helped her family to deal with their financial problems. On 
the other hand, the clients who want children through surrogacy usually pay the private 
agency a total of 350,000 RMB to over 1,500,000 RMB. The article points out that the 
administrative policy banning commercial surrogacy didn’t restrain the development of 
underground surrogacy markets. Furthermore, the growing surrogacy underground chain 
made surrogates vulnerable as they lack negotiating power. 
 
33 Sohu.com is not the original source. This was originally published in ‘news’ sections on several websites, 
while some websites then deleted it. In addition to sohu.com, it could be read via finance.sina.cn and 




On 5 August 2018, Thepaper.cn published a news article entitled ‘Investigation of 
Underground Black Chain Surrogacy Business: 14-year-old teenage girl being tricked 
into selling her eggs, 850,000 RMB for guaranteed one-stop service’34. At the beginning 
of the article, the journalist described the experience of a 14-year-old girl, Xiaojuan, who 
dropped out of school and went to Guangzhou. A web friend talked Xiaojuan into selling 
her eggs to a private agency. The agency pushed Xiaojuan to complete the procedure 
when she found out the egg retrieval operation was performed in a rented apartment. The 
unsanitary and unprofessional procedure triggered ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome 
for Xiaojuan. This article was republished by various influential news media including 
Sina News. Similar news reports appeared on news websites and TV every once in a while. 
In these appearances, the surrogates and egg sellers were represented as unenlightened 
victims who did not know the possible emotional and physical distress caused by these 
procedures, and the private ART companies were referred to as ‘underground/black 
businesses’ that cheated and exploited working-class women from rural China. There 
were parallels here with working-class women’s vulnerability during surrogacy in various 
country contexts such as India and Thailand (Anu et al. 2013, Rudrappa 2018). 
 
In the mass media, the clients of commercial surrogacy and underground gamete selling 
were usually desperate couples who were either infertile or had lost their only children 
and couldn’t find other options to have children. LegalDaily’s new report in 2019 showed 
that 10 to 15 percent of married couples in China have fertility problems, and about 20 
percent of them need assisted reproductive technology to get pregnant. The universal two-
child policy, allowing all married couples in China to have a second child, became 
effective in 2016 and notably encouraged the birth of the second child (Song 2019, Zhang 
et al. 2019). At the same time, older couples who were eager to have a second child 
realised that they were either infertile or too old to bear a child. Furthermore, the shortage 
of available human sperm and eggs in accredited medical facilities seemed to leave 
infertile couples no other choice except turning to the underground ART market. Since 
2016, the growing number of older couples desiring a second child has stimulated the 
booming underground market for informal human gametes trading and surrogacy 
agencies (He 2017, Sohu 2017). My respondents who had been working in the Chinese 
 
34 Thepaper.cn is not the original source. This new article seems to be firstly reported by chudian news. 
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ART industry also agreed that the increased use of private ART agencies and especially 
surrogacy in China in recent years was linked to the second-child policy.  
 
On the other hand, the mass media coverage of the illegal practices of egg selling and 
surrogacy has caused some unexpected consequences. An increasing number of people 
get to know of the existence of ART and become clients of private ART agencies through 
the news, even where ART agencies are portrayed in a negative light: 
“Some parents of gay men didn't know about surrogacy. Once they saw the terrible 
news about the poor surrogate mothers on TV, they realised that their son could do 
this to have children instead of marrying a straight woman!” (Chen, the manager of 
a private ART company in Guangzhou) 
 
The online discourse on ART, especially surrogacy, has become a battlefield where 
gender inequality issues have been visualised. Many female users of Chinese social media 
platforms have actively condemned the underground market in egg donation and 
surrogacy. What is more, people who supported egg donation and surrogacy remained an 
ambiguous group. The mass media platforms, especially TV news, rarely mentioned 
Chinese LGBT people as the clients of underground ART businesses. At the same time, 
it was factual that gay men who employed ART in foreign countries had much more 
online visibility than heterosexual couples who adopted ART to have children. Edison 
Fan is one of the gay-identified influencers who chose to have a mixed-race son through 
surrogacy outside China. His son was born in the United States in November 2017. Unlike 
most gay internet celebrities who had high visibility within online gay communities, but 
were otherwise not known by the public, Edison Fan joined one of the most popular online 
talk shows in 2015, making him famous to the general audience. Geng Le, the BlueD app 
founder, had a baby through surrogacy in the United States in 2017. Some other gay 
fathers who employed surrogacy have become known in online gay communities through 
sharing their daily life with their children on social media, including one of my friend-
respondents, An. It should be noted that Edison Fan, Geng Le, An, and other gay fathers 
who openly shared their lives with their children all used agencies in countries outside 
mainland China. These celebrated gay fathers within online gay communities have 
arguably co-constructed surrogacy as the most desirable strategy for Chinese gay men to 
have children. Compared to these gay fathers, heterosexual couples who have children 
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through surrogacy, either inside mainland China or overseas, kept their practice to a much 
lower profile to avoid gossip (He 2017).   
 
The growing online debates on the legalisation of surrogacy linked poor women to 
wealthy couples and gay men. On December 20, 2019, The Standing Committee of the 
National People's Congress (NPC) announced that they had received 237,057 online 
suggestions and 5,635 letters on the draft book of marriage and family, including 
legalising same-sex marriage (Chinadaily 2019). The announcement by the Chinese 
governing body fuelled numerous polls and open debates on social media. Shortly after 
that, debates on same-sex marriage were linked to the topic of surrogacy. A female user, 
whose web name was A-Yan, posted on the Douban forum: 
“I voted against the legalisation of same-sex marriage (at Ifeng.com35). Do you really 
believe that if same-sex marriage is legalised, there will be no tongqi (wives of 
homosexual men) women? There is no such thing. Gay men still want to have 
children, so whether it is legal or illegal, same-sex marriage does not prevent them 
from pianhun (lying about one’s sexual desires to marry a straight person) to have 
children. Moreover, when same-sex marriage becomes legal, gay men will fight for 
the legalisation of surrogacy as their next stage. Gay men want to promote the 
legalisation of surrogacy by legalising same-sex marriage. Look at Taiwan and the 
United States; we know that women’s status will become even lower when surrogacy 
becomes legal. Not only there will be chaos caused by surrogacy, cases of pianhun 
fraud won’t be reduced, because not every gay man has the economic conditions to 
afford commercial surrogacy and they are going to continue to pianhun” (A-Yan, 
posted 22 December 2019). 
 
A-Yan’s post, which received more than 400 replies, was not a rare one. Many discussants 
showed similar worries that supporting same-sex marriage equals supporting surrogacy. 
Their worries were rooted in the belief that Chinese men would always want a child of 
their own, regardless of their sexualities. Since the issue of tongqi appeared, many women 
have come to argue that the main reason for gay men marrying straight women /pianhun 
 
35 The poll was conducted on 
https://news.ifeng.com/survey.shtml?from=timeline&amp;isappinstalled=0#id=15990, which belongs to 
the Phoenix New Media company. It asks “Do you support the legalisation of same-sex marriage in the 
civil code?”. It received 9,909,482 votes. 
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was to use the tongqi wife to have offspring rather than passing as straight. In this sense, 
gay men who marry straight women used their innocent wives as not only tools for 
passing as straight, but also surrogates for having children. A-Yan’s post entails an 
underlying understanding that gay men were not pitiable for their use of women’s eggs 
and wombs to reproduce. 
 
An online survey conducted by Ding and Gayspot in 2018 showed that 71% of the gay 
respondents wanted to have children through surrogacy and 76% of respondents hoped 
commercial surrogacy became legal in China36 (Ding & Gayspot 2018). What worried 
the female readers of the survey most was that 56% of gay respondents considered China 
to be their desired area for commercial surrogacy. A-Yan and other women on social 
media repeatedly quoted the survey result to prove their argument above. Moreover, I 
suggest that the increasing online visibility of gay fathers whose lifestyles were endorsed 
by other gay men has not only strengthened the reliability of the survey result, but also 
intensified the conflict between the image of gay men as wealthy clients and all women 
as potential victims. In A-Yan’s post, for example, many discussants expressed their 
anger when they saw gay fathers describe how they select ‘luanmei (literally means ‘egg 
girl’)’ and ‘daimu (literally means surrogate)’ during surrogacy. To cite from another 
heated thread with hundreds of replies: 
“You can tell that these gay men don’t respect surrogate mothers and egg donors at 
all by their words. They treat these women like animals and products without 
sympathy. I never seemed to feel the kindness of gay men towards women. On the 
one hand, they want people to understand them and demand social progress to accept 
homosexuality; on the other hand, they still say ‘I need to continue my family line’. 
If you are gay, you should accept being childless.” (Rizhaoyaojin, posted 17 May 
2019) 
 
As a female researcher, I could not disregard these voices from women like A-Yan and 
simply quote words from LGBT-identified people as comment on this matter. During 
fieldwork, I frequently heard gay men saying, “I am envious of you lesbians. You have a 
uterus. Having children for you was no trouble.”  The ‘trouble’ simply meant surrogacy 
was more expensive than IUI/IVF, so lesbians could spend less on having children. This 
 
36 Gayspot and Ding released two questionnaires with some similar questions for mutual verification. 
Questionnaire A received A total of 1,104 replies, and questionnaire B received A total of 1,051 replies. 
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assumption was not factual, although it unpacked the moral and economic aspects within 
the practice of having children. The use of ART is undoubtedly always linked with the 
woman’s body. In IVF, the woman’s ovaries “are artificially forced to ripen extra eggs, 
which are then surgically extracted. This process is expensive, unpleasant, and somewhat 
risky for the woman involved” (Greely 2016:9). Moreover, IVF is often combined with 
other procedures in the case of same-sex couples having children. For instance, a lesbian 
couple would need donated/sold sperm, and a gay couple would need donated/sold eggs 
and a surrogate to have children. Egg retrieval operations and surrogacy cause more 
physical and emotional discomfort for women, and in some cases, these procedures can 
even be life-threatening.  
 
For gay men who desired biologically-related children in China, consuming a surrogacy 
service in a country that had legalised surrogacy was probably seen by the public as the 
most ethical way. Otherwise, gay men having children would always involve the issue of 
a tongqi being used as a free surrogate, a disadvantaged lesbian in a xinghun marriage, or 
a poor surrogate being exploited. For A-Yan, Rizhaoyaojin, and many other young 
women against the practice of surrogacy, Chinese gay men became the main supporters 
for legalising surrogacy in China due to their gender, their role as sons in a patrilineal 
family, and their desire for biological offspring. In this discourse, tongqi, surrogate 
mothers, and women selling their eggs to private agencies were exploited by gay men and 
dehumanised as instruments for having children. Following this argument, the 
legalisation of same-sex marriage became a threat to women’s social status and rights, as 
it might lead to the legalisation of surrogacy.  
 
In addition to the debates raised mainly by women who identified as straight, a great 
number of queer women compared xinghun marriage to surrogacy. Many young lesbian 
respondents assured me that they would never co-parent with gay men. One young lesbian 
respondent claimed: 
“Gay men want xinghun marriage because they can’t afford doing surrogacy in 
countries where surrogacy is legal. They don’t want to pay for having children, so 
they turned to us thinking we can be free surrogates for them!”  
It should be noted that, compared to lesbian mothers who used ART, gay fathers were 
more prone to moral criticism for their use of ART-involved surrogacy. Yet, it did not 
mean that lesbian mothers’ use of ART was ethically acceptable in public discourse. 
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Rather, lesbian mothers’ presence was marginal in public discourse. There were a lot 
more gay-identified micro-celebrities rather than lesbian-identified influencers in Chinese 
mainstream social media platforms overall. To put it another way, gay men’s use of 
surrogacy attracted much more public attention than lesbians’ use of IUI and IVF. Thus, 
queer women and queer men did not deal with the same moral discourse when they 
became clients of ART businesses. 
 
In short, the major platforms for mass media (which seemed to represent the state’s 
attitude due to censorship) portrayed the practices of human gamete trading and 
commercial surrogacy as not only illegal, but also unethical. At the same time, they 
displayed an ambiguous attitude toward the clients of private ART companies rather than 
blaming them. The debates about the practice of surrogacy have been linked closely to 
issues on gender inequality, which further expanded to issues on gay fatherhood and 
same-sex marriage, shadowed by conventional gender and kinship norms in China. For 
many young women in urban China who were concerned about the gender privilege gay 
men held, gay men were only not a threat to women’s rights when they did not desire 
reproduction and abandoned their existing gender privilege. In these debates, gay men’s 
ethical right to pursue biological reproduction was held in question. The emerging 
practice of commercial surrogacy has shaped young women’s attitudes toward gay men 
and LGBT communities. Against this background, it is worth scrutinising the relations 
between queer communities and ART companies and exploring how practices of ART 
are apprehended in Chinese queer lives.  
 
The Only True Sponsor? ART Companies and Their Marketing Strategies with 
Chinese LGBT clients 
On 18 August 2018, I walked into a hotel away from the city centre in Shenzhen to attend 
an annual national conference held by one of the largest LGBT non-profit organisations. 
PFLAG China stands for Parents, Families & Friends of Lesbians and Gays in China. 
PFLAG China states that they focus on various family issues including parental 
acceptance, queer parenting, and elderly care. When I was registering for the conference 
via their WeChat page, I noticed the event’s purpose was to “fix parent-child relationships, 
support family harmony, and build a harmonious society together”. On my way from the 
subway station to the hotel, I met at least 20 volunteers waving small rainbow flags and 
giving attendees directions. The meeting room for the conference was on the 7th floor of 
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the hotel. When I walked out of the elevator, I found the corridor and meeting room full 
of people. More than 500 people registered, and 300 people attended this event. I noticed 
a roll-up banner (pic.1) of an ART agency named HH Company in the meeting room. 
There were flyers (pic.2) of the same company on every chair as well. 
 
Pic.1 banner for HH Company 
 




The annual conference started with a short video introducing the history of PFLAG China 
and emphasised ‘love, understanding, responsibility, family’ as PFLAG’s theme. There 
were four hosts, two identifying as gay men and two identifying as lesbians. The talkfest 
consisted of six topics. At each topic, a host would organise the talk with guest speakers. 
The last topic was ‘having and raising children’. The guest speaker Chen was the business 
leader of the HH ART Company, which sponsored the conference. She briefly introduced 
the service that HH Company provides. Moreover, she revealed that she and her girlfriend 
have twins through IVF. Finally, she promised that clients reaching them through PFLAG 
China would enjoy the guaranteed success (bao chenggong) package without paying extra 
fees. Chen and her colleagues booked a guest room in the hotel for consultations after the 
conference. 
 
From August 2018 to July 2019, I attended six PFLAG events in Shenzhen, Dongguan, 
and Guangzhou (all located within the Guangdong Province). The number of attendees 
ranged from around 50 to above 300. It became impossible for me to ignore that all of 
these PFLAG events were sponsored by ART companies. In every event poster, there was 
a logo of PFLAG and a logo of an ART company (pic.3). At every event, there were 
representatives from ART companies giving speeches on their experiences of having 
children. In fact, LGBT people talking about having children has become a fixed part of 
the program at all LGBT events held by PFLAG China. There were promotional banners 
and information booths in every talkfest for potential LGBT clients. By attending the 
events, I got to know Zhao and Chen, two of my major respondents who worked closely 




Pic.3 some posters for PFLAG China events   
 
After moving to Guangzhou to live with his boyfriend, Zhao started job hunting and his 
previous work experience as a schoolteacher qualified him to be a training manager at 
PFLAG China. Not long after joining PFLAG, Zhao took on the new challenge of 
becoming the fundraising manager. As the first fundraising manager at a large Chinese 
LGBT organisation, Zhao’s work experience was significant for understanding the 
relations among Chinese LGBT organisations and private companies. Zhao had tried to 
raise funds from various enterprises selling consumer goods. Nevertheless, few of the 
companies were willing to provide money to LGBT events directly. For instance, some 
cosmetics and sex toy companies offered coupons and samples as gifts for attendees. On 
the other hand, the ART agencies gave positive responses to Zhao’s request: 
“These ART services are almost the only business that supports us (PFLAG China) 
with real money (zhenjinbaiyin). At first, we worked with foreign ART organisations 
and agencies assisting clients in having children in the United States. Now you see, 
we are sponsored mostly by the Chinese ART companies because the overseas ART 
organisations are too expansive. Many overseas ART organisations thought they 
didn’t attract clients from PFLAG and therefore stopped supporting our events. 
Furthermore, we believe the Chinese ART companies are more affordable for most 
Chinese LGBT people.”  
 
In 2018, Zhao resigned from his position at PFLAG China. His previous business contact, 
Chen, reached out to him and offered him a job position in HH Company. Since then, 
Zhao has worked as a sales and marketing counsellor in HH Company specifically for 
LGBT clients. Zhao told me that he had thought about finding a new job in another LGBT 
non-profit organisation, but he then thought that “working in these private ART 
companies can also help LGBT people”. During the fourth month of his new job, Zhao 
acquired two clients. One client was a married woman introduced by his lesbian friend, 
and the other client was a single gay man in his 40s.  
 
Two months after exchanging WeChat numbers with Chen, I had the chance to visit HH 
Company’s main office. Chen’s HH Company was the major title sponsor of PFLAG 
annual talkfests. HH Company was located in a commercial building near several major 
transport terminals. When I arrived in the afternoon, Chen was chatting with a middle-
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aged heterosexual couple and a young woman. She asked me to wait in her office with 
her other two lesbian friends. After a brief talk with Chen’s friends, I realised that the 
married couple was interviewing the young woman as a potential egg provider for their 
expected child. “The wife couldn’t conceive as they tried many times in hospital”, they 
told me, “but she is so picky about the egg donor. She should know how hard it is to find 
a woman willing to sell her eggs”. I introduced myself and asked about their purpose for 
visiting the HH Company. They replied that they had known Chen for a long time and 
were considering opening a branch of the HH Company in Shenzhen. They were very 
interested in the ART industry as they went over the document Chen provided.  
 
An hour later, Chen finished her conversation and came back to the office to chat with us. 
Her office looked typical of most Chinese entrepreneurs, with a tea table and tea set big 
enough for six people to talk while drinking tea. After her friends finished reading the 
document, Chen handed it to me and said: 
“You must know many rich gay and lesbian people. If you introduce customers to us, 
you will get a percentage of the sales as well! You can cooperate with us like these 
two. You know you can trust my company as we sponsored PFLAG events. Feel free 
to look at our service packages and ask questions!”   
I quickly went over the document and thanked Chen for her trust. As someone with lots 
of queer contacts, I had great potential as a sales agent in their eyes. We chatted casually 
and had several cups of tea. After Chen’s friends and colleagues left the office, she started 
to reveal her personal history.  
 
Chen referred to herself as a T and it was easy for me to tell this from her appearance and 
the way she spoke. She was born in 1985 in Zhuzhou, Hunan. She came to Guangzhou at 
an early age for better job opportunities. She has had some romantic same-sex 
relationships; her ex-girlfriends either cheated on her or entered heterosexual marriages. 
Eight years ago, Chen met her partner Liu, the sales manager in one of the earliest Chinese 
ART companies. According to Chen, Liu was a very capable and strong-minded woman. 
Liu was divorced and lived with her son before Chen ‘baiwan (made someone gay)’ Liu. 
Chen then started working as Liu’s assistant. Two years after moving in together, they 
thought about having children together. For Chen, the process via which to have children 
was easy due to Liu’s position, 
135 
 
“Before meeting Liu, I never knew that I could have children without marrying a 
man! Liu’s career offered us a chance to get enough information and resources to 
have children through IVF.”  
 
Chen and Liu quickly decided to have two children using their eggs and the same man’s 
sperm. Chen called it ‘AB luan (egg) A huai (conceive)’, a developed version of A luan 
B huai and required better medical techniques. They went through the list of sperm sellers 
at Liu’s company and asked one to provide sperm. Liu gave birth to lovely twins, who 
were four years old when I met them. Chen mentioned her experience of having children 
as a lesbian mother every time she advertised the HH Company at LGBT events.   
 
Two years ago, Chen used her experience working as Liu’s assistant to found HH 
Company with a doctor she previously worked with. Chen was responsible for the sales 
part and the co-founder specialised in the IVF procedures. According to Chen, there were 
more than 150 IVF/surrogacy agencies in Guangzhou by 2018, while few of these 
agencies own actual medical clinics. “A lot of them bring their clients to us because we 
have a real medical lab”, said Chen. In other words, Chen’s company was the actual 
service provider in the industry, and she was hoping to make connections with as many 
agencies as possible. She confirmed that every surgery was performed in their ‘medical 
lab’ in Guangzhou, including test-tube surrogacy37. Chen’s statement about the number 
of ART companies was somewhat accurate. As Yang and Yan (2012)’s report indicates, 
there were four to five hundred surrogacy companies in China: one-tenth of them in 
Guangzhou alone. LegalDaily’s report in 2019 also estimates that there were over 400 
surrogacy agencies in China. Since the two-child policy passed in 2015, a large number 
of heterosexual couples tried to have their second child. Many of them turned to private 
agencies when public hospitals couldn’t provide satisfying results. Private ART agencies 
continue to grow in cities. Chen was aware that the business was in the grey area as she 
mentioned it multiple times. At the same time, she seemed not to be worried about being 
shut down by authorities. According to her, Guangdong was far from Beijing, so “the 
policy is more relaxed”. Her company was expanding vigorously across China during and 
after my fieldwork.  
 
 
37 I didn’t get to visit the ‘medical lab’. Chen didn’t want non-clients to know the exact location of the lab 
because they could be shut down and fined if they were discovered by the authorities.  
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Similar to other Chinese ART companies, Chen’s company offered two IVF and two 
surrogacy service packages for clients. The IVF basic package was around 150,000 RMB 
and the basic surrogacy package was around 600,000 RMB, excluding the cost of buying 
human gametes. Choosing the more expensive package means the client can choose the 
sex of their children (usually for people who want sons). Chen’s company provides 
services for both straight and non-heterosexual people, which was rather uncommon 
among hundreds of Chinese ART companies. HH Company has divided their target 
market into six groups, including families who have lost their only child (shidu jiating), 
couples who want sons, couples who were too old to bear a second child after the two-
child policy became effective in 2015, couples suffering infertility problems, wives who 
don’t want pregnancy to ‘ruin’ their bodies, and LGBT people who want children. During 
my fieldwork, Chen’s company established a ‘Rainbow Business Division’ and continued 
to develop their strategies to attract Chinese LGBT wannabe parents. 
 
Pic.4 Logos of HH ART Company and its ‘Rainbow Business Division’ 
 
In 2018, Chen hired Zhao, who had previously worked at PFLAG China. She later hired 
several other gay men at different LGBT organisations as salespersons. The rest of the 
HH company employees were relatives of the other main partner of the company. 
Regardless of their gender and sexual identities, the HH Company employees were aware 
of the strategies for locating LGBT potential clients through LGBT-themed social media 
platforms. Chen’s colleagues have studied gay and lesbian slang terms extensively, 
including 1,0, T, P, and so on. They tried to tell if their clients were 1 or 0 sometimes 
from their appearance. A married male manager responsible for finding surrogate and egg 
providers told me he didn’t know the meaning of these jargons before he started working 
at the company. Once, during my visit to HH Company’s office, a young male employee 
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who is Chen’s nephew explained to other employees about gay slang by showing them 
the livestreaming on the BlueD (gay social networking) app. He was in several xinghun-
marriage/queer parenting WeChat groups. Chen firstly taught her nephew to post on gay 
and lesbian forums alleging, “I want to organise a xinghun WeChat group for everyone 
to meet”. After gathering sufficient members in a chat group, he would send each member 
a friend request and talk to them individually. “You can’t advertise directly in the chat 
groups, and you can’t tell them what you do”, Chen suggested to her nephew and other 
new recruits, “you need to let these members browse your WeChat profile and find out 
what our company does by themselves. Then, they will come to you when they want a 
child”. They regularly post positive news about how they assisted their clients in 
becoming parents. The tactics of ‘pretending’ to be lesbians and gay men and organising 
xinghun chat groups were based upon their knowledge of queer daily lives. As mentioned 
in the last chapter, one purpose for Chinese non-heterosexual people to enter heterosexual 
xinghun marriages was to have children. In other words, people who were interested in 
xinghun were usually interested in having children as the following step.  
 
Not long after they started sponsoring LGBT events, HH Company’s ‘Rainbow Business 
Division’ established a WeChat Public Account named ‘Rainbow Studio’. This account 
regularly shared LGBT-related news with their company’s information attached (see 
Pic.5). Likewise, a few ART agencies offering IVF/surrogacy service packages in China 
or overseas own WeChat public accounts named “(company name) Rainbow Baby”. They 
mostly share positive news and useful information on LGBT rights and the development 




Pic.5 picture attached with ‘Rainbow Studio’ articles 
 
On December 15, 2018, I attended a “Rainbow family sharing salon” held by Chen’s 
company. Zhao was the main organiser. The salon was advertised in the xinghun 
marriage/queer parenting WeChat groups and was held in the office of ZT (pseudonym), 
a Guangzhou-based LGBT non-profit organisation focusing on gay health rights. There 
were 13 attendees, including 11 men and 2 women. Besides me, attendees were all 
considering or planning on having children in the near future. Some of them felt 
suspicious of ART companies in mainland China. An employee at ZT gave a brief speech 
introducing the role of ZT and Zhao. They then held a warm-up open discussion about 
coming out. They proposed an interesting angle as they asked not only how to come out 
to one’s parents as a queer child but also to society as a queer parent. The attendees 
generally believed that Guangzhou and other big Chinese cities were becoming tolerant 
toward out-of-wedlock parenting. After the warm-up discussion, Zhao played a video 
about the queer family. He introduced himself as the former full-time fundraising manager 
at PFLAG. He then explained the history of artificial insemination and IVF in China. The 
attendees asked questions about legal policies and disputes rather than the procedures. 
Like many ART company representatives at the PFLAG events, Zhao also emphasised 
that LGBT clients get discounts because “life is not easy for us (dou bu rongyi)”. Weeks 
after the sharing salon, I asked Zhao if he had acquired new clients from it, he laughed 
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and told me people who attended the salon hadn’t become his clients yet, but he had 
secured some contracts with people in the xinghun marriage/queer parenting WeChat 
group where he advertised the sharing salon. 
 
During my visits to the HH Company, I also became familiar with the employees who 
identified as straight and didn’t work directly at its ‘Rainbow Business Division’. Most 
of them were either Chen or her business partner’s family relatives. Two of Chen’s 
cousins came from Hunan to work as salespeople at HH Company in Guangzhou. Their 
clients were mostly from their social circles in their hometown, as they knew many 
desperate wives who “would give their lives for having a son”. Each employee has a 
particular WeChat account for work. Since I had added both queer and straight employees 
at the company as my WeChat contacts, I saw their WeChat posts directed toward 
different groups of clients. For the five groups of potential straight clients, they used a 
general poster38 (Pic.6 left) which described their scope of services as “test-tube babies 
(shiguan ying’er), guaranteed surrogacy (daiyun baosheng), guaranteed baby boys 
(baosheng nanhai), sperm and eggs provider (gongjing gongluan)”. The poster also 
shows their genetic testing and sex identification of the fetus services. A WeChat post by 
a salesperson (pic.6 right) translated as the following: 
“(The news title) Wife gave birth to two daughters, this man felt embarrassed and 
castrated himself with a knife? You have the courage to castrate yourself, why can’t 
you make a turn of your thinking? As in vitro technologies are so mature today, you 
can decide to have a son or daughter as you wish!” 
 
38 The HH Company circulated this poster in queer events (see pic.2) before they established the ‘Rainbow 




Pic.6 WeChat posts by a salesperson at HH Company  
 
As Mamo and many other scholars point out, while same-sex desires were being 
constructed as nonprocreative, ART medical specialities were portrayed as curing 
(heterosexual) childlessness, and their legitimate clients were portrayed as childless 
heterosexual people. In this way, ART would “reproduce not only human beings, but also 
natural women and natural families” (Mamo 2007:130). The legal policy in China 
reinforced this kind of reproduction by restricting the use of ART in public medical 
centres. Also, state policy normalised parenthood as exclusively legitimate for 
heterosexual married couples. At the same time, private ART centres like the HH 
Company have emerged in China, marketing assisted reproduction as both challenging 
and strengthening normative family forms and kinship norms. In addition to making 
possible single and queer parenthood, HH Company also fuelled sex selection and gender 
inequalities that have long existed in China.  
 
Chen’s LGBT clients doubled in 2018. Her marketing strategies with LGBT organisations, 
including PFLAG China, was indeed one reason for that. Another reason was the 
relaxation of family planning policies and the information circulation about emerging 
reproductive technologies. In several major Chinese cities, single parents were no longer 
required to pay the high social maintenance fees when they register hukou for their 
children. Interestingly, Chen was helping the affiliated agencies who were unfamiliar 
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with sales strategies for potential LGBT clients. Still, heterosexual married couples 
constitute the majority of Chen’s clients. As Chen explained, heterosexual couples were 
always in a hurry when they found Chen and Chen’s colleagues, 
“Straight people usually think of signing a contract with us after they failed several 
times in a public hospital. They want an immediate result. Lesbians and gay men 
usually come here to consult and learn the process of ART so that they can make 
long-term plans accordingly.” 
 
Overall, HH Company’s different sales and marketing strategies towards its queer and 
straight potential clients was remarkable. Meanwhile, services like biological sex 
selection were popular among all types of clients based on their sales experience. On the 
one hand, HH Company has employed various strategies to integrate their IVF/surrogacy 
service with queer organisations and queer online communities as rescuing queer 
childlessness. They strived to gain attention and trust from Chinese queer wannabe 
parents through showing financial support for LGBT social events, presenting a particular 
‘rainbow’ company image, and recruiting people with LGBT contacts. For Chinese 
LGBT organisations like PFLAG China, the choice of event sponsors was expressly 
limited in the existing social context. On the other hand, HH Company’s promotional 
materials towards a more generally target market showed a preference towards marketing 
sex selection services, which was legally prohibited and morally controversial in China.  
 
Not long after meeting Zhao, I learned from other PFLAG volunteers that at least three 
full-time employees at PFLAG China switched to work at private ART companies. 
Although Zhao stated that he was helping LGBT people who wanted children, PFLAG 
volunteers expressed mixed feelings towards Zhao and other people who jumped into the 
ART industry and turned their hundreds of LGBT contacts into potential clients. During 
fieldwork, many lesbian volunteers told me that people like Zhao were attracted by the 
high commission possibilities in the ART industry rather than motivated by the desire to 
help LGBT people. Some lesbian volunteers were particularly disappointed that PFLAG 
China worked closely with these ART companies. In the group dinner after a PFLAG 
conference, a young lesbian said in anger, “How can an LGBT organisation, a civil 




Paradoxically, we sat with two mothers (mama) of gay men who were guest speakers in 
the conference, and I recalled that one mama mentioned ART in the conference:  
“The posterity issue (for non-heterosexual people) is now easily solved; it’s just a 
matter of technology and method”.  
 
The tension between being the ‘only sponsor of Chinese queer social events’ and ‘an 
industry chain that exploits women’ was embodied in the ART companies’ marketing 
strategies toward their target clients. The relationship between LGBT organisations and 
the ART industry therefore encompasses not only sexuality, but class, kinship, and gender 
concerns. Following this section, I will demonstrate how the private ART companies and 
gay fathers who employed ART attempted to re-phrase their practices around developing 
new moral perspectives. 
 
“We Are Here Doing Good Deeds”: Non-heterosexual people Working for 
IVF/Surrogacy Companies 
I met Fei in a lesbian online forum when we discussed the issues lesbian mothers might 
have and I told her the purpose of my research. After learning we were both in Shenzhen, 
we arranged a Friday night to have dinner together with her girlfriend Zhenzhen. Both 
Zhenzhen and Fei are from other parts of Guangdong Province and went to colleges in 
Shenzhen. At the time we met, Zhenzhen was undergoing IVF. She had already gone to 
Thailand to retrieve her eggs and had ‘selected’ the sperm provider. Out of curiosity, I 
asked about Zhenzhen’s job. Zhenzhen hesitated for at least five minutes before telling 
me she had recently changed her job to work in the financial department at a Shenzhen 
ART agency, which assisted her in her visit to a Thai hospital. She also persuaded Fei to 
apply for an administrative job at the agency to work with her. Being aware of the online 
debates over ART, Zhenzhen was worried that telling others about her job at an ART 
agency would make others judge her morality. Unlike Chen’s HH Company which had 
access to a complete (underground) industry chain inside China, Zhenzhen’s employer 
was more of an agency that took clients to the allied hospital in Thailand. She told me 
that after entering this business, she found out she was overcharged by the first agency 
she used. “However, I am grateful for this experience because it inspired me to a new 
career path,” Zhenzhen said. Later, Zhenzhen explained multiple times that her employer 
was legal. As we talked about the industry in China, Zhenzhen expressed her disgust with 
Chinese private ART companies involved with the underground surrogacy chain:  
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“I am telling you; those kinds of Chinese companies are illegal! They have no licence, 
and they are not responsible. I only work at lawful companies. Although I know they 
earn more profit than we do, I will never risk working for an illegal and morally 
corrupted business. It is dangerous! I don’t want to end up in jail.” 
 
After working at the first IVF agency for half a year, Zhenzhen and Fei made a leap to 
another IVF agency and worked as channel managers. Their new employer was similar 
to the previous one. Again, Zhenzhen highlighted that her new employer was certified 
and directly associated with the Thai hospital. Their role was to establish contact with 
medical personnel in public hospitals, so these contacts could recommend their agency to 
patients whose needs couldn’t be met by public hospitals39. They told me their working 
experience in this industry gave them the negotiating power to double their salary. As I 
have learned, there were not many experienced people in this industry, straight or queer. 
Zhenzhen and Fei were very passionate about working in the ART industry. Zhenzhen 
believed this was a growing industry with plentiful opportunities for upward 
mobility. They told me they had done some research on the salary levels in their job and 
were confident their income would soon rise again. Zhenzhen added:  
“Don’t you see the top managers of this industry are mostly women? As a client, you 
don’t want to talk about pregnancy and parenting with a man. Women have more 
knowledge and advantages doing this.” 
 
According to Zhenzhen and Fei, their boss was a middle-aged homophobic man who 
didn’t even realise the existence of potential LGBT clients. Thankfully, their boss was 
not aware of their loving relationship, and they weren’t bothered by the manager’s 
homophobic attitude. Rather, they have been thinking positively about the future trend of 
the Chinese ART business. They have been using lesbian socialising apps to reach other 
wannabe lesbian mothers. Zhenzhen said:  
“Once I have a baby myself, I will have an unbeatable professional advantage as a 
lesbian mother. Some gay and lesbian salespersons don’t have children; how can they 
persuade other non-heterosexual people to have children?” 
 
 
39 For example, couples wanting to choose the sex of their child and couples who can’t conceive at all and 
can only use surrogacy to have children.  
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Apparently, Zhenzhen was one of the queer parents who sensed the marvellous potential 
market of the ART industry in Chinese queer communities as a client herself. As a lesbian 
and a wannabe parent, Zhenzhen was confident that ART would be the most desirable 
way for Chinese non-heterosexual people to have ‘children of their own’. For Zhenzhen, 
her gender, her queerness, and expected pregnancy turned from career disadvantages to 
career advantages in this industry. At the same time, Zhenzhen was sensitive about the 
existing moral attitudes towards the ART industry. Through repudiating unlawful 
Chinese ART companies like the HH Company, Zhenzhen sought to claim the moral high 
ground in this industry. Yet, the emerging ART agencies that took clients to hospitals in 
Thailand, Russia, USA and other countries were often criticised for overcharging clients. 
After I went back to the UK, Zhenzhen made another leap to a famous ART agency in 
Shenzhen founded by a gay man and increased her income once again.  
 
  
Pic.7 from Rela app (left) and Ifeng.com (right) 
 
When Zhenzhen was expecting her children as well as a bright career life, there were a 
rising number of lesbian mothers and gay fathers doing what she planned to do – sourcing 
clients through same-sex socialising apps. They posted photos of their babies born 
through A luan B huai (IVF) or surrogacy (pic.7) and made suggestions to their followers 
who wanted to have children through ART. Several respondents used the IVF agency 
recommended by a lesbian micro-celebrity on Rela, who had two children with her same-
sex partner. According to Danny and Pam, who purchased the IVF package recommended 
by the Rela micro-celebrity, she was very nice and patient. “She is sharing positive 
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energy”, Danny commented. This was a core argument these queer micro-celebrities 
made when they framed their work as good deeds. For them, the emerging image of a 
loving same-sex couple and one or more babies ‘of their own’ was more encouraging to 
Chinese LGBT people than the image of gay men cruising public parks. That is to say, 
they believed that posting their family photos proved the possibility of Chinese non-
heterosexual people having long-lasting relationships and a harmonious family openly 
without giving up their same-sex desires. As experienced queer parents, they were willing 
to give suggestions to their queer clients about whether to have a mixed-race baby, how 
to come out to others as queer parents, and how to cope with the existing family planning 
policy on single parenting. These queer parents were undoubtedly seen as model Chinese 
non-heterosexual citizens by their followers, though not yet representative. By sharing 
their experience, queer parents like An and many other micro-celebrities in online same-
sex communities have linked the use of ART with notions of ‘rainbow babies’ and more 
crucially, the desired future for a ‘perfect queer family’ that could live openly in China.   
  
Regardless of the categories of Chinese ART companies and the ambiguous legal policies 
and reinforcing acts regarding the business, all private ART agencies tended to frame 
their work in positive language. Just like other ART companies, Chen and An have 
emphasised that they help both their clients and the surrogate mothers and sperm/egg 
providers. Since An has invested in a Russian clinic, he told me (and clients) that in 
European societies, women choose to be surrogate mothers not only because they want 
money, but because they want to help wannabe parents. Chen, on the other hand, 
explained that the surrogate mothers her company recruited enjoyed the relatively ‘cushy’ 
job and generous financial rewards compared to working in a factory. Her colleagues 
usually distribute small recruitment cards outside the factories around Shenzhen. Chen 
let me stay in the office once a candidate for becoming a surrogate mother walked in. The 
candidate took a long-distance bus from a nearby factory to Guangzhou. Chen’s colleague 
asked the candidate, “Does your husband agree with this?” The candidate said yes and 
explained her situation. Her family borrowed money from underground parties and had 
no other way to pay the interest. She had given birth to two sons, which qualified her for 
the job. After finding out she could not leave Guangzhou to visit her family during 
pregnancy, she hesitated and said she needed to discuss the issue with her husband. After 
the woman left, Chen’s colleague told me the candidate wouldn’t take the job because her 
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sons were too young and complained about the difficulties of employing surrogates and 
egg donors.  
 
The fact that Chen and her colleagues didn’t hide their hiring process with surrogates and 
egg donors from me revealed something about their understanding of their work. Nor did 
they conceal their income from me; Zhao, Zhenzhen, and the other respondents who 
entered the industry as salespeople received a commission from two to fifty thousand 
RMB for each service package sold. One of Chen’s colleagues bought a luxury car within 
one year of joining the HH Company. After her twins turned five years old, Chen’s mixed-
race baby daughter was born by a surrogate mother in 2020. The seeming highly 
profitable and promising market kept attracting non-heterosexual people and especially 
queer parents into the ART business. Ever since I introduced my research project, 
respondents working in the ART industry have repeatedly expressed their desire to 
‘justify’ their moral image. HH Company claimed that they didn’t abuse surrogates/egg 
providers, nor did they overcharge their clients; instead, they paid surrogates/egg 
providers a higher rate than their factory work and they charged LGBT clients a lower 
rate than overseas ART agencies. HH Company also came up with a special discount 
service package for same-sex couples. Chen once said, “Doing business is the greatest 
charity work (shangye jiushi zuidade gongyi”), which resonated with Zhao’s statement, 
“working in these private ART companies can also help LGBT people”.  
  
As a rising number of non-heterosexual people joined ART companies and attempted to 
frame their work as a good deed, especially towards queer wannabe parents, it is hard to 
ignore the underground surrogacy chain and the trading in human gametes. In the HH 
Company, surrogates couldn’t leave the apartment without obtaining permission and were 
not allowed to have contact with clients. Chen explained that if surrogates went out 
casually during pregnancy, they might lose the baby; and if surrogates met the clients, 
they might extort money from clients. Also, the clients could choose to ‘interview’ the 
eggs/sperm providers and look at their backgrounds, while the gamete providers wouldn’t 
be able to get any of the clients’ details. According to ART companies in China, these 
rules were set out primarily to protect clients’ privacy and rights. Such practices 
inevitably intensify the unequal relations between surrogates/gamete providers and 
IVF/surrogacy agencies and clients. As mentioned earlier, gay men’s tendency to view 
women having children as a pain-free task was obvious. Many gay men told me that 
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having children for me was cheap and easy because I have a womb; others complained 
that surrogacy was too expensive. In this sense, women’s wombs became a simple 
commodity, and every woman had the freedom to rent them out. The reduction of 
IVF/surrogacy to merely a ‘womb-for-rent’ business continued to impact the moral image 
of queer parents, especially gay fathers, in China. Therefore, I argue their attempts to 
form a new moral perspective that supports their business has failed to take account of 
the gender relations in China. What remained more unsettling was the prevailing 
endorsement of the practice of ART as the most desirable strategy for Chinese non-
heterosexual people to build a ‘perfect queer family’.  
 
Choosing Own Children? 
At this point, it is vital to take a closer look at the actual process of queer wannabe parents 
using ART. Although ART was often seen as ‘the ideal choice’ among queer wannabe 
parents, my friend-respondents revealed that employing ART to have children took much 
longer than they expected. Many of them changed their initial schedule, their ART 
agencies and hospitals, the egg/sperm donors, and surrogates due to health, legal, and 
economic reasons.  
 
Getting to know and sign a contract with ART companies was usually considered the first 
and most vital step for most queer wannabe parents. Gay fathers I have met prefer to do 
surrogacy overseas not only for economic and legal concerns, but also motivated by 
concerns about the healthiness of the surrogates. Gay respondents were aware that women 
choosing to be surrogate mothers and egg providers in China were in need of money and 
this was often their only possible motivation. Such motivations inevitably turned 
surrogacy into an unequal business since the surrogate mothers and egg providers had 
less negotiating power. Min, who has twin sons with his boyfriend through surrogacy in 
California, told me that the surrogate mother of their children was a religious white 
woman. Min felt his choice in having children was morally acceptable since the agent 
told him the surrogate mother chose her job for good reasons. Furthermore, Min was 
impressed by how healthy the surrogate mother was, believing Chinese surrogates would 
not be so healthy. For Min, the surrogate’s health condition had a direct influence on the 
health condition of the baby: 
“I thought the egg donor was more important than the surrogate mother since the 
children had her genes, then I found I was wrong. The surrogate mother is very 
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important. Our surrogate mother is a devout believer who has a strict daily routine. 
She is very healthy. After the babies were born, she provided enough colostrum. 
Because of that, my sons are healthy. I am grateful for that.” 
 
Many non-heterosexual people doubted the reliability of Chinese ART companies. 
Although a large amount of money was circulating in this industry, the contract between 
Chinese ART companies and clients were generally invalid in Chinese law due to their 
violation of public interest (Ding 2015). In most cases, they were ‘gentleman’s 
agreements’ that solely depended on mutual trust. The disputes over the contract and 
custody of children related to IVF and surrogacy were brought to the courts from time to 
time, and the courts have presented inconsistent views on these disputes (ibid). An 
attendant of the “Rainbow family sharing salon” co-organised by the ZT organisation and 
HH Company commented, “I’d rather pay more (to foreign ART companies) to avoid 
disputes”. Obviously, this man didn’t become a client of the HH Company.  
 
Tian said he simply didn’t trust Chinese businessmen during a one-to-one conversation 
even though he belonged to this group. Tian owned an online shop and most of its 
merchandise was cheap international branded clothing direct from factories. He reasoned 
that Chinese businessmen didn’t have religion and therefore had low moral standards. It 
should be noted that the primary reason he didn’t choose a Chinese surrogacy company 
was through a lack of trust. Eventually, Tian signed a surrogacy contract with a Thai 
agency with Chinese-Thai translators. Likewise, Zhenzhen claimed that her agency 
worked directly with Thai hospitals, though the contract between these kinds of agencies 
and clients was legally invalid as well. To put it another way, many non-heterosexual 
people didn’t consider doing ART inside China as a satisfactory option. 
 
Queer wannabe parents became clients of Chinese ART companies mainly for their 
competitive price packages and convenient location. After I had known Wen for two years, 
she started researching Guangzhou ART companies and asked me if I knew any good 
ones. She was eager to conceive before she reached 40. Wen did a lot of research on the 
pricing and the marketing of IUI and IVF services. Although she had little trust in Chinese 
ART companies, they remained the only affordable and practical option for her. Wen’s 
job wouldn’t allow her to take a long overseas trip, and the Chinese agency offered her a 




As I point out in the previous chapter, being able to freely choose the egg/sperm donors 
was a vital preference many respondents emphasised. Each queer parent who employed 
an ART service gave me a detailed elucidation of how they made their investigations and 
final decisions in selecting the suitable sperm/egg donor or surrogate mother. They looked 
at the egg/sperm donor’s skin colour, height, educational background, career, health 
condition, and other characteristics. Zhenzhen showed me the photos of candidates of 
sperm donors when we talked about her trip to Thailand to prepare for IVF cycles. All 
photos had the candidates’ personal information attached. She told me she interviewed 
the candidates for a whole day:  
“These candidates are all good-looking! One of them is a TV actor in Thailand and 
he came with his broker, but I doubt he was wearing heightening insoles to fake his 
height.” 
Zhenzhen eventually selected a model in Thailand as she felt the person was sincere 
during the interview. She further explained how she selected the sperm donor: 
“You need to meet them in person, so you know if they lied about their height or 
anything. I found out many of the candidates in Thailand are gay and lie about their 
sex life in order to be sperm donor. But I don’t want a gay man to be the sperm donor; 
I am afraid they might have HIV.” 
As Zhenzhen showed me the photos of the Thai candidates and told me more about them, 
I didn’t comment. Zhenzhen’s words reflected her perspective on human gamete 
providers, which was prevalent among people who used ART-related service: one must 
be suspicious of the ART agencies and people involved as they could lie. During my time 
in Chen’s ART company, I noticed that interviewing the egg/sperm donors and asking a 
series of personal questions was generally preferred by clients, even if they needed to pay 
an extra price for it. 
 
Min and his partner bought an ovum from a Chinese student studying in the United States. 
According to Min, the average price of an ovum was 8,000 to 10,000 dollars, while they 
paid 15,000 dollars for an ovum since Asian ova were rare in the USA. Min was willing 
to pay a higher price for an Asian ovum because he wanted Chinese babies rather than 
mixed-race babies. As a university professor, Min didn’t want his children to attract 
attention from others. His concerns resonate with several lesbian respondents’ statements 
on having mixed-race children: having a mixed-race baby meant other people would 
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always be curious about the baby’s other biological parent and even ask rude questions, 
which might cause trouble parent’s career.  
 
An, an openly gay father of three sons and a successful entrepreneur living in Shenzhen, 
said that he spent more than four million RMB on having his mixed-race triplets. An 
visited hospitals in Thailand, Russia, and China multiple times before deciding where to 
use surrogacy services. As the owner of a private enterprise, An welcomed public 
attention to his ‘rainbow’ family rather than being afraid of it. An was aware that the news 
about his mixed-race sons and family helped him gain much attention and fuelled his 
Russia-based ART agency. During and after my fieldwork, An sent his mixed-race sons 
to numerous talent classes and variety shows.  
 
In short, the experience of these queer parents who employed ART has echoed Chen’s 
saying, which is “Wait until you are wealthy enough to have children”. This statement 
associates parenthood with personal agency and resources. This kind of rhetoric, used by 
queer parents and ART companies, resonates with Mamo’s research on lesbian mothers 
who employed ART in America. Society delivers a message that “individuals with agency 
can overcome constraints with the right attitude, knowledge, drive, and choices” 
(2007:230). Few respondents in their 20s have the financial confidence to consume ART 
services and raise children by themselves. Rather, they told me that they need to have a 
stable conjugal relationship and generous income to have children and form a perfect 
queer nuclear family. The freedom of choosing a reliable and ‘personalised’ ART service 
and thus a desired biological child of one’s own were only available to people like An. 
On the other hand, it is increasingly difficult for the young generation to achieve upward 
mobility in urban China. 
 
Furthermore, the ability to cruise the legal ‘grey area’ freely has become a key personal 
skill for both ART companies and desiring queer parents in China. For the HH company, 
it was the ability not to be fined or shut down by the local authorities that made their 
business sustainable. Chen and her peers were extremely careful to avoid drawing any 
attention from state authorities, and they changed their social media profile information 
regularly. Chen never sent me any typed messages and, whenever I asked questions about 




Queer parents who employed ART without entering legal marriages had to cope with the 
legal ambiguity and sometimes difficulties that went along with their unmarried status 
and out-of-wedlock children. Some respondents solved these problems with a 
considerable amount of money, and some solved them with their social relations (guanxi) 
with officials. It has only been recently that major cities have stopped charging social 
maintenance fees for out-of-wedlock births. Still, in most parts of mainland China, 
unmarried parents had to pay more money and go through more bureaucratic processes 
to get proof of paternity and other legal certificates. Gay fathers who have children 
through surrogacy often need to provide officials in police stations with a made-up story 
when they register birth and hukou information for their newborns. For instance, Tian 
pretended to be a single heterosexual man who had had a romantic encounter with a Thai 
woman when he brought his newborn son to China. When he went to the airport and the 
police station with his little son, he told the governmental officials repeatedly that the 
mother didn’t want the child and showed them a written claim by the mother. The written 
claim was provided by the ART agency, which included it as a part of their service 
package. These alleged ‘tactics of convenience’ were used frequently by other gay clients 
and circulated in queer communities. 
 
Conclusion: Reproduction Without Sex – A Liberating Future or Unaffordable Hope? 
Since IVF appeared, it has been realised as the crucial method that will lead to the end of 
sex as the only way to conceive (Greely 2016). By this time, IVF and IVF-related 
reproductive technologies have become a “better-established and widely available 
consumer option, and itself a more normalized and naturalized activity” (Franklin 
2013:228). It becomes vital for researchers to not read reproduction as merely ‘biology’ 
or read IVF as merely a ‘biological technology’, for IVF ultimately transformed our 
understanding of biological relations and points to the future of reproduction and kinship 
(Franklin 2013). As mentioned earlier, Chinese queer people’s desire to have children is 
closely bonded with the ever-changing notions of filial piety, elder care, and individual 
choice. The unstoppable trend of using ART to have a biological child among Chinese 
non-heterosexual people suggests some inconsistencies with regards to their 
understanding of social ties and biological relatives. 
  
Chen once said, “It (IVF/surrogacy) is no different from having children by your own.” I 
couldn’t count how many times I heard similar statements from ART salespeople, from 
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my friend-respondents, and from my ex-stepmother who had a daughter through 
surrogacy in Shenzhen. From their point of view, the parenthood of a biological child was 
naturally unquestionable without the need to be constructed, and it wouldn’t be threatened 
by the involvement of technology as long as using one’s own sperm/egg. Such a statement 
inexorably reinforces the notion of blood ties and distinguishes biological parenthood 
from non-biological parenthood. 
 
It became palpable that these queer parents and ART companies co-constructed ART as 
the ideal way for Chinese non-heterosexual people to have ‘children of their own’. The 
practices of A luan B huai and surrogacy have further emerged as desirable techniques 
for Chinese same-sex couples to have children together. With the emergence of Chinese 
ART companies and their marketing strategies towards queer communities, queer 
wannabe parents appeared to have more choices as they could have access to ART either 
in foreign countries or in mainland China. My respondents’ personal accounts are 
immersed in the language of choice and kinship, including how they chose the ART 
agency and service packages, how they selected the eggs/sperm providers, how they 
decided to have mixed-race babies or not, and how they made such choices with their 
partners and other family members.  
 
From the very beginning, A/AB luan B huai emerged as an ideal technological device for 
lesbian couples in urban China to form co-motherhood rather than to overcome infertility. 
Unlike Mamo (2007)’s lesbian interviewees in California, who turned to advanced 
technologies only if other technologies failed, many of my friend-respondents actively 
sought out reciprocal IVF as their first choice. In this sense, Chinese lesbian couples’ use 
of IVF has indeed queered the heteronormative knowledge of reproductive technologies 
and parenthood, even if they didn’t intend to challenge the cultural norms. It’s worth 
noting that both the practice of A/AB luan B huai among lesbian couples and surrogacy 
among gay couples have transformed how we understand the adjective ‘biological’, and 
the varied arrangements in queer couple’s use of ART has destabilised the popular belief 
that T-P/1-0 roles are an imitation of heterosexually gendered relations. 
 
This chapter closely engages with the ongoing debates around choice and individuality 
for non-heterosexual people (Weston 1991, Dempsey 2010, Gabrielson 2011, Lo 2020). 
Choice is an individualistic and bourgeois notion (Weston 1991). The language of choice, 
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free will, and self-determination risks “concealing the structural forces and inequalities 
that shape reproductive decisions”. (Gammeltoft 2014:16). Strathern (1992a) also points 
out that choice in English society has become naturalised and constrained by consumer 
culture whose conventions are internalised as personal style. What becomes clear is that 
we can’t examine the alleged personal choices and social constraints as self-evident and 
mutually exclusive conceptions. This chapter, together with chapter 4, delineates how 
market and economic conditions shaped queer (wannabe) parents’ decisions regarding 
whether, when and how to have children in addition to state and cultural conventions. As 
the consumer of medical services, queer (wannabe) parents’ practices were marked by 
social stratification along knowledge, resources, and power. What is more, being middle-
upper class customers, non-heterosexual people’s practices of choosing egg/sperm donors 
and surrogates risked commodifying the disadvantaged latter group and reinforcing social 
stratification.  
 
With the assistance of IVF-related ART, queer individuals and couples may have 
biologically-related children without sexual intercourse and without entering any form of 
heterosexual marriage, but the high costs of IVF and the required extensive timeframe for 
such procedures arguably enable capitalist reproduction in queer sexual citizenship. As 
Mamo points out, “the history of assisted reproduction is a history of the enforcement of 
biopower” (2007:57). Queer parents’ participation in assisted reproduction has enacted 
stratified reproduction, that is, the medical support only available to certain groups. As 
many studies indicate, ART remains restricted to the global elite class (e.g., Twine 2015, 
Mamo & Alston-Stepnitz 2015). Furthermore, the emphasis on ART as the ultimate 
solution in queer life-worlds reconsiders and requalifies the concept of queer sexualities 
as reproductive. In the context of ART, queer futures are simultaneously made possible 
and normalised. If a desirable queer future can be reached only through reproduction and 
a desirable queer (nuclear) family can be formed only through ART, one may ask: is there 
no future for queer, or poor people?  
 
Furthermore, as all my friend-respondents stated, the cost of ART services was small 
compared to further parenting costs. In the case of same-sex couples having children 
together through ART, the children could only be legally registered with one parent, an 
issue which they had to strategically overcome to address their needs. The categories of 
biological relative (for example, egg donor), as Strathern argues, results in a distinction 
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between social and biological parenthood (1992b: 19). In the context of queer parenting 
in China, this further created an alleged distinction between biological, social and legal 
parenthood. The next chapter moves to explore the interference between ideas of the 







Chapter 6 Negotiating Conjugal and Parenting Relationships 
 
In this chapter, I discuss queer parenting in urban Chinese society. As this research has 
documented, there are various models of queer parenting that have existed in urban China 
for years. Queer parents have children through previous heterosexual marriages, xinghun 
marriages, guoji adoptions, or ART solely; they are single, divorced parents or they co-
parent with their same-sex partners. For queer couples, having children together has 
increasingly become a key strategy to strengthen their conjugal relationship. Yet, the 
recognition of the child as a mutual bond/jiban between same-sex couples only works 
under certain conditions. In other circumstances, it could work the opposite way. What 
continually came to my attention during my fieldwork was how my respondents used 
their understanding and language to distinguish ‘my children, ‘my partner’s children’, 
and ‘our children’, and how they integrated such distinctions into their relationships with 
partners, families of origin and wider society.  
 
The study of kinship has always been a vital and dynamic field in anthropology as the 
knowledge of kinship is continually destabilised and renewed. Strathern(1992a) makes it 
clear that the facts of kinship are simultaneously facts of nature and facts of culture and 
society. Sahlins proposes the idea of the “mutuality of being”, in which kinsmen are 
“persons who belong to one another, who are members of one another, who are co-present 
in each other, whose lives are joined and interdependent” (2003:11). Kinship 
relationships are rarely severed nor end completely, and even the breakdown of 
relationships, as with divorce, can lead to the re-ordering of social continuities (Simpson 
1994, Strathern 1996). New kinship studies have indeed shaped the discussion about 
family relations and intimacies today. Developed from these arguments, we should be 
careful not to presuppose what constitutes kinship or ‘authentic’ forms of kinship. Rather, 
my purpose is to make visible how my respondents make claims on kinship as their social 
facts and what they do with them. Moreover, this chapter explores how Chinese queer 







‘My Own Children’ versus ‘My Partner’s Children’ 
I have known Ei for years. As I detailed in Chapter 4, Ei had twins through a xinghun 
marriage and later divorced her xinghun partner. Ei and her xinghun partner are the twins’ 
biological parents, and they occasionally spent some family time together. Born in 1982, 
Ei often referred to herself as more ‘traditional (chuantong)’ and more focused on family 
than younger generations. After the twins were born, Ei’s parents moved to Ei’s house to 
care for them. Ei immediately started to look for girlfriends after her twins were born. 
Despite the fact that these women often stayed in Ei’s apartment, Ei’s parents never asked 
Ei about her relationships with them, and nor did Ei say anything. Like many other 
respondents, Ei interpreted her parents’ response as ‘silent acceptance (moren)’ of her 
same-sex relationship. Still, Ei had been complaining to me about her intimate 
relationships. She told me that ever since she had had children, the dates she met through 
same-sex socialising apps were constantly jealous of her children, causing numerous 
quarrels. For Ei, her children were her major focus, and she spent the most time with her 
children rather than with girlfriends. One of Ei’s dates, who was in her mid-20s, once told 
Ei that “if you treat your children so well, you should treat me the same”. Yet, Ei felt 
uncomfortable with such a comparison. She admitted that she couldn’t spend the same 
amount of time and money on any future girlfriend as compared to her children. 
Furthermore, Ei referred to her children as her blood and family, whereas she never 
referred to her ex-girlfriends and dates as her family members. 
 
Ei’s understanding of her children indeed resonated with her experience with her ex-
girlfriend, whom she was with from 2009 to 2015. The major reason they broke up was 
that her ex-girlfriend had a child with her xinghun partner and tended to focus on the child 
and xinghun family rather than Ei. Ei’s ex-girlfriend had been living with her xinghun 
husband and parents-in-law after the wedding. After giving birth to a son, Ei’s ex-
girlfriend stayed with her xinghun family and rarely went out to meet Ei. At first, Ei 
thought her ex-girlfriend was just feeling tired after childbirth. Not long after, Ei realised 
that her ex-girlfriend wanted to take care of the child rather than spending time with her. 
Ei felt like an outsider in her ex-girlfriend’s xinghun family and told me she couldn’t even 
give her ex-girlfriend’s child a nickname. Ei’s attempts to participate in the child’s life 
failed, and she blamed her ex-girlfriend for not being independent enough. Ei concluded 
her experience with her ex-girlfriend as a lesson learned: “If you are weak, your xinghun 




Ei didn’t become the co-parent of her ex-girlfriend’s child, although she expected she 
would do. They eventually broke up over the phone. As a result, Ei felt her ex-girlfriend 
formed stronger kin relations with her xinghun nuclear family which she was an outsider 
to. After Ei started co-parenting with her xinghun partner, Ei realised that her children 
were so crucial to both her and her xinghun partner, that she would never expect her future 
girlfriend to see her children the same way. In this sense, by treating her children as her 
blood tie and essential family members, Ei seemed to emphasise the significance of blood 
relations as authentic and unbroken and therefore deny the possibility that her future 
girlfriend could blend in as a family member. 
 
I asked Ei about her expectations for a girlfriend and she answered:  
“I just want a girlfriend that I can spend some time with. In a few years, I will be 
worrying about my children’s life at school and have no more time to play with 
girls”.  
According to Ei, dating (tanlian’ai) and living together (guorizi) were two different things. 
The former was just ‘playing’, while the latter was far more complicated and involved 
dealing with more complex kinds of relation. Ei prioritised her relations with her parents 
and children as blood ties. On the other hand, Ei expected her younger dates to accept the 
arrangement that Ei had ‘another’ part of her life with her children. Ei’s expectations for 
her future imitate relationships was valenced by the comparison with her blood 
relationships. To put it another way, Ei anticipated that her blood relatives would be the 
key support resource in her elderly life, whilst she didn’t think a girlfriend would 
accompany her when she grew old. In this sense, same-sex dating was a time-limited 
relation without a future. Ei asked me to introduce potential girlfriends to her, although I 
never managed to do so. Among young lesbians I’ve met in urban Chinese cities, Ei’s 
ideas about children and relationships were morally contradictory, if not selfish.  
 
Having children has drastically altered Ei’s romantic relationships although she once 
claimed that “children and girlfriend are separable so they don’t affect each other”. She 
couldn’t let her girlfriend stay over for more than a few days, since she lived with her two 
children and parents. Also, Ei’s xinghun partner still visited their children on a weekly 
basis despite their being divorced. Therefore, Ei’s claim, or her effort to ‘separate’ her 
children and girlfriend into two different relationships, didn’t lead to the result she desired. 
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Rather, the disconnection between her children and girlfriend has limited her capacity to 
maintain a lasting same-sex relationship. Since Ei was a single and divorced mother, the 
issues she had in same-sex intimate relationships have resembled other single/divorced 
mothers in heterosexual relationships. Many people, including gay men, used to quote the 
popular belief that mothers always focus more on their children than anyone else. In the 
meantime, people I have met during fieldwork held a popular opinion that gay fathers 
were less bothered by parenting because they were not socially expected to stay home 
and look after children. Additionally, Ei’s tactic to not explicitly introduce her romantic 
relationship with her girlfriend to her parents again limited the possibility of building 
connections between her family of origin and lovers. 
 
Ei’s personal experience renders the often-talked about myth in same-sex communities 
about the harmonious co-existence between ‘my children’ and a same-sex lover for a 
queer parent. Many Chinese non-heterosexual people, including Ei, who had their 
biological children, doubted that they could find a same-sex partner who treated the 
children as their own. The hope for having both a blood-related child (especially through 
heterosexual marriage) and a same-sex lover was increasingly perceived as selfish among 
queer youth, as they believed that a loving partner shouldn’t be treated as less important 
than blood relatives. In this sense, it became intolerable if their queer lovers placed more 
emphasis on their biological children than them. This was what Ei’s young lover 
expressed when she said, “if you treat your children so well, you should treat me the 
same”. The underlying logic of this statement symbolises resistance to the Confucianist 
hierarchical order of kin relations where conjugal relations were less important than 
parent-child relations. This emerging opinion among young lesbians had led to older 
lesbian mothers like Ei and Guan complaining that there was little chance of them finding 
a girlfriend. Some lesbian mothers thus claimed to their potential dates that their children 
were ‘left’ with grandparents and that they were free from parenting responsibilities. Such 
statements seem to suggest the competing relations between children and partners, 
revealing the perception that a queer subject needed to cut loose the relation with their 
children (and sometimes together with the family of origin and xinghun partner) to pursue 
romantic relationships. Otherwise, they may face moral criticisms from other young gay 




Tian (previously mentioned in chapter 4&5), a gay father of two sons, broke up with his 
ex-boyfriend when he was planning to have his second child:  
“We have been together for years. He showed no interest when I asked him if he 
wanted children with me, so I did it using my sperm. He said he was fine with it, but 
his indifferent attitude annoyed me. He should have at least asked about the surrogacy 
progress. He seemed to never care about my sons. What’s the point if my partner 
didn’t want to be involved in my life with my children? I felt lonely, so we separated.” 
Tian came out to his mother after his second son was born. After Tian brought his son 
back from Thailand, he was still looking for a committed relationship. “It’s best to have 
three children”, Tian told me, “I want to have my third child with my future partner; we 
can use his sperm”. 
 
It shouldn’t be discounted that, when same-sex couples were planning to have children, 
the recognition of parenthood as single/joint could constantly be in negotiation. “I am not 
going to take care of other people’s children”, said Zhenzhen (previously mentioned in 
chapter 4&5) during a casual dinner. Just turned 24 years old, Zhenzhen was going to 
have her first child while living with her girlfriend Fei in Shenzhen. We had a 
conversation on the relationship between ART and parenthood. Zhenzhen expressed her 
desire to have children through surrogacy: 
“I am young. I don’t want to waste my youth in pregnancy. The previous (egg 
retrieval) surgeries I did have already frightened me. I am considering surrogacy, but 
it is very expensive. I really want Fei to carry my baby. However, she is too skinny. 
Also, my mother and I think it is unfair to her. She would be just like a surrogate 
since the baby would be my legal child.”   
I asked Zhenzhen: “but if Fei gave birth to your child, she could be the child’s legal 
mother?” I said this to Zhenzhen since, by that time, I had known lesbian couples planning 
to do the A luan (egg) B huai (conceive) method and assumed Zhenzhen and Fei could 
follow this trend to obtain joint parenthood. Zhenzhen answered:  
“No, the child has to be my legal child and be in my hukouben (household register 
booklet). That’s why I think this is unfair to Fei. If she left me, she would lose her 
best times and she would be an unmarried woman who had given birth. How would 




Zhenzhen compared the A luan B huai method to surrogacy, as she thought if she asked 
Fei to carry a baby using her egg, Fei would be like a free surrogate without receiving 
any benefits. Fei held the same opinion as Zhenzhen. The key factor that they didn’t 
consider A luan B huai as a desirable method was Zhenzhen’s insistence on registering 
the expected baby as her child rather than Fei’s child. Thus, the child would be 
biologically and legally Zhenzhen’s child, whereas Fei’s connection with this child would 
be held in question. In this sense, Zhenzhen and Fei had little confidence that the child 
would be ‘their child’. Zhenzhen continued to treat the process of having children as her 
own business, despite hoping that Fei would care and support her.  
 
From Zhenzhen’s words, it was obvious that Zhenzhen valued her mother’s opinion 
during the process of having children. It was Zhenzhen’s mother who encouraged 
Zhenzhen to have children both biologically and legally. To further complicate this matter, 
as queer individuals choose to have children with or without their same-sex partners, 
whether their parents recognise their children as grandchildren was a significant issue to 
be taken into consideration. Zhenzhen and Fei told me that, although Zhenzhen had never 
mentioned her lesbian desires to her parents, Zhenzhen’s mother was alerted and even 
showed suspicion and discontent when she found out that her daughter was living with a 
woman. However, after they lived together for more than a year, Zhenzhen’s mother 
started to ‘silently acquiesce’ in the fact that her daughter was not going to marry a man 
and instead hoped Zhenzhen would have offspring. This is not unique in Chinese non-
heterosexual people’s experience, as offspring are often seen as the trade-off for the 
acceptance of a same-sex partnership. To put it another way, parental acceptance of same-
sex desires/relationships doesn’t necessarily reduce the pressure to marry and have 
children for my friend-informants and many others. 
 
Against this background, Zhenzhen confirmed that her child had to be legally registered 
with her hukou so that the child would be legally the grandchild of Zhenzhen’s parents. 
In another WeChat talk, Fei explained: 
“It’s not that I don’t care about Zhenzhen. She accused me of being half-hearted 
towards her parenting plan. I honestly don’t know what she expects from me. I just 
graduated from university; I am not ready to be pregnant or be a parent. I am her 
girlfriend, not her wife. Her mother won’t think me as her wife as well.” 
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When Zhenzhen was preparing to be a mother, Fei had not yet come out to her parents. 
For Fei, Zhenzhen’s expected child could never be accepted by Zhenzhen’s parents as a 
grandchild. From 2018 to 202140, I heard Fei reassure Zhenzhen many times that she was 
willing to raise Zhenzhen’s child with Zhenzhen, but their co-parenting plan was never 
settled between them and their families of origin. 
 
Zhenzhen, Tian and Ei’s expectations of their same-sex partners were ambiguous and 
inconsistent. The focus on blood ties and the emphasis on having one’s ‘own children’ 
inevitably shaped their conjugal relationships with their same-sex partners. Meanwhile, 
people in queer communities have come to notice that cultivating a conjugal relationship 
with a queer parent might require a living arrangement with ‘their children’. The question 
of how should one treat same-sex partners’ children remained highly controversial in 
queer communities. Indeed, many online discussants and respondents stressed that they 
could not treat their partners’ children as their own simply because “it’s their blood 
(xueyuan), not mine”. In other words, they held that the centrality of blood relations was 
an unshakable social fact that was more powerful and more secure than their ‘unprotected’ 
intimate relationships. Ei and Tian could break up with their same-sex lovers and cut their 
relations completely, but not do the same with their biological children. In this context, 
they made a distinction between reversible and irreversible relations. Their partner’s 
children couldn’t be biologically and legally recognised as their own heir, and therefore 
had no responsibility for taking care of them when they were old. To put it concisely, the 
underlying logic was that their partner’s children were by no means their future, and 
therefore not worth any investment.   
 
Furthermore, my respondents tended to use their same-sex partners’ negotiations with 
blood ties and lovers as a significant criterion for their loving relationships. Mo 
(previously mentioned in chapter 3), living with her girlfriend Lin in Shenzhen, strongly 
refused to see or live with Lin’s school-age son. Lin’s parents in her hometown convinced 
her to enter a heterosexual marriage and have a son. When Lin tried to divorce her legal 
husband, who she only saw once a year, he asked Lin to take custody of their son. Mo 
told Lin that she hated taking care of little children, especially boys. Eventually, Lin gave 
up trying to bring her son to Shenzhen. Lin’s son stayed in rural Anhui with his 
 
40 Due to the Covid-19 situation, Zhenzhen had to give up her travel plans to do IVF in Thailand and 
restarted the whole process with a private Chinese ART company.  
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grandparents. When I sat with Mo in a café waiting for Lin to finish her work, Mo told 
me that she was satisfied with Lin’s decision, as it showed that Lin prioritised her feelings 
rather than those of other kin relatives.   
 
For my friend-informants and many other Chinese queer couples, the difference between 
‘my children’ and ‘my partner’s children (and therefore not my children)’ was 
unquestionably understood through the conception of ‘xueyuan guanxi/blood tie’. In 
addition to legal uncertainty, a central question to be negotiated among queer couples was: 
would my families of origin accept this child as my/our offspring? Against this backdrop, 
one’s parenthood was unquestioned when using own eggs/sperm. Yet, such distinctions, 
based on the notions of blood and biology, makes it problematic for a single/divorced 
queer parent to seek and maintain same-sex conjugal relationships, whether intentionally 
or unintentionally. We mustn’t ignore the existing legal implications of queer intimacies 
and parenthood in China which interact with the notion of blood, as the child can be 
legally bonded to only one mother and one father. The conceptions of biology/blood and 
family line, together with the legal implications of joint parentage/custody, have shaped 
the distinction between ‘my own children’ and ‘my partner’s children’ and created 
challenges for queer individuals to balance their kinship roles as children, parents, and 
partners. As these child-related issues have been increasingly discernible in queer 
communities, queer couples attempted to identify suitable strategies for achieving joint 
parenthood, so they could strengthen their relationships instead of weakening them. 
 
‘Our Children’ 
During a get-together dinner, I had the following conversation with Wen, a 34-year-old 
lesbian who was planning to have a child: 
Me: “I had dinner with a lesbian couple Xie and Hong last weekend. They have a 
lovely baby boy whose nickname is Doudou.” 
Wen: “I am so jealous that they have children together. It would be the best way. Are 
they a T-P couple?” 
Me: “Yes, Xie is T and Hong is P.” 
Wen: “Do their parents accept them? Doudou is Xie’s son, right? Do Hong’s parents 
acknowledge Doudou as their grandson?” 
Me: “No, Doudou is Hong’s biological son. They used Hong’s egg. Hong got 
pregnant via IUI (Intrauterine insemination) directly.” 
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Wen: “Doudou and Xie are not blood ties?” 
Me: “The sperm they used was from Xie’s brother.” 
Wen: “Oh, that also works.” 
When I mentioned that Xie and Hong have a son, Wen immediately assumed their son 
was biologically linked to Xie (the T) and was given birth to by Hong (the P). This process 
was commonly referred to as A luan B huai. Otherwise, Wen wouldn’t think the baby was 
their son. The confusion raised in our conversation indicated the ambiguous link between 
blood ties and parenthood in today’s queer world. Is there a universal signifier that marks 
the shift from ‘my own/parter’s children’ to ‘our children’ for Chinese queer couples? 
  
As revealed earlier, A luan B huai has emerged as a popular strategy among lesbian 
couples to have children together since the 2010s. Made possible by IVF-EF technology, 
A luan B huai enables a woman to conceive a baby with the egg from her same-sex lover. 
During the last few years, numerous Chinese queer women I have met in person and 
online have endorsed A luan B huai as the ideal strategy to ‘solve all problems’ including 
having offspring and establishing jiban (mutual bonds) with same-sex partners. Danny 
and Pam, a couple who chose A luan B huai as their most desirable path to joint 
parenthood, decided to use Danny’s eggs to have children. Pam, who was due to give 
birth in 2020 at the time of my fieldwork, once said, “imagine a baby comes from my 
body and looks like Danny, isn’t that wonderful?” In other words, Pam felt she was 
connected to the baby as she was the one who bore them. Instead of emphasising biology, 
they employed the notion of ‘bodily experience’ to validate such mutual connections. In 
this way, they also naturalised Pam’s motherhood with the Chinese adjective qinsheng. 
Literally meaning giving birth by oneself, qinsheng was normally used to refer to one’s 
own children/parents. With reciprocal IVF, Pam gave birth to the baby and describe it as 
qinsheng, therefore the baby as her own, blurring gestational/biological motherhood. 
 
Also, Danny and Pam had made plans to ‘explain’ where the baby was from to their 
parents. After their child was born, they would be legally registered as Pam’s child. Pam’s 
parents already knew about their daughter being with a woman, and Pam was confident 
that her parents would be satisfied to see her being recognised by others as a single mother 
rather than a childless lesbian. On the other hand, Danny was in a xinghun marriage, but 
she planned to divorce her xinghun husband and come out to her parents once the baby 
was born, so she could tell her parents that she had a child and had fulfilled her familial 
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duty. According to Danny and Pam, no one would be hurt in this way. They bought sperm 
from a private ART company instead of using sperm from Danny’s xinghun husband. 
Danny was of the opinion that they mustn’t raise children with her xinghun partner, or 
their children would have too many parents and grandparents involved. 
 
At the same time, some respondents worried about the potentially unequal positions 
involved in A luan B huai childrearing. A luan B huai is sometimes called T luan P huai, 
since person A (biological mother) is usually a self-identified T, and person B (gestational 
mother) is usually a P and was more economically dependent in their relationship. People 
who were against the practice of A luan B huai argued that person B, who gave birth to 
the baby, was no more than a surrogate being exploited by person A. To support their 
opinion, they shared stories of their (web) friends, who were usually P and had given birth 
to their T girlfriends’ biological children, eventually losing both their house and custody 
of children after breaking up with said girlfriends. In these stories, the key point was 
always who the baby was legally registered with. In the case of A luan B huai, it is 
possible to either register person A41 or person B as the child’s legal mother, but not both. 
Based on my observation in field sites and online platforms, most queer women believed 
it was unfair to register the child’s legal identification with person A, as person B would 
have neither biological nor legal connections with the child. In this sense, the language 
of ‘body/bodily experience’, or constructing motherhood through pregnancy and as 
qinsheng, might be made effective or invalid by legal practice.   
 
Like Zhenzhen, Xie (previously mentioned in chapter 3&4) emphasised the vital role of 
biological connection in authenticating one’s parenthood. Furthermore, Xie was 
conscious of the significance of establishing socially recognisable joint parenthood with 
Hong. Xie had already had a son from a previous heterosexual marriage, while Hong had 
no offspring. Xie prevented Hong from having children through entering a xinghun 
marriage as she warned other lesbian couples, “having children with the xinghun partner 
means you two are bonded for a lifetime!”  
 
Xie and other respondents acknowledge that co-parenting relationships in xinghun 
marriages could profoundly impact their same-sex intimate relationships and make same-
 
41 Although person A doesn’t give birth to the child, she may do the DNA test to obtain a parent-child 
relationship certificate.  
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sex co-parenting extremely difficult. Ei’s experience resonates with Xie’s statement. As 
a result, Xie and Hong decided to use Xie’s brother’s sperm since Xie wanted the child 
to be her blood as well. “Don’t think of yourself as a great person”, Xie said. In other 
words, Xie was not confident that she could treat a child as her own who was not her 
xueyuan/blood. Xie’s brother, who lived in Hunan, agreed to help them. Since Xie was 
an experienced nurse, they did IUI in a hotel room. In 2018, Hong gave birth to a baby 
boy and registered as the child’s legal mother. The procedure of single mother registering 
the baby “couldn’t be easier” in Shenzhen, according to their experience. For Xie and 
Hong, no matter who the baby was registered with, the baby was ‘their’ child and their 
xueyuan/blood. Both Xie and Hong’s parents went to see their offspring and slowly 
acquiesced in their cohabitating relationship. When Hong and Xie shared their experience 
with me and another lesbian couple, the younger couple immediately started discussing 
which male family relative they could ‘borrow’ for having children. The most secure 
solution, as regarded by the lesbian couple, was to make sure the child was tied by blood 
to both, therefore eliminating risks caused by legal ambiguity.   
 
This idea of ‘borrowed fertility from a relative’ is not unique and happened among several 
other queer couples I met. What seems to be happening here is that one form of kinship 
is being used to establish another; in this case, a brother is a way of producing a mother, 
and in a way this also reverses the roles and blood ties of uncle, aunt, and father. In this 
sense, these queer couples not only construct their co-parenthood around the central 
position of the blood tie, but also mobilise the idea of blood and kinship terminology. 
 
Making sure the children are biologically linked to both people in a gay couple has been 
somehow made possible by IVF-EF technology as well. Min and his boyfriend had two 
babies through surrogacy using both their sperm and an egg from the same egg donor. As 
a result, their twins would be blood brothers with different fathers but the same mother. 
By this means, Min and his partner have two sons together. Both of their parents were 
satisfied and visited their flat several times a year. Some gay respondents, on the other 
hand, pointed out that raising one child was already expensive.  
 
The question being elicited here is: is this strategy which is made possible by ART the 
only solution to constructing mutual parenthood for a same-sex couple? By exploring the 
use of emerging ART, which are seen as both enabling and interfering with nature, 
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Strathern (1992a) blurs the boundaries between nature and technology and points out the 
very ground for nature to be seen as a distinct domain from culture has become 
questionable as nature needs to be protected by technology. Hayden’s research (1995) on 
lesbian mothers has suggested that biology is mobilised from a singular category to 
various meanings and biology itself is no longer a self-evident symbol. Their research 
findings from Western societies indeed brought insights for this research. Here I link the 
Confucian conception of the family line with the discussion of queer parenthood in 
Chinese society. How was the social parenthood described by Strathern (1992a&b) being 
anticipated by Chinese non-heterosexual people in the era of ART? The emerging 
practices of IVF and surrogacy among same-sex couples in urban China and the issues 
raised by these practices have suggested that the distinction between biological 
parenthood and social parenthood were interpreted and made explicit not only by queer 
individuals themselves, but also by their families of origin and the wider society. In this 
context, Chinese non-heterosexual people’s practice of single and co-parenting should 
not be understood without realising the symbolic patrilineal tradition of family lines.  
 
“If my encounter with Joe is our destiny, the arrival of Jack is a gift from God”. This is 
quoted from Tommy’s blog ‘Three men under one roof (sannanyizhai)’, through which 
he has been sharing his life with his partner Joe and their son Jack since 2005. As a 
journalist who writes both accessibly and exquisitely, Tommy’s ‘Three men under one 
roof’ has received lots of attention, and his family is frequently being referred to as the 
‘Chinese version of the tongzhi family’ by journal reporters and queer activists in China. 
During our first meeting, Tommy’s mobile phone screen lit up and he pointed out the 
wallpaper of his phone to me: “look, my son Jack”. 
 
Tommy never hides the fact that he and Jack are not biologically related. Tommy’s 
partner Joe is Jack’s biological father and legal guardian. Joe’s ex-wife gave birth to Jack 
before Joe divorced her and moved in with Tommy. It was obvious from Tommy’s blog 
and from his words during our interview that he treated Jack as ‘our child’ rather than 
‘my partner’s child’. When Jack turned two years old, Tommy and Joe brought Jack to 
Guangzhou and started to live together. Tommy emphasised many times that it was 
holding little Jack in his arms that gave him the feeling of family. Jack always calls Joe 
‘Baba (dad)’ and Tommy ‘Daddy’ inside and outside the home. Tommy has been the 
major breadwinner for the family, and Joe works as a househusband (jiating zhufu). 
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Though Tommy worked in Yunnan and Thailand for years, he was proud to tell me that 
he never missed important moments as Jack grew up. In every parent meeting in school, 
Tommy came as Jack’s godfather and Joe came as his father. The teachers and other 
parents never asked anything. “It feels very natural”, said Tommy.  
 
Tommy and Joe came out to Jack when Jack was 11. Tommy described this in his blog 
as one of the most important days in his life. When he finished work and came back home, 
Jack opened the door and asked him, “Daddy, are you tongxinglian (homosexual)?” 
Tommy suddenly froze and didn’t know how to respond. Jack laughed, “Dad told me you 
are both homosexual. He told me you love him very much, don’t you?” Tommy saw Joe 
surfing the net and Jack holding his PSP gaming console; everything seemed smooth. He 
smiled and answered, “Yes, I love your dad, and I love you too. Tell me what you want 
for your birthday?” Joe stopped Tommy and said, “don’t bribe Jack. He is fine.” Tommy 
advised that other gay fathers ought to come out to their children when they were 8 to 10 
years old, as he reasoned, “If they are younger, they may not understand what their father 
is saying; if they are older, they may already hear homophobic statements in school.” 
Tommy joked that his son had a big heart and perhaps too big and that Jack told his 
girlfriend in high school about his family.  
 
Tommy used his personal experience to tell other gay men that affective bonds are as 
important as blood relationships. The three of them have been living together since Jack 
was 2 years old, and Jack treats both as his father. It should be noted that Tommy was 
never Jack’s legal guardian or adoptive father. Tommy has spent more than 15 years 
trying to make his parents accept his relationship with Joe and Jack. After Tommy’s father 
passed away, Tommy’s distant relatives in his hometown continued to curse him for “not 
getting married and having offspring”. Jack accompanied Tommy to the farewell 
ceremony and the following family dinner, when one of Tommy’s uncles questioned, “He 
(Jack) is not your blood, can you put his name on your father’s gravestone?” Eventually, 
Joe and Tommy decided to put Jack’s name on Tommy’s father’s gravestone, prefixed 
with ‘grandson’. 
 
When Jack was going to the United States in 2018 for a college exchange program, 
Tommy said he encountered a problem that he never thought about before preparing for 
the F-1 visa. As a college student who didn’t have an income, Jack needed to submit his 
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parents’ financial statement. However, Jack’s biological and legal father Joe didn’t have 
a stable income and the property certificate to prove that he was able to afford Jack’s 
tuition and living costs overseas. Tommy said: 
“If I were the one to provide the financial statement, it would be so much easier. I 
have held an executive position in a private company and have satisfactory bank 
statements and property certificates. But how can I prove my relationship with Jack? 
Jack’s teachers and my colleagues all know my family. Jack has called me ‘Daddy’ 
for 18 years. We believe we have been doing fine just like other families even we 
don’t have a marriage certificate. Nevertheless, this little legal certificate suddenly 
becomes necessary.”  
 
Unlike adoptive parenthood, Tommy’s status as Jack’s father was not recognised by the 
law and thus created difficulties that were more powerful than their neighbours and 
schoolteachers. Tommy actively used his influence as a journalist and his financial 
capability to deal with most troubles he encountered. After his father’s funeral, Tommy 
never came back to meet his distant relatives from his hometown. Eventually, Jack’s F-1 
Visa application passed fine with Joe’s financial statement, but left Tommy and fellow 
gay fathers worried. What else could happen if they failed to prove their parental status 
to officials? For most people, the troubles Tommy and Joe have encountered seemed to 
be insurmountable without adequate resources, thus making such queer ‘social 
parenthood’ unprotected and vulnerable. In this sense, Tommy’s parenting practices were 
often seen by non-heterosexual people like Xie as selfless behaviour while not desirable. 
Tommy didn’t feel he was doing a selfless deed, as he stated that having Jack as their son 
made his connection with Joe long-lasting. If Tommy didn’t treat Jack as a ‘our child’, 
he wouldn’t have a mutual life goal and eventually wouldn’t establish deep 
jiban/mutuality with Joe. Tommy has been managing several WeChat groups with nearly 
200 members calling themselves gay fathers. As Tommy mentioned, the number of gay 
fathers has been steadily rising as more and more gay men became aware of ART.  
 
In short, the ethnographic accounts imply that the notion of biology/blood tie plays a 
central role in the construction of parenthood for Chinese non-heterosexual people, while 
it was not essentially fixed or interpretable. Rather, it can be mobilised to create the 
feeling of jiban (mutual bond) and joint parenthood among same-sex couples with the 
assistance of ART. In other words, the queer parents in my research didn’t construct 
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lesbian/gay parenthood through all-out distinction from the centrality in biology and 
blood ties. When a queer parent was already in a co-parenting relationship with an 
opposite-sex partner, it became particularly challenging to maintain lasting relationships 
with same-sex lovers as romantic relationships were distinct from essential family 
members. My respondents’ narratives reveal that they may or may not be the ‘co-
mother/father’, ‘second-mother/father’, or ‘chosen father/mother’ of their partner’s 
biological child. At the same time, same-sex co-parenting practices raised further debates 
about the unequal division of work in T-P/1-0 co-parenting relationships, as the 
housewife/househusband role in same-sex relationships was not protected by law, and 
therefore the person in this role was at higher risk of losing custody. Against this backdrop, 
many Chinese same-sex couples desired legal marriage and joint custody as protection 
and security against risks. As Xie and Hong and other same-sex couples have realised, 
parents of non-heterosexual people may slowly and silently accept their children’s same-
sex cohabiting relationships without necessarily acknowledging their same-sex desires, 
especially after knowing they have grandchildren. The grandchild played a vital role, 
making the same-sex couple into co-parents and making the grandparent-grandchild bond 
recognisable. Therefore, same-sex couples may strategically utilise the family line’s 
symbolic importance to make their natal families accept their same-sex partner as a family 
member that was similar to son/daughter-in-law. 
 
The dynamic interrelations between same-sex intimate relationships and queer co-
parenting practices elicit questions about the elasticity of kinship in today’s urban China. 
The personal experience of my friend-respondents successfully achieving co-parenting 
relationships and thus tightening their conjugal intimacy have demonstrated the 
possibility of mobilising the dominant centrality in biology and the Confucian conception 
of family ties. The centrality in blood ties alone didn’t work to achieve or destroy queer 
co-parenting relationships; rather, it was their capability to eliminate the involvement of 
a third biological or legal parent outside their queer conjugal relationship, to negotiate the 
uncertainties caused by the legal terms of custody, and to handle their parents’ attitude 
toward their co-parenting relationships. One’s gender, social status, financial ability, age,  
and distance from families of origin all come into play. The fact that Xie and Hong are 
always able to take their little son Doudou to hang out with other lesbians reinforced their 
co-parenting status and closeness that is recognisable in queer communities. As queer 
parents and their parents attempted to define the boundary between kinship and non-
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kinship relations through a social/biological distinction, the existence of such boundary 
became an oxymoron. The recognition of biological ties and chosen ties is further voiced 
in the use of the language of love and care in queer intimate and familial lives. 
 
“Children will accept us if they feel enough care and love” 
“Daddy, I am willing to give you all my pocket money; you can take it from my 
drawer without asking me.” 
Bei, a gay man in his 40s, told every queer participant in a meetup that his 5-year-old son 
said this to him the other day when he joked that he had no money to buy sustenance for 
the family. Bei started living with his partner 13 years ago, and they adopted the second 
child of his partner’s brother as their son. In other words, Bei’s partner was the child’s 
shushu (uncle) in conventional Chinese kinship terminology. Unlike Tian’s ex-boyfriend, 
Bei had always wanted a son, and he felt connected to the baby boy when he saw him the 
first time. Thus, Bei’s partner guoji adopted the boy from his brother, who felt 
overwhelmed by raising two sons. Bei was touched by his son’s generosity and thought 
his son learned from him to express his affection. For Bei, his son showed him love and 
care through the will to give him his pocket money. Moreover, Bei knew that his son 
recognised him as a warm father from daily conversations like the one above. Because of 
that, Bei was positive about their son’s attitude toward having two fathers. Bei’s parenting 
experience again echoes Tommy’s argument on the importance of affective bonds. What 
intrigued me in the narrative was their expression of affection and its material 
underpinning. 
 
In this research, every respondent with children has indicated that love for children is the 
most important thing for one to qualify as a decent parent. In the meantime, the most 
frequent topics being brought out in interviews and daily conversations on parenting were 
companionship and education.  
   
Tian and his friends visited several Pride parades in Europe last year. On the last night of 
the trip, a middle-aged gay father cried during their talks and Tian was touched:  
“This gay man is my laoxiang (person from one’s fellow town). He got married and 
had a child before knowing he was gay. He told us that he felt sorry for his grown-
up child. His child never left Hunan until college. Think about it. His child must have 
faced a lot of discrimination growing up in that small town. I felt for him.”  
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After hearing his laoxiang’s story, Tian decided that he wouldn’t let his child Xiaoyu 
grow up in a small town. Tian planned to get Xiaoyu into the private international school 
in Dongguan, which didn’t require Dongguan hukou (residence), while being far more 
expensive than public school. Tian asked me many questions as he couldn’t decide 
whether to send his son to a private boarding school or a day school. During a talking 
session, Tian mentioned that his son Xiaoyu was diagnosed with autism 2 years ago. He 
immediately took Xiaoyu to seek treatment. Tian took Xiaoyu to the same doctor recently, 
and the doctor said his 6-year-old son was ‘normal’ with no sign of autism. Tian 
emphasised that love and companionship were the most important thing for a child to 
grow up happily. He said, “some heterosexual couples don’t spend enough time with their 
children. The left-behind children (liushou ertong) are poor.”   
 
Each weekend, Tian took Xiaoyu to meet other gay and lesbian parents and their children 
for hiking, picnics, or causal gatherings at each other’s houses. Tian explained to me that 
he and other parents were intentionally doing it for their children. “Because I am a man, 
I want Xiaoyu to grow up with some women like his mom’s role in his life. I collaborate 
with a lesbian mom very well”. Just like Tian, other queer parents who were willing to 
participate in my studies were confident that they “are doing better than the heterosexual 
parents” by showing other people the (material) resources and ‘healthy’ childhood 
experience they have provided for their children.  
 
An stressed in the interview that he and Ye would never hesitate to spend for their sons. 
After their three mixed-race children were born, they hired several babysitters and each 
of them stayed at home for half of the year. Also, An’s mother moved to Shenzhen to 
babysit her grandsons and lived with them since then. An never explicitly came out to his 
mother, who didn’t say anything about their cohabitating status. An’s mother and Ye get 
along fine as they often go to the local food market together. The children call Ye “ABi”, 
since they couldn’t pronounce “Babi (an alternative of Daddy)”. Ye spent a lot more time 
playing with their sons, while An was not so patient with the children. One day, the kids 
came back home and suddenly called Ye ‘mom’; An and Ye explained to their sons that 
their mom is in Germany and they may see her when they grow up. An and Ye’s three 
sons were going to an international kindergarten and taking weekly interest classes. An 
planned to send three sons to the Harrow International Boarding School in Hong Kong, 




Chen and her girlfriend Liu’s 4-year-old children were attending a bilingual kindergarten 
as well. After hearing my educational background, Chen often mentioned her philosophy 
towards child education: 
“Whenever my children have vacations, Liu or I take them travelling. They have been 
to many places so far. Last summer, my partner took them on a road trip to Tibet. 
This year they went to Japan. We don’t think it is too early to take them to the 
Himalaya Mountains. They learn a lot from travelling. We want to provide them with 
the best we can.”  
Chen also told me that their home was decorated like an amusement park. Liu filled the 
entire second floor of their house with numerous toys. They had added a small swimming 
pool in their bathroom.  
“My children’s kindergarten classmates love our house! The moment they entered 
our living room, they usually ask my children, ‘is it really your home? you are living 
in a fairyland!’ When they left our house, they always asked if they could come back 
again. Some kids even told their partners to make their house like ours.”  
Chen was proud that other kids admired her children’s home. Chen and Liu were planning 
to move to a larger house as they thought they would soon need a larger swimming pool 
at home. Although Chen and Liu never explicitly mentioned their relationship to other 
parents at kindergarten, the parents, according to Chen, were gao suzhi (high-quality) and 
smart enough that they never asked ‘embarrassing questions’ about their intimate 
relationship or let their kids do so.  
 
It is worth re-mentioning the trend among queer parents for choosing Euro-American 
egg/sperm donors to have mixed-race babies. When I first met Chen, she felt that such a 
choice could possibly hurt the child because people might get curious and gossip about 
the child’s biological parents. Still, Chen frequently encountered young gay and lesbian 
clients who wanted mixed-race children. A year later, Chen changed her opinion and had 
a little mixed-race daughter. In urban China, a Euro-Asian mixed-race appearance was 
always related to positive descriptions like good-looking (gao yanzhi) and high-class 
(gaoji). Against this background, giving children a Euro-Asian mixed-race appearance 




Tian, An, and Chen have arguably endorsed and followed similar good parenting models 
promoted by the mass media and consumer culture. Lin (2019) examines the relationship 
between children, family, and the education consumer market under the dual background 
of market reform and family transformation in urban China. Lin and Li (2011, see also 
Xie 2013) identify a trend toward the nuclear family characterised by two parents and an 
only child. Families with an only child have exhibited children-oriented consumption, 
spending more money on the child rather than the adults in the household (Yin 2003). 
Chinese parents see fulfilling children’s material desires as an approach to purchasing 
happiness for them and expressing parental love (Fong 2004, Lin 2019). After the only-
child generation became parents themselves, their consumer behaviours continued to 
affect how they treated their children. The consumption market for children has expanded 
and is not limited to dietary supplements, toys, clothing, and education. On the other hand, 
investments in children’s education have been closely linked to the desire for 
intergenerational class mobility (ibid).  
 
Besides providing material and educational resources, it has become a crucial aspect in 
queer parents’ lives to construct a loving family atmosphere for their children. As many 
of my respondents clarified, children could still receive enough parental love even though 
they didn’t grow up in a ‘whole’ family. Their personal experiences with their families of 
origin also inevitably shaped their conception of what constituted a good family.  
 
When Xie heard about my research, she said she was surveying T’s relations with parents 
and concluded none of her T-identified friends felt parental love from their fathers. I then 
realised that the criterion of ‘love’ for Xie was closely associated with material resources 
and gender relations. Xie was born in 1975 during the period of the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution. According to Xie, her mother was from a dizhu jiating (literally 
meaning landlord family, which was the target of violent denunciation campaigns). To 
erase the capitalist background for herself and her offspring, Xie’s mother married a 
farmer with a ‘clean (farmer) background’ and had a son and a daughter. Her father only 
valued the male child and never listened to Xie’s requests. Xie once said:  
“No matter what form of a family is, love is what the kid needs most. My family is 
complete with a mom and a dad, but I didn’t feel love growing up. My parents prefer 
men over women. As women, we couldn’t have meals at the table. I never received 
the same amount of care as the men growing up in that family.”  
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When Xie graduated from junior high school, she went to nursing school although her 
father could have afforded to send her to a public high school which might have led to 
better career opportunities. Xie’s father ignored Xie’s complaints and later persuaded her 
to enter marriage. Years after leaving her family of origin and hometown, Xie has been 
doing business and started enjoying a well-off life. Xie supposed she had the braveness 
to leave her previous heterosexual marriage, come out to her parents, and gain economic 
independence partly because of her T role and masculine style (T role was widely 
believed to be more independent and have more personal agency). Still, Xie was not 
satisfied with her educational background as she knew she could do better if she went to 
college. During a get-together, she said to me and another lesbian couple in their early 
30s, “You can’t do anything without education nowadays. We are going to provide our 
children with the finest educational resources we can.” 
 
Xie’s accounts reveal the generational changes around the conception of parental love 
and care. Scholars agree that the conception and forms of family and marriage have 
changed enormously under social changes in rural and urban China (e.g., Riley 1994, 
Pimentel 2000, Li 2011, Tang & Chen 2012, Xie 2013). Cohen (2005) points out that the 
de-collectivization of interests has caused rural families to lose much of their economic 
autonomy, while family (jia) remains an essential social unit. The traditional 
disadvantaged positions, women and youth, have gained increased individual freedom. 
The shifting control over marital decision from parents to youth was promoted by the 
Communist Party of China through the introduction of the Marriage Act of 1950 (and 
1980) and through encouraging women into the job market (Pimentel 2000). The average 
age of the first marriage and divorce rate has risen since then. It is necessary to recall that 
the idea of love cannot be taken for granted as ‘actual’ events; rather, it is a discursive 
discourse (Povinelli 2006). The rise of ‘romantic/free love’ and the rejection of arranged 
marriage in the last century are closely linked to the sense of modernity, freedom, and 
individual autonomy (Yan 2003, Lee 2006, Pan 2015). The relationship between romantic 
love and filial piety “became an important site on which new modes of subjectivity and 
sociality were worked out” (Lee 2006: 16). Again, the changing attitudes towards the 
‘complete’ family didn’t happen inside the queer community, but in wider society under 
family and marriage transformation. As the national divorce rate continues to climb and 
marriage rates continue to decline, the conventional obligation of establishing and 
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maintaining a complete family with two opposite-sex parents and children has been called 
into question. 
 
Being raised in a rural family that treated her as someone who didn’t merit material 
investment, Xie felt disappointed and eventually cut her parents out so she could pursue 
her own desired life. Xie made it clear that having a complete natal family with a mother 
and a father didn’t mean the family provided good quality of care for children. Xie’s 
opinion resonates with the younger generations, who have shown a growing rejection of 
simple-minded filial piety (yuxiao) and an endorsement of mutual respect and equal 
relations between parents and children (See also Li 2011). In this sense, reciprocity in 
parent-child relation is emphasised: only if you love your children and care for them as 
they grow up, are you a good parent who can enjoy their love and care in return. Xie and 
Hong talked with other lesbian mothers about coming out to their children and were 
confident that their children would accept their same-sex relationship when they felt 
enough love and care. Just like Chen said, she once joked with their children, asking them 
if they wanted a father to replace her. “The kids cried and yelled ‘no’ to me and Liu,” 
Chen confessed, “I immediately regret my words but feel happy in the meantime.” 
 
The rhetoric of chosen families and love leads us again to evaluate the notion of 
individuality and choice. Although Tommy, Chen, Min, Xie and An never detailed their 
income to me, owning several housing properties in first-tier cities like Shenzhen 
undoubtedly placed them in the upper-middle classes. They were living in well-managed 
neighbourhoods, usually located near elite elementary schools. One cannot neglect the 
material underpinning of their alleged higher-than-standard parenting choices. As 
Povinelli puts it, the choice is perceived as if it is the “only real choice available to us” 
made between these discourses of individual freedom and social constraint in our 
everyday life (2006:6). This argument resonates with Strathern’s discussion on 
individuality. The individual person, as Strathern explains, exercises choices as they do 
style, while their motivations are neither private nor public (1992a:166) and style itself is 
“an imitative act” (177). In this sense, choice has become “naturalised by the aesthetic 
and constraints by consumer culture” (1992a:162). What my respondents meant by “being 
a good parent and giving children the best life” could be explicated in a similar manner: 
protecting their children by avoiding ‘low-quality (suzhi)’ homophobic neighbours and 
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schoolteachers, giving them the most comfortable living arrangements, providing them 
with the best educational resources, and spending quality leisure time with them.  
 
Consequently, saving money and purchasing housing property in a tolerant 
neighbourhood have become essential steps for becoming a reliable parent, queer and 
straight alike. Even for young non-heterosexual people like Claire and Zhao who didn’t 
want kids at all, these steps were desirable for maintaining a lasting same-sex relationship 
and having a better chance of being accepted by their parents. Hence, non-heterosexual 
people’s choices to move to cosmopolitan, open-minded cities for upward mobility are 
closely linked with the existing practices of love and care and their visions of a desirable 
future.  
 
Conclusion: Blood Ties and Queer Relations 
Overall, this chapter reveals the complexity in defining the boundaries between kin and 
non-kin, biological ties and chosen ties. As the division of biological and social facts 
appeared in the discussion of kinship, it has firstly become clear to anthropologists that 
kinship is not reducible to biology. At the same time, scholars have pointed out that 
kinship is a lumpy, contagious connection, and is not always positive in the sense of 
bringing warmth to its members (Das 1995, Carsten 2013, Meinert & Grøn 2019). For 
queer parents who shared their life experiences in this chapter, blood ties and affective 
bonds seem to sometimes be threatening and sometimes reinforcing each other’s positions. 
First of all, my respondents in this chapter expressed incompatible views on the issue of 
alleged biological, legal and social parenthood. Ei and many other queer parents 
conceptualised blood ties as the most central and authentic form of kin relations, and they 
tended to view non-heterosexual conjugal relations and non-biological parent-child 
relations as non-kin or ‘less-kin’ relations. The young urbanites, on the other hand, 
highlighted the central position of conjugal love in their kinship value system in 
comparison with the traditional patrilineal parent-child relation.  
 
As described above, most non-heterosexual people perceived their same-sex lovers’ 
children as non-relatives not solely because they were not blood relatives; rather, their 
decisions to participate in childrearing with their same-sex partners were shaped by 
various social factors and private interests. Here, legal recognition plays a significant role 
in their understanding of parenthood, as a queer individual couldn’t establish a legally 
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recognisable tie with the biological child of their same-sex partner through marriage, and 
hence they could only count on affective bonds (with their lover and their lover’s children). 
In other words, social parenthood in queer life-worlds could hardly equal legally 
recognisable parenthood like adoptive parenthood or step-parenthood in heterosexual 
households, and even the idea of social parenthood became questionable for many non-
heterosexual people. What Ei and other non-heterosexual people often stated was the 
alleged irreversibility of consanguineal relations and reversibility of affinal relationships. 
Like Simpson (1994:837) suggests, the history of divorce in Euro-American society is a 
history of the growing reversibility of affinal relationships. One might be an ex-husband, 
but not an ex-father. In this sense, the high reversibility of Chinese same-sex conjugal 
relationships is especially problematic since they don’t go through legal marriages and 
divorces. Just like the lawyer speaker in a non-profit workshop said, “non-heterosexual 
couples don’t even qualify as feifa tongju (illegal cohabitation) in legal terms”. With 
neither a marriage certificate nor joint ownership, Ei’s ex-girlfriend and Ei might end their 
intimate relationship in a flash, but they couldn’t cut their relations with their biological 
children easily. In Ei’s case, she found out she might cut out relations with her ex 
completely, but she might never cut her relationship with her xinghun partner/ ex-husband, 
who is the other biological parent of her children. For this reason, co-parenting in xinghun 
marriages might form durable mutual bonds between the lesbian ‘wife/mother’ and the 
gay ‘husband/father’ with gendered roles, whether they expected it or not. Some non-
heterosexual people therefore argued that biological parent-child relations are stronger 
than same-sex intimate relationships. Yet, we must acknowledge that the belief that 
“blood is thicker than water” is configured by existing marriage and adoption laws in this 
context.   
 
To discuss this matter further, I suggest that establishing parent-child relations with the 
biological child of one’s queer partner can be seen as a non-heteronormative/queer 
relationship, as the person has no biological or legal bond with the child. Queer relations 
rely on affective recognition as the other two perceived authoritative recognitions – blood 
and law – are absent. The very uncertainty between state legislation and queer kinship 
shapes non-heterosexual people’s perceived nature of queer relations, including queer 
conjugal relations and queer non-biological parenthood (Borneman 1997, Goodfellow 
2015). Moreover, non-heterosexual people’s natal families rarely acknowledged their 
queer lovers’ children as their offspring that worth investment. Consequently, some queer 
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parents had to make tough choices between their blood kins and their chosen tie. Ei chose 
her blood relations over her girlfriend, and Lin chose to live with her same-sex lover 
instead of her son. In an extreme circumstance, Xie left her natal family and her biological 
child in her hometown to chase upward mobility and romantic relationships in a modern 
city.  
 
It appears that Tommy held a view on queer parenting quite contrary to Ei who embraced 
seemingly conventional kinship values; Tommy’s life choice to be an openly gay father 
of a child not biologically linked with himself was more modern and radically innovative. 
Although Tommy was aware that he might never be legally recognised as Jack’s father, 
he chose to co-parent with his same-sex partner Joe. Tommy’s parental status and his 
relations with Joe and Jack were acknowledged by his friends and colleagues in their 
everyday life with several prerequisites. The biological mother of Jack already divorced 
Joe and didn’t request custody of Jack. Moreover, Tommy’s job as a journalist and his 
considerable income level in a big city allowed him to express his queerness in a relatively 
free manner. Yet, Tommy had to negotiate with the uncertainties of his father status 
caused by the legalities of custody, and to handle his distant relatives’ attitudes toward 
his same-sex co-parenting relationships. In this way, Tommy’s statement that the 
“affective bond was as important as the blood relationship” is also shaped by legal 
concerns, conventional patrilineal family norms, and material resources.  
  
Against this background, using ART without entering any form of heterosexual 
relationships has emerged as the seemingly ideal way for queer couples to become co-
parents, mostly because these practices cause less legal risk about parenthood in their 
eyes. Like many of my respondents explained, there would be no fighting for custody 
with an opposite-sex zhihun/xinghun partner. In the case of A luan B huai (reciprocal IVF) 
among lesbian couples and surrogacy among gay couples, the position of biological 
relatedness was often put together with the role of bodily experience and affective bond 
in constructing the couple’s co-parenthood. Some respondents chose to have two children 
or use the sperm/egg of their partners’ opposite-sex relatives to make sure that their 
children were biologically related to both. Either way, the success or failure in achieving 
queer couples’ co-parenting status in their everyday life unsettle the notions of blood and 




Finally, queer parents’ reflective narratives in this chapter reveal the generational changes 
in conceptions of parental love and care. Developed from the previous chapters, I suggest 
that both the expression of parental love and conjugal love were conditioned by one’s 
material resources. At the same time, the changing understanding of love and care 
signifies transforming Chinese kinship values. I suggest that the idea of blood and biology 
still holds its centrality in Chinese family life, while it is also proved to have elastic 
potentialities for queer couples who want to establish joint parenthood. The emerging use 
of ART and the disputes raised by the alleged distinction between biological and social 
parenthood for queer couples stresses the very uncertainty of queer parenthood and 
kinship that coexists with the ambiguity of state law and everyday heteronormative family 
norms in Chinese society. The notions of biology and patrilineal continuity line alone 
didn’t work to achieve or destroy the queer co-parenting relationship; rather, it was the 
queer subject’s capacity to eliminate the involvement of a third biological or legal parent 
outside their intimate relationship, to negotiate with the uncertainties caused by the legal 
terms of custody, to secure educational and housing resources in big cities, and to gain 
parental acceptance. The various arrangements of parenting and co-parenting practices 
demonstrate the mobilising possibilities beyond ‘blood’ kin ties, that is, (co-)parenthood 





Chapter 7 The Chinese Version of the ‘Rainbow Family’? 
 
This chapter focuses on the changing understanding regarding the basis of a family in 
urban China in the context of social transformations. I am especially interested in how 
these changes interact with everyday practices of intimacy and parenting in Chinese queer 
life-worlds. Developed from the previous chapters, I document the various forms of non-
heterosexual families I encountered during fieldwork, including people’s self-
understandings of the (rainbow) family. LGBT/non-heterosexual families are often 
delineated through the language of ‘fictive/chosen families’ in contrast with 
‘biological/blood’ families, and such discourse assumes that LGBT families are creative 
and innovative in their structure (Weston 1991, Dempsey 2010). In the meantime, the 
emerging research on LGBT families in non-Western societies as ‘families of choice’ has 
been challenging the dominant Western knowledge of queer kinship and coming-out 
politics (Mizielińska & Stasińska 2017, Lo 2020). In most Chinese social studies and 
queer communities, family/jia was always perceived as the most essential and powerful 
social unit that affected queer personal life (e.g., Chou 2001, Engebretsen 2009, Kam 
2013, UNDP 2016). Huang and Brouwer thus suggest “the most profound struggle that 
Chinese queer subjects face is, hence, not in a ‘public,’ socio-political domain; instead, it 
is located in their ‘private’ lives – in the precarious, lasting negotiations with their 
intimate families, especially their parents” (2018:101). On the other hand, Hildebrandt 
(2018) reminds us to apply a social policy lens to family pressure felt by LGBT people in 
China as he examines the heteronormative features of the one-child policy and elder care 
reforms. In this sense, the ‘family pressure’ in research risks being reduced to parent-
child relations, excluding the broader social context.  
 
Against this backdrop, I investigate ‘family/jia’ for Chinese non-heterosexual people not 
only through its cultural meanings, but also through its socio-legal meanings. The cultural 
and legal meanings of family are not always the same. This research treats family as a 
contested field. I will explore how queer subjects perceive ‘fictive’/ ‘chosen’ families and 
families of origins in urban China. I do not intend to narrow down the definition of 
Chinese queer families as there is not only one model of these. Rather, in this chapter, I 
investigate how these forms of family are either recognised or denied in different times 
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and spaces. Through my ethnographic fieldwork and reflections, I complicate the normal-
radical, visible-invisible, public-private dualities in Chinese queer relationships.  
 
Coming Big Home, Coming Small Home  
In the Shenzhen PFLAG talkfest 2018, the host asked everyone, “what is the best way to 
express ‘I love you’ in Chinese?” Then, she answered herself, “I think the Chinese version 
of ‘I love you’ is ‘my parents have approved us’”. Every time one asked the other the 
question “have you come out?”, they always meant coming out to families of origin 
especially gaining parental acceptance. Indeed, parent-child relations have been the most 
important relationships in Confucian Chinese society and still hold their significance in 
today’s China. Parents are still involved in spousal choice and married lives (Riley 1994, 
Pimentel 2000). The host’s speech in this PFLAG event demonstrates the strong wish for 
the coexistence of romantic love and parental harmony during the emergence of queer 
subjectivities. Moreover, the host’s discourse on parental acceptance echoes the 
indigenous “coming out as coming home” strategy (Chou 2001) which stresses 
harmonious negotiation between the Chinese kinship system and non-normative 
sexualities. For Chou, ‘jia (family/home)’ is culturally unique in the Chinese language as 
it also refers to the mental space one belongs to. On the other hand, some scholars (Wong 
2007, Huang & Brouwer 2018, Wei 2020) point out that it would be culturally essentialist 
to view coming home and coming out strategies in a local/global binary, and that these 
are insufficient for Chinese non-heterosexual people in shifting contexts. After all, the 
changing notion of ‘family/jia” has constantly interacted with queer life aspirations, as I 
will demonstrate below. 
 
The month of Chinese New Year is always the peak time for passenger transport as most 
urban migrants leave the city for their hometown to reunite with their families. 
Celebrating the Spring Festival Eve with the whole family has been a nationwide tradition 
in China42. In other words, it is the most important family gathering of the year. In the 
days following the Spring Festival Eve, relatives began to visit each other. For those 
living in Shenzhen that was far from home, Spring Festival may be the only time to have 
face-to-face communication with their parents and extended families. Being an 
international student, I was hardly able to go back to China during Spring Festivals. 
 
42 It is also a tradition that the married couple have the family reunion dinner with the husband’s parents 
on the Spring Festival Eve. This tradition has been questioned and challenged in recent years.  
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During the Chinese New Year Holiday of 2019, I came back to my hometown and met 
many relatives I hadn’t seen for years. When an aunt asked me gently if I ever plan to 
have a boyfriend and get married at age 28, I suddenly realised how frustrating talking to 
distant relatives could be for youth, women, and non-heterosexual people. Spring Festival 
became the peak time for coming out, as many non-heterosexual people couldn’t stand 
the intense marriage pressure from parents and relatives when they returned from migrant 
cities (Lin & Xu 2013). 
 
In reality, my friends and respondents spend Chinese New Year in various ways. Queer 
couples who hadn’t come out to parents often go back to their home alone as single 
persons. They described it to me as “gehuigejia (each to one’s own home)”. Many non-
heterosexual people in this research were in-betweens. Their parents might already know 
about their same-sex relationship status, but they either sidestepped it or refused to talk 
about it. Non-heterosexual people who have come out (such as Zhao) may go back to 
their hometowns with their lovers. Some of my friends living in Shenzhen didn’t go back 
to their hometown during the Chinese New Year holiday. Instead, their parents went to 
Shenzhen and stayed for a few days. ‘Reverse reunion’ is becoming popular in first-tier 
cities like Shenzhen among young migrants. China News and other news websites have 
reported ‘reverse Spring Rush/ reverse reunion’ as the newfangled trend since 2018. The 
reason more and more young migrants choose not to go back to their hometowns seems 
obvious: the price for train/flight/coach tickets from migrant cities to other parts of China 
is much higher than the other way around, and it is easier for their parents to go to 
Shenzhen. Despite the obvious factor, young non-heterosexual people have more subtle 
reasons to stay in the city and more complicated experiences with their families of origin 
during Chinese New Year. 
 
Alice and her girlfriend Fiona are from Chengdu, the capital city of Sichuan Province. 
They met each other in college and their relationship was entering into its seventh year in 
2019. They had been living in Shenzhen for three years. Both of their parents have noticed 
their conjugal relationship, showing neither approval nor fury. In 2018, Alice and Fiona 
each went back to their own parents’ home in Chengdu during Spring Festival. Their 
relatives still asked them about their plans for marriage and other personal questions. 
Moreover, they assumed that working in Chengdu was better than working in Shenzhen 
and continued to persuade them to come back to live in Chengdu. Fiona was irritated and 
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talked back. In 2019, Fiona went back to her parents’ home in Chengdu while Alice stayed 
in Shenzhen. This time, Alice told me she had a much better experience. 
 
Several months before the holiday, Alice asked her parents if they want to visit her in 
Shenzhen because she didn’t want to hear her relatives asking her about her work and 
relationship status anymore. To her surprise, Alice’s parents responded positively. The 
day after Fiona flew back to Chengdu, Alice’s parents arrived in Shenzhen. Alice let her 
parents stay in her rented apartment,  
“At first, I was going to book a hotel room for mom and dad. Then, I realised they 
have figured out my relationship with Fiona anyway. What the big deal is they 
staying in our apartment and see Fiona’s things! There is no need to cover up the fact 
that we are living together”. 
Alice and her parents lived together in Shenzhen for 2 weeks and visited the city. Alice’s 
parents had a great time and stopped asking Alice to go back to Chengdu. Alice told me 
she and her parents are all glad they had spent Chinese New Year together and, at the 
same time, far from other relatives:  
“I had some chats with my mom and realised that she was not unhappy with my 
issues, but rather worried about confronting the relatives. She cares so much about 
how others think of us43. Therefore, I am going to take her to travel next Spring 
Festival.”  
 
Before this Spring Festival holiday, Alice spent years subtly mentioning her same-sex 
relationship to her parents. After that, she realised the key issue in her coming out was 
her uncles and aunts’ traditional family values. In a large extended family, members from 
different age groups, social classes, and educational backgrounds could have dramatically 
conflicting values; however, they might feel morally obliged to show care for each other’s 
personal life because they are linked by blood. Alice’s unmarried status was a failure in 
some relatives’ eyes, which made her mum anxious. Alice tried to distance her mum from 
her relatives and she was positive about her strategy. Alice and Fiona both held master’s 
degrees and were able to secure satisfactory jobs in Shenzhen. After working in Shenzhen 
 
43 Alice and Fiona also mentioned that Alice’s mother has two female friends who are a couple and have 
had a child together recently. Alice’s mother certainly knows they are lala as she told Alice that the baby 
was born through reciprocal IVF using A’s egg and B’s uterus. Alice thinks it is also a reason that her mother 
changed attitude toward same-sex relationships. 
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for some years, Alice’s mother began to take her words into account rather than her 
relatives. For Alice, her parents spending the Chinese New Year with only her, in a family 
of three, was a positive sign. Alice expressed her hope that she would settle in Shenzhen 
with Fiona, so their parents could come to Shenzhen and therefore be away from their 
relatives’ gossip for good.  
 
Fiona agreed with Alice and said she had an unpleasant holiday back in Chengdu: 
“I had to give the younger relatives a lot of red pocket money, and the aunts and 
uncles drove me mad. One day, my aunt rebuked her husband when they were 
preparing dinner. I tried to ease the tension, while my aunt suddenly turned to me and 
said they would stop quarrelling if I got married! What’s wrong with her?” 
Fiona admitted that she had to be very aggressive and even mean to her relatives to make 
them stop bringing up such (private) topics: 
“I have offended almost everyone. When they ask me how much my salary is, I ask 
them about their house loans. When they ask me when I will get married, I ask them 
when they will divorce.”  
Fiona’s statement is the epitome of many young urbanites’ attitudes toward annoying 
questions from distant relatives, queer and straight alike. Fiona also planned to spend the 
next Spring Festival somewhere else with only her parents. She believed that the ‘reverse 
reunion’ and travelling during Spring Festival would be the future:  
“The reason why we are still going back to the hometown and having dinner with all 
the relatives is because the family elders want us to do so. The grandparents can’t 
travel long distances and they are the only people who unite the big family. However, 
when the elders are gone, the big family (da jia) will disperse and only small families 
(xiao jia) remain.” 
 
In Fiona’s words, the ‘big family’ refers to the Confucian patrilineal family, and the 
‘small family’ refers to the nuclear family with one’s parents included. It becomes clear 
that the increase of the ‘reverse Spring Festival reunion’ in urban cities reflects the 
changing understanding of ‘family’ and ‘relative’, and such changes have a nuanced 
influence on queer intimate and family relationships. In a family in which one’s parents 
were close to a large number of kin relatives, coming out was tricky as one felt one’s 
private life became a subject of moral judgement for all aunts and uncles. In this way, 
one’s personal desires and intimate relationships were morally assessed by relatives. 
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Some respondents who chose to enter xinghun marriages told me that they had already 
come out to their parents; they still needed to marry to protect their parents’ moral 
reputation (mianzi) in the ‘big family’. In other words, their parents failed the ‘big family’ 
test if their offspring didn’t embrace a heteronormative lifestyle. Fiona and Alice’s 
experience reflect the increasingly perceptible distinction between the ‘big family’ and 
‘small family’ in Chinese private life. 
 
Since living in Shenzhen, I have found that a noticeable number of parents of young non-
heterosexual people have begun to gather with only immediate family members during 
traditional family reunion events like Chinese New Year. In meeting with my peers, I 
often heard young people say that their parents used to be close with their cousins and 
felt obliged to help each other. Often, they lent money to their cousins or did business 
with them. After these relatives took advantage of their parents, their parents learned the 
lesson and distance themselves from relatives. These kinds of widely-spread narratives 
among young people also demonstrated that they didn’t think blood relatedness or sharing 
the same male ancestor would automatically produce trusting relations. Most young 
Chinese urbanites didn’t include their relatives in their scope of family anymore. 
According to some young non-heterosexual people, their parents also tended to ‘escape’ 
from relatives after discovering their children were queer since they didn’t want their 
relatives to gossip about them.  
 
In short, many respondents concluded that nowadays “the big family is becoming the 
small family (dajia bian xiaojia)”. This was happening generally among Chinese young 
urbanites. Li (2011) points out the trend toward nuclear families in urban Chinese cities 
and argues that urban youth are becoming estranged from distant relatives. In other words, 
the nuclear family is becoming more important than the extended family under rapid 
social change and market reforms. The decrease in small-scale family cooperation and 
the emergence of the free labor market were crucial factors. Young queer couples might 
settle into a place away from parents and relatives and eliminate their shared interests. As 
Schroeder (2012) observes, being able to choose leisure activities and to choose who to 
spend free time with has become vital for exercising individual autonomy. What’s more, 
relatives were no longer seen as part of one’s family by young non-heterosexual people, 
especially if they didn’t feel emotionally close with their relatives. Therefore, one was no 
longer morally obligated to always spend time with relatives and please them. In this case, 
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the importance of blood, or a common male ancestor, has decreased. Still, urban young 
non-heterosexual people in this research showed a noticeable dependence on their parents 
and desire for parental acceptance. Mizielińska and Stasińska (2017) point out the ‘sticky 
relations’ between LGBT people and their families of origin in a Polish context. Polish 
non-heterosexual families often can’t cut themselves off from their families of origins 
due to their emotional and material dependence on them. Rather, Polish LGBT people 
need support from their close relatives. Similar to Polish society, Chinese LGBT 
communities were relatively weak, and elder care was mainly a family duty. I suggest 
that, in the Chinese context, the parents and the children are psychologically and 
materially interdependent on each other, whereas the importance of relatives has 
weakened. In the cases of middle-aged gay fathers, such as Tian and An, their mothers 
left their hometown to live with their sons’ queer families and silently acknowledged their 
sons’ same-sex relationships. Many young non-heterosexual people therefore expressed 
a strong desire to gain enough resources to settle in a big city and facilitate their parents 
moving away from their relatives.  
 
Furthermore, we mustn’t only focus on young non-heterosexual people solely as if they 
are the only social group undergoing transformations. In many cases here, parents of non-
heterosexual people revised their kinship values and supported their children’s life 
choices. Moreover, they became their children’s spokespeople in the ‘big family’, and 
focused on their children’s well-being rather than their moral reputation in the Confucian 
patrilineal family. Many parents of non-heterosexual people therefore described their 
experience of acknowledging their children’s queer relationships as ‘coming out’ as well.  
 
Rainbow Families as Role Models: The Dynamics of Gender, Sexualness, and Social 
Class 
A rainbow family is generally defined as a same-sex or LGBTIQA+ parented family in 
Euro-American society and this term has lately been adopted by Asia-Pacific regions. 
Over the last few years, the terms ‘rainbow family (caihong jiating)’ and ‘rainbow baby 
(caihong baobao)’ have been increasingly mentioned in Chinese queer communities, 
principally by LGBT organisations, gay and lesbian bloggers, and private ART agencies. 
Chen’s HH company has been managing a WeChat public account named “Rainbow 
Studio”. Likewise, quite a few ART agencies offering IVF/surrogacy service packages in 
China or overseas started their WeChat public accounts named “(company name) 
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Rainbow Baby” from around 2015. They share positive news and useful information on 
LGBT rights and implicitly promote their ART services in the articles. With their 
successful clients, they have linked the use of ART with the definition of the ‘rainbow 
baby’ and more crucially, the desired future for a perfect same-sex family that could live 
openly in China.   
 
At the PFLAG Changsha talkfest in 2019, the host asked the guest speaker Tian: “since 
you have a child, Xiaoyu, already, why do you want a rainbow baby (caihong baobao)?”  
As a gay-identified father of two children, Tian guoji adopted his older son Xiaoyu from 
his brother and had his little son via surrogacy. The PFLAG host referred to Tian’s second 
son, whom he had through surrogacy, as a ‘rainbow baby’. Tian didn’t address this 
question directly; instead, he acknowledged that he came out to his mother after his 
‘rainbow baby’ was born. He felt his coming-out experience sounded like a fake one:  
“My mom was not angry after I told her I was gay. She even started to speculate 
about my friends and said, ‘oh, is that guy who is very tall and muscular homosexual 
as well?’ I thought my mom would not sleep that night; it turned out I was the one 
who couldn’t sleep.”  
Most attendees seemed unsurprised, as they supposed that Tian’s mother had no more 
reason to be angry about Tian’s same-sex desires. Tian had brought a biological and 
legally recognised offspring into the family and therefore fulfilled his familial duty as a 
son. Several implications arise here. Tian’s older son Xiaoyu was never called a ‘rainbow 
baby’ by others at these kind of events, which implied that the birth of Tian’s second child 
was innovative and different from normative reproductive relationships. Although Tian 
felt astonished and grateful that his mother accepted him quickly, most listeners tended 
to relate Tian’s successful coming-out experience to his parental status. As mentioned 
before, having offspring was often viewed as aiding one’s coming out to families of origin. 
How does this relate to the emerging forms of queer family in China? 
 
The discussions on whether a family might call themselves a ‘rainbow family’ and their 
child a ‘rainbow baby’ in queer communities always involved an evaluation of one’s 
marriage and parenting practices. From my experience with my friend-respondents, ART 
agencies, and LGBT communities, it seemed only the babies born through a way that was 
free from association with heterosexual marriage and sexual intercourse belonged to the 
category of rainbow babies. Lesbian mothers and gay fathers were hesitant to refer to 
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their children from previous zhihun (heterosexual marriages with heterosexual-identified 
spouses) as rainbow babies. Also, queer parents in xinghun (gay-lesbian contract 
marriages) rarely referred to their co-parenting status with opposite-sex xinghun partners 
as a rainbow family, nor would they join such WeChat groups. In this sense, queer parents’ 
past life histories were also taken into account. For instance, journalists generally called 
Tommy’s family a ‘Chinese Version of Tongzhi Family’. If Tommy’s family stories 
demonstrate a type of gay family that resisted centralising biology, his college-age son 
Jack was yet not recognised as a rainbow baby and Tommy’s family therefore didn’t fit 
in to the strict definition of the rainbow family.   
 
Not long after I discovered Tommy’s ‘Three men under one roof’ blog, several lesbians 
recommended a well-known WeChat public account named “Caihong Baobao (Rainbow 
Babies)”. This public account was created by a lala couple in 2015 who had mixed-race 
twin babies through the A luan B huai process overseas. The lala couple, owning a 
kindergarten themselves, had been positively sharing their life. The couple also shares 
news and suggestions regarding LGBT families worldwide. Many lesbians endorsed them 
as the model lesbian/rainbow family. Starting from 2015, the lala couple has been 
collecting stories of “non-xinghun tongzhi families with children”, which they later 
termed ‘rainbow families’. As the public account attracted thousands of followers, the 
lala couple organised online support groups for non-heterosexual people who want to 
have or have children to exchange experiences and resources. Although they strictly 
prohibited group members from advertising ART agencies, there were still employees 
from ART agencies trying to join these groups. The lala couple emphasised that firm self-
identification was significant for queer parents to raise children, as they pointed out that 
some older queer parents didn’t accept their sexualities well and could easily collapse 
when their kids questioned their sexualities. Moreover, the lala couple described their 
choice to have a rainbow family as a resistant and aggressive move. In other words, they 
believed that they chose to set their lifestyle in opposition to obedience and compromise. 
In this way, they appeared to embrace western coming-out advocacy and acknowledged 
the rainbow family as a lifestyle that attacked the normative heterosexual family.  
 
In addition to online social media platforms, the ‘rainbow family ‘and ‘rainbow baby’ 
have been increasingly acknowledged in offline queer communities. PFLAG China, one 
of the largest Chinese non-profit LGBT organisations whose major aim was to promote 
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family harmony, have demonstrably contributed to the standardised discourse on the 
Chinese rainbow family or role model LGBT family. From 2017 to 2019, I have attended 
six PFLAG events in four cities. Four of them are LGBT talkfests and two of them are 
LBT special sharing sessions. In each LGBT talkfest, there were several types of themes 
and guest speakers that were never absent. Firstly, the events usually began with the topic 
of self-acceptance. The guest speakers were gay men and lesbians who had completely 
come out to their families and the public and devoted themselves to the LGBT community. 
Coming out and family acceptance’ was one of the most emotional themes when the 
parents of gay men and lesbians shared their feelings and experiences after knowing their 
children were not straight. They were addressed as ‘Mama/Papa’ and were surrounded 
by young non-heterosexual people who wanted advice on coming out to their parents. At 
least one same-sex couple would share their love stories and advice on maintaining a 
‘lasting relationship’. The hosts always started the discussion by asking the couple, “how 
long have you been together?” When the couple answered with a period that was usually 
several to more than ten years, attendees all clapped and cheered. Queer parents were also 
the necessary guest speakers in the ‘having children’ section. As a gay father with two 
sons, Tian has been invited to be a guest speaker at various online and offline PFLAG 
events since he had his second son (who was acknowledged as a rainbow baby) and came 
out to his parents. When the hosts began to introduce the same-sex couples and queer 
parents, the screen would display a photo of a sweet moment between them. The themes 
were selected by organisers to encourage participants to come out to their parents, avoid 
entering any form of heterosexual marriage, have a lasting same-sex intimate relationship, 
build a network of elder support, and take part in LGBT activities.  
 
Organisers nominated the guest speakers as role models who gave guidance to curious 
attendees. Besides Tian, other invited guest speakers were mostly considered successful 
individuals by the public, including doctors, professors, entrepreneurs, etc. After these 
same-sex couples and queer parents walked off the stage, there were always some 
attendees approaching them and asking for their WeChat IDs or phone numbers. It should 
be noted that the majority of attendees in these LGBT talkfests events were self-identified 
gay men, some were self-identified lesbians, and only a few identified as transgender or 




Certainly, guest speakers’ personal characteristics and resources were often admired by 
numerous attendees and seen as the reason they were so successful in both their careers 
and familial life. On the other hand, the selected guest speakers and themes have 
discouraged attendees from expressing themselves from disadvantaged backgrounds even 
though PFLAG China didn’t charge any entrance fee for its talkfests. During the same 
PFLAG talkfest at which Tian was one of the guest speakers, a gay man raised his hand 
and asked:  
“I don’t understand why I can’t find a boyfriend. I already came out to my family ten 
years ago. I think having a romantic relationship (tanlian’ai) is harder than coming 
out. Otherwise, I wouldn’t be alone. I have attended several of your events but no 
one wants to talk to me further. I feel everyone is young and good-looking except me. 
I am now asking if anyone is interested in me?” 
The man’s strong accent and clothes indicated his rural working social class status, and 
he was obviously middle-aged. He was surrounded by young gay men wearing 
fashionable clothes and wristbands with rainbow elements. After his speech, the silence 
in the banquet hall lasted for at least ten seconds. The host comforted the man briefly, and 
the event moved on as usual. Various studies on Chinese LGBT/ tongzhi activist groups 
and LGBT communities have pointed out how sexual politics are shaped by the state, 
capitalism, and the discourse on cultural citizenship (Rofel 2007, Kong 2010, Bao 2018, 
Wei 2020). The story of Mei and Youzi below further delineates how the Chinese 
homonormative discourse on the role model queer family has been fortified.  
 
At another PFLAG talkfest, a young gay man yelled excitedly: “they have been together 
for 10 years! I think they should be the next guest speakers!” Suddenly being the centre 
of attention, Mei and Youzi looked shy as a hundred queer attendees turned their heads 
to look at them. Mei and Youzi were both 30 years old. They met each other via an online 
forum when Youzi was at university. Surprisingly, they found out that they used to live 
in the same neighbourhood. They smiled and told me they fell in love at first sight. Mei 
had a hard time living with her family of origin. Her mother died when she was young. 
Her father then married a young woman who Mei describes as impetuous. Mei couldn’t 
get along with her stepmother. Consequently, she quit school and moved out of the home. 
When Mei met Youzi, she was already working as a clerk. After their relationship became 
serious, Youzi asked Mei to move to her home and live with her parents. Mei’s parents 
are not aware of their intimate relationship as Youzi introduced Mei as a close friend who 
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had been suffering with some family drama. Mei lived in Youzi’s home for two years 
until Youzi graduated from university. They currently live in an apartment away from 
Youzi’s parents in the suburb of Shenzhen and far from Mei’s parents as well. Youzi was 
working as an engineer in a state-owned company, which provided a stable level of 
income. 
 
During my fieldwork, Youzi and Mei both entered xinghun marriages as they felt this was 
the pragmatic and reasonable response to marriage pressure. On a Sunday night in March 
2019, we were having dinner and Youzi mentioned she was going to get the marriage 
certificate the next day due to a small accident:  
“It was funny. We (Youzi and her xinghun husband) went to the civil affairs bureau 
this Friday trying to get a marriage certificate, and then we discovered we didn’t have 
the required photo! You know, the official photo that will be on the marriage 
certificate. So tomorrow we are going to the photo booth at first and then go to the 
civil affairs bureau.” 
Mei nodded and added some amusing details to Youzi’s story. Mei and Youzi described 
the process around arranging xinghun marriage as a series of daily trifles. I met many 
same-sex couples who became worried and scared when they started to talk about their 
xinghun marriage experiences. Therefore, I was impressed by Youzi and Mei’s relaxed 
attitude. They went through the process together and every future move was planned. 
They both notarised pre-marital property with their xinghun partners and were not worried 
about any potential financial disputes. Furthermore, Youzi and Mei were certain that they 
didn’t want children, either on their own or with their xinghun partners. They avoided 
parent-in-law issues as much as they could, and agreed with their xinghun husbands that 
they wouldn’t own any communal property or have a child. In many online chatting 
groups, such xinghun marriages are often called successful and nominal ones – a minimal 
bond between the gay ‘husband’ and lesbian ‘wife’.  
 
Youzi and Mei only went to the PFLAG talkfest once with their gay friend and didn’t 
understand why people in the event treated them like celebrities. “We are just a normal 
couple, no secrets of success”, Mei said when others asked them to share their love story. 
After I met them at that event, Youzi and Mei only hung out with me and my partner, and 
they never attend PFLAG events anymore. They didn’t enjoy participating in PFLAG 
talkfests, as they felt they would be judged by others. Although they didn’t feel their 
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xinghun marriage was a problematic and unmoral move, they shortly realised that the 
practice of any form of heterosexual marriage was conceived as a symbol of one’s 
weakness and obedience in PFLAG philosophy. To put it another way, Mei and Youzi 
didn’t want to be and indeed didn’t qualify as role model speakers at PFLAG events. 
Coming out to their parents and the wider public and having a rainbow baby were not 
included as a part of their future plan. 
 
The capacity to establish an acknowledged modern rainbow family is conditioned by 
one’s gender and socio-economical class rather than one’s ‘deviant’ sexual desires and 
behaviours. Firstly, female same-sex couples who raised children together were 
noticeably fewer and less visible than gay co-fathers. Until now, Chinese women have 
generally earned less income and had less personal autonomy than men (Tan & Jiang 
2006, Fincher 2014, Ji et al. 2017), and these issues on gender inequality make 
childrearing a more challenging task for lesbian co-mothers. In addition, respondents 
working in governmental sectors and state-owned enterprises were especially concerned 
with their image as single parents in their colleagues and employers’ eyes, not to mention 
their non-normative sexualities. Having a ‘rainbow family’ also means having children 
out-of-wedlock, which is considered to be disobeying family planning policy and hence 
could cause the unmarried parent to be fined and harm one’s career. Chinese people and 
organisations who applied the term ‘rainbow family’ to themselves were often required 
to prove their relationships within a Euro-American-originated frame of anti-
heteronormativity, which set them apart from ‘traditional’ lifestyles and state policies.  
 
The emerging discourse on the ‘rainbow family’, like that on ‘free love’ in transforming 
Chinese societies, suggests a formulation of seemingly rigid contradictions between 
tradition and modernity. As rainbow families become a symbol of modernity and 
progression in online and offline queer communities, non-heterosexual people with 
‘normative’ marriages currently or in the past remain silenced in queer public spaces, as 
they are under the gaze of other non-heterosexual people, who seem to regard themselves 
as more modern. The LGBT identified micro-celebrities, the LGBT organisations like 
PFLAG China and their partnering ART companies were ultimately endorsing the same 
kind of queer role models and again stressing queer individuals’ personal agency to gain 
upward mobility, which echoes the dominant narrative of being a good sexual citizen by 
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being a good consumer (Rofel 2007) and the discourses of modernity and 
homonormativity (Duggan 2002).  
 
If the emerging discourse on ‘rainbow family’ in Chinese same-sex communities 
embodies homonormative subjectivities and norms, this kind of homonormative politics 
should not be perceived as the same as Euro-American-originated homonormativity. 
Even before I started my fieldwork, I realised many LGBT, women, and other minority 
organisations never referred to themselves as ‘non-governmental organisations 
(feizhengfu zuzhi)’, but instead called themselves ‘non-profit organisations (feiyingli 
zuzhi)’. People working at PFLAG China and other surviving organisations gave others 
some simple advice: don’t discuss sensitive (mingan) topics like civil rights, politics, and 
activism, and don’t work with any foreign organisations, including embassies. Most of 
PFLAG’s events tended to focus on queer intimate and familial life, such as providing 
support on coming out to parents and building LGBT friend networks for old age support. 
In this way, PFLAG China itself reflected an interesting paradox in the tradition-
modernity binaries. And yet, being a wenhe (peaceable, non-aggressive) LGBT 
organisation emphasising “promoting family harmony” and often quoting President Xi’s 
words in its visual materials, PFLAG’s funding has been constantly questioned and 
interfered with by local officials, according to a full-time employee. On the other hand, 
many non-heterosexual people didn’t attend PFLAG’s events as they told me, “these 
organisations are too radical. I am just an ordinary (putong) person”. In other words, 
PFLAG China might not be an LGBT rights charity in the Euro-American definition, but 
it was still considered too aggressive and too high-profile among a large number of 
Chinese non-heterosexual people. Some of them only showed up at LGBT events for 
pragmatic reasons such as finding dates and looking for relevant support. A PFLAG 
volunteer complained to me, “many people only think of us when their parents found out 
they are gay, that saying, when the fire is burning their eyebrows”. 
 
The exclusion and inclusion processes of ‘rainbow family’ in Chinese queer communities 
reveal the multi-layered interplay of social status, gender norms and sexualness. 
‘Sexuality’, as Khanna (2017) points out, emerges as an aspect of personhood, a ‘modern’ 
phenomenon, a political object, and a context of queer movement. Yet, sexual desire 
doesn’t always inform interiority or the inner psychic formation about someone (Khanna 
2017). The personal accounts above demonstrate the limits of the dominant sexuality-as-
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personhood framework in understanding queer citizenship and social mobility in a non-
Euro-American context. The discursive relation between sexual desires and relational 
personhood in China cannot be ascribed to ‘sexuality types’. Rather, a shift toward 
understanding the sexualness of the Chinese citizen is vital.  
 
Moreover, the discussions on Chinese rainbow families tended to focus on one’s personal 
agency in creating a role model queer family or one’s failure to do so; yet it didn’t mean 
that social and political factors had less influence on queer intimate and familial lives. In 
today’s China, politics is indeed a sensitive topic, and people only felt comfortable talking 
about it with their most familiar ones. What was often bypassed in the daily conversations 
in queer everyday lives were social and political factors such as LGBT rights, public and 
governmental attitudes toward same-sex marriage and queer co-parenting. For most 
Chinese people, social and political factors would not change for them, but they could 
change themselves to secure better living arrangements. I concur with Boyce (2014) that 
non-heterosexual people’s ambivalent responses to sexual rights reveal the “complex 
relationships between sexual subjectivity, economy, law, the state, and people’s most 
intimate aspirations” (2014:1201). Concisely, Chinese non-heterosexual people’s 
endorsement of the rainbow family concentrated more on the individual’s capabilities 
rather than the person’s non-normative gender and sexual relationships. I now move to 
explore their attitude toward public visibility and acceptance of queer families. 
 
Being ‘Ordinary’ (invisible), being ‘Radical’ (visible) in different times and spaces 
In Chinese popular online forums, it was common to see homophobic statements under 
the topic of LGBT matter as below: 
“I am straight. I am not against tongxinglian (homosexuality). I just can’t accept their 
sexuality. I think I am being nice enough and you tongxinglian people shouldn’t ask 
more from me.” 
“I am fine with gay people in society, but you shouldn’t ask us to help you advocate 
for homosexuality.” 
“I don’t discriminate against homosexual people, but you can’t flaunt your 
homosexuality on the street!” 
Such statements often reduced homosexuality to same-sex sexual behaviour. In this sense, 
non-heterosexual conjugal relationships, especially female same-sex relationships, were 
ignored rather than discriminated against (see also Kam 2013, Sang 2003). At the same 
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time, the emerging online debates against same-sex marriage were linked to the issues of 
tongqi (wives of gay men) and commercial surrogacy while neglecting the very existence 
of non-heterosexual families, especially female conjugal relations.  
 
In the interviews, nonetheless, most respondents tried to convince me that the social 
atmosphere in Shenzhen was tolerant and they never experienced homophobic behaviours 
in their daily life as non-heterosexual identified subjects. Many reasoned that homophobic 
behaviours happened mostly in underdeveloped rural areas and in online forums full of 
‘hatred comments’, and linked homophobic attitudes with one’s low-quality (di suzhi) 
status. This is a major reason queer individuals, especially queer parents, desired housing 
in middle-upper class neighbourhoods.  
 
An, a gay father and an entrepreneur enjoying a middle-upper class life in Shenzhen, said 
he was not concerned about homophobic messages. During our interview at An’s 
company, An took a break to look after his crying children. The cameraman responsible 
for videotaping our interview commented: 
“I bet he is not troubled by having three kids, or you know, parenting without getting 
married. If I had as much money as him, I would be happy all the time and have as 
many children as I could.” 
An emphasised many times that “the society is more tolerant than you think”. He provided 
several examples: 
“I and Ye (An’s partner) hold hands on the street and no one says anything. One time, 
I forwarded an article about gay men to my WeChat Moments and forget to make it 
public only to selected friends – it became public to all Wechat contacts. Then my 
business partners ‘liked’ it.”  
During the interview, An contended that public recognition for homosexuality was a false 
proposition and he didn’t need such recognition. For An, such progression wouldn’t do 
much to aid his career. In the meantime, An was aware that other people rarely asked 
about his intimate life and family status due to his high social position. An was also aware 
that the news about his mixed-race sons and the images of his high-profile rainbow family 
helped him to gain attention and potential business resources. As an employer, An didn’t 




In a similar narrative, Tommy concluded that “we are very lucky”, as he and Joe never 
had any noteworthy trouble being gay fathers in their everyday lives. One reason for that, 
as Tommy explained, was that “the big city is more tolerant.” Tommy’s apartment is in 
the centre of Guangzhou. Tommy said he was worried that Jack would have problems 
with having two daddies. Thus, when Jack was in kindergarten, Tommy told Jack, “You 
have seen many types of families in our neighbourhood. Some of your friends have only 
one father; some have only one mother. You shouldn’t discriminate against any of them.” 
Tommy meant not only divorced parents, but also the mistresses who had illegitimate 
children with married businessmen in Hong Kong. Tommy shared the neighbourhood 
with some wealthy mistresses, and they were respectful enough not to judge each other 
in public. When the three of them walk in the friendly and elegant neighbourhood, no one 
has ever questioned who Jack’s father was. Tommy once visited Jack’s elementary school 
teacher before Mother’s Day, when students were often required to write an essay about 
their mothers or show gratitude to their mothers. Tommy said, 
“I told Jack’s teacher that Jack’s father and mother were divorced a long time ago, 
and he doesn’t live with his mother. Therefore, I hoped she could relax the 
requirement a little bit. Maybe she could ask students to write about any family 
member they like. She took my advice.” 
 
These vivid examples of social tolerance listed by An and Tommy have many things in 
common. They hardly ever mentioned their queer sexualities as a primary focus. Rather, 
they described how others reacted to their relationship with their same-sex partners or 
children. Quite a few gay fathers and lesbian mothers expressed optimistic beliefs that 
society was becoming tolerant to non-heterosexual families when they never displayed 
their gay/lesbian parenthood in public sites. In other words, they blurred the boundaries 
between social tolerance toward non-normative families and social tolerance toward non-
normative sexualities. Non-normative family is anything outside the imaginary of a 
hetero-reproductive nuclear family made up of an opposite-sex married couple and 
children. In such narratives, queer parents’ images in social institutions like kindergarten 
and hospital were often conflated with those of single parents or divorced families. Queer 
parents in this research usually told the schoolteachers that “my child has no 
father/mother”. In urban cities like Shenzhen, the teachers could usually get the hint from 
the subtle explanation. Queer parents, therefore, concluded their neighbours and 
schoolteachers “respected people’s privacy because they don’t ask private questions”. For 
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Tommy and many other non-heterosexual subjects in urban China, the fact that they were 
not pushed to explicitly disclose their queer sexualities to their neighbours, work partners, 
children’s teachers, and governmental officials to live their queer familial life was the 
evidence of social progression. In this way, social tolerance was understood as equating 
to not disturbing one’s everyday life rather than supporting one’s rights. The subtle 
expression of one’s queer relationships and the silent tolerance of them prevailed in the 
discourse on social tolerance, distinct from the Euro-American activist advocating of 
being ‘out and proud’ and public visibility. 
 
Among my friend-respondents who contended they were just ordinary people, social 
news and legal policy were often considered as ‘public matters’ that wouldn’t directly 
pose threats to one’s personal life. In other words, most non-heterosexual people didn’t 
immediately think about being socially and legally recognised as a couple or family when 
the topic of coming out was brought up. They understood their private life and the 
political public as two unrelated things. Many explained to me that they wanted to “focus 
on practical things rather than political things”. Some respondents commented that 
“LGBT activists couldn’t even feed themselves”. As a result, LGBT organisations like 
PFLAG China tended to present the goal of their events as “making friends and giving 
suggestions on dealing with parents” (practical) rather than “promoting LGBT rights” 
(political) in order to attract attendees.  
 
Here I relate the discourse on coming out and public visibility to the private-public sphere 
in queer intimate and familial life rather than identity politics. The coming-out advocacy 
in the Euro-American world could be troubling for queer couples in a non-Western 
society (Wei 2007, Engebretsen & Schroeder 2015). The Western notion of coming out 
and being ‘closeted’ implies a duality as one is either completely out or keeps their 
sexuality completely hidden. Valentine points out that “the process of coming out is more 
complex with individuals maintaining multiple identities in different space and in one 
space but at different times” (1993: 246). Hence, time and space are significant factors 
for non-heterosexual people to decide either to reveal their queerness or ‘pass’ as straight. 
 
Both in their late 20s, Saisai and her girlfriend Yina had an informal wedding party with 
their parents and friends in 2018 to celebrate their ten-year relationship. Saisai was 
working at a state-owned enterprise, and Yina was working for hotel chains. Yina was 
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Saisai’s junior at University, and she realised she liked women when she fell for Saisai. 
Yina thought of herself as bisexual and actively made many LGBT friends through queer 
social media and volunteer networks. Furthermore, they both came out to their parents in 
recent years. Saisai explained: 
“Coming out was slow and difficult progress. My mother and Yina’s mother have 
accepted our relationships, but both of our fathers are still unhappy about us. My 
father believed that I would have a poor life living with a woman, so we worked hard 
to prove that he was wrong.”  
During their wedding, their parents and relatives shed tears of joy when they all stood 
together for wedding photos. Saisai and Yina thus saw the wedding as a great strategy to 
make their family recognise their relationship. Saisai and Yina’s experiences don’t fit into 
the coming out/coming home binary, as they valued both their individualistic desires and 
their parents’ feelings. In the local lesbian community, Saisai and Yina were considered 
a successfully ‘out’ lesbian couple blessed by family elders. The narratives of coming out 
and being accepted by each other’s parents were repeated on every occasion when an 
experienced queer couple showed up. No one would bother to ask if they had come out 
in their workplace. As a short-hair T-style woman, Saisai thought her boss must already 
know she was lesbian but didn’t bother to question her:  
“The employer, especially in private firms, doesn’t care about your sex life at all. 
They just care about whether you (female employees) are married and the possibility 
of taking pregnancy leave. Believe me, they would be happier if you never get 
married and never had pregnancy leave!”   
 
Another explanation for the indifferent attitude was perhaps that non-heterosexual people 
in Chinese cities felt they could easily pretend about/ ‘weaken’ their queerness once they 
need to negotiate with the wider social world or the Chinese legal system. I once had 
dinner with a lesbian couple Danny and Pam (previously mentioned in chapter 4&6) in a 
fusion restaurant which they recommended. In the last few years, Danny changed her 
visible T style to a more feminine one, growing long hair and wearing feminine formal 
clothes. She explained that it was partly because of her job as a lawyer and partly because 
of her changing understanding of T/P roles. Pam had worked in different cities as a 
freelance photographer before she thought about coming out to her parents. Danny and 
Pam had been living together for two years and were saving money to have children 
together through the process of A luan B huai. While Pam had come out to her parents, 
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Danny promised her parents she would get married and was looking for a nominal 
xinghun husband. In Danny’s workplace, Pam showed up as Danny’s flatmate every time 
she picked Danny up after work. As we walked out of the restaurant, the restaurant owner, 
who was also a friend of Danny’s employer, recognised Danny’s face and went to greet 
us. After some friendly small talk, the owner said to Danny, “Take your guimi 
(bosom female friend) to my restaurant next time!” Danny smiled and said yes. We said 
goodbye to the restaurant owner and left. This night was an ordinary scene in both 
Danny’s and my everyday knowledge. Many of my lesbian peers told me their bosses say 
homophobic statements all the time but could never tell their employees are not straight. 
I shared the same cultural knowledge with Danny and many other respondents, so I rarely 
bothered to ask them why they chose to hide their queerness in the workplace or other 
public spaces. Initially, I didn’t write it down in my field notes because the taken-for-
grantedness of spatial taxonomies like public and private happened instinctually in our 
lives. Queer relationships were presented in different degrees of visibility, as Danny and 
Pam were a loving couple in my eyes, close friends in Danny’s family relatives’ eyes, and 
flatmates in Danny’s colleagues’ eyes. For Danny and Pam, it was no more difficult than 
lifting a finger to pass as straight in public as they rarely need to explain their relationships 
to others. Whether their colleagues were homophobic or not, their personal interests 
wouldn’t be affected.  
 
Often, my friend-respondents describe such practices as keeping a low-profile life to 
avoid unnecessary troubles: 
“Chinese people are very realistic. They have too many things to worry about: money, 
career, house, etc. They just want to earn as much money as they can to feel secure. 
As long as everyone is living their own life and minding their own business, why 
would they even pay attention to us?” (Wen, age 34)  
Under the narrative of pragmaticism, a supportive social environment for non-
heterosexual people often didn’t stand out as a primary focus. Rather, it was one’s 
financial capability that was mentioned most often. A gay respondent, Min, explicitly 
summarised his understanding of the ‘jia (family)’:  
“I think there are two important factors that make me feel at home: children (haizi) 
and a house (fangzi)”.  
Similarly, some younger respondents said owning a pet and a flat would be enough for 
them to feel like they were at home. In this sense, the desire for a privatised jia/family 
200 
 
space is connected with the desire for a middle-class lifestyle (Zhang 2008). One’s family 
fell into the category of one’s own business, distinct from the general public or political 
public. I have met non-heterosexual people working in private firms, state-owned 
enterprises, and universities. Most respondents told me the reason they didn’t come out 
in the workplace was that such an act was ‘unnecessary’ and ‘pointless’ rather than risky. 
In everyday life, there was a strong sense of distinction between public and private space. 
 
From my ethnographic fieldwork, however, it became evident that social policies on 
marriage, hukou citizenship, and parenting custody have drastically shaped queer’s 
people’s practices for building lasting conjugal relationships and having children with 
same-sex partners. To some extent, legal policies have shaped people’s imagination and 
choices with regard to creating a new ‘jia / family’ with their queer partners. 
 
Several months after their informal wedding, Saisai and Yina complained to other lesbian 
friends and me that they still felt like they were dating (tanlian’ai) rather than married, 
especially when Yina went to work at a new company and wrote her married status as 
‘unmarried’ in the employee personal details form. Yina’s new colleagues tried to 
introduce Yina to potential male mates several times, and Yina had to make different 
excuses to refuse their invitations. Intimacy, as Berlant points out, “reveals itself to be a 
relation associated with tacit fantasies, tacit rules, and tacit obligations to remain 
unproblematic” (1998:287).  
 
Saisai and Yina’s experience with their family members and colleagues disclosed the 
fictive fantasy of keeping queer intimate relationship in a clear work-family binary. Not 
long after, Saisai and Yina went to the local notary public office to register as appointed 
guardians for each other. This gave them some feelings of legal bond and security. Adult 
voluntary guardianship, permitted by article 33 in the General Provisions of the Civil Law 
2017 version, allows adults with the full capacity for civil conduct to name a trusted 
person to make decisions for them in case they lost or partially lost the capacity for civil 
conduct. Initially, this article was not formulated to protect same-sex relationships by any 
means, although it was quickly circulated in urban same-sex communities as a practical 
tactic to tighten conjugal relationships. Even so, not being recognised as a married couple 





Conclusion: Transforming Families and Queer Modernity 
To sum up, this chapter treats family/jia as a transforming discourse. Fiona and Alice’s 
experiences with their parents and relatives during the Chinese New Year Holidays have 
revealed the changing understanding of the scope of family. Customarily, Chinese 
people have a reunion dinner on New Year’s Eve with all members from the same 
patrilineal family line or the same surname. People travelled back to their hometowns 
and visited relatives during the Chinese spring festival. For an increasing number of 
Chinese young people, the notion of big family (da jia), which refers to the 
Confucianist patrilineal family, has been replaced by the modern small family (xiao jia), 
which refers to the nuclear family with one’s parents included. The emerging small 
family has been fuelled by economic reforms and social policies. Young non-
heterosexual people’s life choices and family aspirations have been shaping and are 
shaped by the changing notion of a Chinese family, and this is particularly visible in 
their home-leaving and home-reunion experiences. Wei (2020) develops a paradigm of 
stretched kinship among Chinese non-heterosexual people, who try not to break up with 
their family but keep their relationship with their families of origin elastic and resilient 
in their home leaving and reunion process. This chapter’s personal accounts further 
point to the stretched and elastic meaning of natal families in Chinese society. Young 
people didn’t visit their relatives as often as the older generations, and they didn’t feel 
the moral obligation to do so. Rather, many of them hoped their parents would put more 
focus on them instead of the big family. In this sense, family/jia represents not only 
blood relativeness, but also emotional closeness. While parent-child relations are still 
central in the Chinese kinship system, the importance of ‘big family’ and relatives have 
been weakened. In other words, even blood families or families of origin could have 
different meanings for Chinese people from different generations. As many respondents 
clarified, they only needed their parents’ acceptance, not their relatives’. The changing 
conception of family in transforming Chinese society cannot be neglected, as the 
elasticity in Chinese kinship values provides negotiating space for Chinese non-
heterosexual people to express their desires.   
 
Non-heterosexual people who migrated to first-tier cities like Shenzhen took the 
opportunity to distance themselves from relatives and made light of their moral 
judgments. At the same time, they were still in materially and mentally interdependent 
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relationships with their parents. The visible trend of “reverse spring festival reunion” in 
first-tier cities indicated that both the parent and the queer child were essential actors in 
Chinese family transformations. Still, non-heterosexual people who stayed in their 
hometowns might feel morally obliged to maintain good relations with relatives and 
hence find it difficult to distance themselves from the big family.  
 
Various forms of non-heterosexual families have emerged in today’s urban China, and 
they are characterised by many voices. Non-heterosexual individuals from different age 
groups and social backgrounds, LGBT non-profit organisations, same-sex dating APPs, 
and ART agencies have all contributed to the discursive and dynamic understandings of 
role model ‘tongzhi/rainbow family’. Tian’s account indicates manifold and complex 
orders of family-forming processes among Chinese non-heterosexual people, as people 
may choose to enter a heterosexual xinghun marriage and have children before they 
come out to parents and find a same-sex partner to form a queer family with.  
 
The role model rainbow family promoted by LGBT non-profit organisations and gay 
and lesbian influencers linked the use of ART with the definition of ‘rainbow baby’ and 
more crucially, the image of a perfect same-sex nuclear family. On the other hand, this 
dominant and homonormative discourse on the rainbow family has often omitted queer 
subjects who lacked the capabilities to settle in big cities, to consume ART services and 
to raise children on their own. Wilson (2006) recognises the conflation of ‘Western’, 
‘modern’ and ‘globalisation’ as the source of sexual modernity in Asian societies. 
Under such Western hegemony, queer life and practices that don’t correspond to the 
first-world model are described as ‘traditional’. In this context, the inclusion process for 
non-heterosexual subjects is selective, and peri-urban/rural queer life-worlds may be 
represented as hard to reconcile with utopian queer imaginaries (Boyce & Dasgupta, 
2017). As a lesbian couple who have been living together for ten years, Youzi and 
Mei’s choice to enter xinghun with gay men rather than coming out to parents was 
interpreted as a symbol of weakness in homonormative spaces. As rainbow families 
become a symbol of modernity and progression in online and offline queer 
communities, non-heterosexual people who didn’t embrace an ‘out and proud’ lifestyle 
remained silenced in queer public spaces. At the same time, PFLAG China and other 
LGBT organisations’ efforts to avoid political topics like civil rights, politics, and 
activism in their events for surviving as a queer person in China reflected the 
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ambivalence of the modern-tradition binary in queer communities. The role model 
rainbow families, therefore, represented a desiring non-heteronormative lifestyle 
punctuated by its bourgeois politics. 
 
In researching Thai migrant women in the global labour market, Mills (1999) suggests 
modernity is contextual/contexted, multiple; it represents “a break between past and 
present” (13). As Mills points out, when migrant women moved between urban and 
rural areas, they deal with not just a shift in spaces, but also in identity. There is no one 
singular, stable description of Chinese modernity; rather, Chinese modernity is a 
dynamic discourse and it needs to be understood in its context. Similarly, the 
acknowledgement of ‘rainbow’ politics among Chinese non-heterosexual people 
embodies their understanding of both Chinese modernity and queer modernity. In other 
words, the descriptive sense of desiring a queer nuclear family is geo-temporal and is 
shaped by state policy, capitalism, gender and family norms, and the western-originated 
language of coming-out advocacy.  
 
The middle-class non-heterosexual person’s claim that society is becoming more 
modern and more tolerant toward homosexuality is contextualised and preconditioned, 
as we mustn’t see the socio-economic status as isolated from non-heterosexual 
relationships. The subtle expression of one’s queer relationships and the silent tolerance 
of them prevailed in the discourse on social tolerance, which was distinct from the 
western activist advocacy of being ‘out and proud’ and public visibility. Social 
tolerance was understood to equate to not disturbing one’s privacy rather than 
supporting one’s rights. In this way, public visibility and sexual rights were rarely 
mentioned in queer daily lives as essential needs, while financial capabilities were 
desired as essential for establishing a modern queer nuclear family. Consequently, most 
Chinese non-heterosexual people tended to internalise the failure to establish a 
recognisable family. 
 
Yet, this research demonstrates how social policies on marriage, citizenship, and 
parenting custody drastically shaped non-heterosexual people’s perceived freedom and 
choices to create a new ‘jia / family’ and how in many ways these choices relate to 
socio-economic status. It also raises the query of how certain narratives of acceptance 
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and tolerance close down around the ‘modern’ ‘homonormative’ ideologies and these in 
turn produce negative stereotyping and class stratification inside queer social circles.  
 
Returning to queer couples who claimed they created lasting relationships and families 
through financial cooperation, mutual property, and co-parenting practices, their choices 
were already conditioned by the existing social and legal context. Negotiating with the 
social and legal uncertainties in the process of creating and maintaining queer families 
through obtaining social mobilities and economic capital has ultimately become the 
(homo)normative narrative in queer communities. We must recognise that to be 
transgressive or to be assimilative within society is not an available choice and is “not 
easily practiced and achieved; rather they are complexly inhabited and refused, 
structured and reproduced” (Taylor 2010:75). From the most ‘visible’ gay co-fathers 
like An and Ye to the most ‘low-profile’ lesbian couples like Mei and Youzi, whether 
they were recognised as a good and representative non-heteronormative family involved 
constantly re-appropriating the public matter-private life dualities. The paralleled 
rhetoric of role model queer family and ordinary Chinese citizen take us back to the 
discussion of sexuality and sexualness, as they powerfully stress the manifold and 
dynamic process of constructing one’s sense of ‘self’. One may tactically choose to be 
recognised as an ordinary hetero-reproductive family by wider society (namely, work 
partners and public sectors) and identify as queer family in queer social spaces 
synchronously. In other words, they may not always be radically queer, and they may 
not always be assimilative. The modern queer families in urban China are therefore 
fluid in different times and spaces.  
 
In short, the queer family can include family modes that are radically different from and 
conform to the mainstream hetero-reproductive family model. Moreover, the emerging 
kinship practices, such as gay and lesbian xinghun marriage and surrogacy, lead to 
conflicting moral interpretations in queer social circles and wider society. It becomes 
problematic to make a unified characterisation of the Chinese modalities of queer 
family. The diverse Chinese modalities of the queer family challenge the universalist, 
linear assumption of queer modernity that only exists in the form of being out and 
progressive.   
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
 
In 2018, 2019, and 2020, I spent a lot of time with the lesbian couple Xie and Hong and 
their baby son Doudou. Xie is from the post-70s generation (70 hou) and Hong is from 
the post-80s (80 hou). They started their own business and successfully settled in 
Shenzhen. Through the technique of artificial insemination, Hong gave birth to Doudou 
in 2018 using her egg and Xie’s brother’s sperm. During our dinners, Hong and Xie 
always took turns to hold their sons and walk around in the restaurants. Like other 
middle-age friend-informants in this research, Hong and Xie found it strange and even 
uncomfortable to articulate their kinship practices and life choices in terms of non-
normative sexual identities. When I first introduced my research subject to them, Hong 
looked bewildered and asked, “Why bother researching this? we are all the same.”  
 
Hong’s words evidently resonated with most non-heterosexual individuals in China, 
who don’t think of their sexual practice as a determining factor in constructing their 
personhood. Rather, Hong saw herself as a responsible and hard-working middle-class 
Chinese citizen. In this sense, we could miss the point if we assumed a universalised 
centrality of individual selfhood and ascribe Hong’ sense of self to sexual identity. Hong 
didn’t feel she was different from most Chinese people and, more crucially, she desired 
the same socio-economic capital and a middle-class lifestyle as many other Chinese 
citizen-subjects. This vignette again reminds us to understand the diversity of gender 
and sexual experiences in Chinese context with a sense of dividual and relational 
selfhood (Yan 2017, Khanna 2017). Echoing Patel’s call to “bring sexuality into the 
ecology of sustainability and rethink fullness and care, life and futurity” (2006:54), this 
research has found Chinese non-heterosexual subjects’ strategies in forming and 
sustaining mutuality/jiban for long-lasting queer relationships are marked by their 
complex understanding of love, care, family, risk, and moral sense of self. ‘Non-
heterosexual people’ can simultaneously refer to a child, a lover, a parent, a 
husband/wife, and so on, in different given social relations. Each kinship role involves 
discursive moral expectations that intersect with Confucian familism, state policy, 
capitalism, and homonormative politics. This research is theoretically grounded in 
kinship and queer scholarship that denaturalises the notion of biology and centrality of 
hetero-reproductive relationships (e.g., Strathern 1992a, Hayden 1995, Folger 2008) 
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with the purpose of furthering our understanding of kinship, queer life aspirations, and 
Chinese social change.  
 
This thesis identifies several key topics with respect to queering kinship in urban China: 
queer intimate love, queer parenting, queer family, and queer futurity. The first 
ethnographic part focuses on queer intimate relationships. The proliferation of role 
terms from binary T-P/1-0 to diverse spectrums and shifting modes of same-sex 
relationships across different generations have innovatively destabilised gendered 
culture and, at the same time, produced hierarchy of same-sex relationships models. At 
the same time, it is vital not to reduce T-P/1-0 relationships to heterosexual-informed 
modes as it would risk understating heterosexual relationships as an eternally static 
object for comparison. The dating practices in queer communities have been constantly 
shaped by discursive discourses on modernity, lesbian/gay authenticity, and gender 
cultures. 
   
Contrasting to cruising public parks and consumerist bars, non-heterosexual people in 
urban China realise offline and online cultural spaces including queer film clubs and 
same-sex socialising apps as emerging spaces for seeking long-term loving 
relationships. In the meantime, the vague path from unrelated intimate stranger to real-
life partner in queer dating practices renders Chinese moral standards uncertain as they 
are relationally defined in accordance with one’s positionality in a given social relation 
(Yan 2017). When non-heterosexual people developed an intimate relationship with 
someone who was considered an unrelated individual completely outside their 
established social webs, their sentiments, health, and assets were all potential risks 
which they must internalise by themselves (Kleinman et al. 2011). One critical guidance 
emerging from online dating with a same-sex lover is to make sure the potential date is 
honest and reliable, meaning the person doesn’t intend to take advantage of or hide their 
marital status. Such uncertainty in seeking same-sex relationships needs to be 
understood within both the globalising queer politics and the context of the rapid 
modernisation and ethical shift in urban China. Generationally, trusting concerns have 
increasingly shifted from exposing oneself to public judgement to being taken 
advantage of emotionally and financially (see also Fu 2015). In this sense, what young 
non-heterosexual people desired from romantic relationships in many ways looked like 




The practices of seeking and maintaining stable same-sex relationships for non-
heterosexual people encompasses the blurred distinction of romantic/free love and 
conjugal/companionate love. Non-heterosexual people’s intimate experience cannot be 
articulated alone without acknowledging their family backgrounds, career paths, and 
migrating experiences to the ‘big city’. Research respondents stressed similar cultural 
tastes and complementary personal characteristics as the main factor they fell in love 
with their same-sex partners. In other words, non-heterosexual people in today’s urban 
China increasingly perceive their relationship partners beyond erotic lovers. They 
constantly negotiate economic, cultural, and legal factors that threaten their life status 
and queer intimate relationship, and keep a manageable distance from their families of 
origin in their hometowns. Most importantly, they attempt to find pragmatic solutions to 
secure their cohabiting relationship when the legalisation of same-sex marriage sounds 
too far a step for them. Without the housing bought by themselves or their parents 
which ensured their stable life status, queer couples would have to find alternative ways 
to maintain their relationships. Both the notions of conjugal and parental love are 
infused with consumer culture since purchasing goods for the other is closely linked to 
the expression of care and love in everyday life.  
 
The strategies for Chinese queer people to maintain long-lasting same-sex partners often 
involve creating an exclusive cohabiting relationship that is perceived as irreversible 
and sustainable, most often through owning mutual property or/and co-parenting 
practices. Such intentions and practices on the kinship continuum firstly render the 
material underpinning to family and care relationships (Simpson 1994, Patel 2006). For 
queer couples, establishing jiban (mutual burden) with each other in a foreseen future 
creates the feeling of mutual responsibility and security, in other words, an insured life 
against risk. At first glance, creating jiban is often understood and practiced as a 
substitute for a legal marriage. Yet, the individual narratives in this ethnographic 
research showed that jiban is not risk-free when it is not protected by state law or 
approved by each other’s families of origin. The gay-lesbian co-parenting practices in 
xinghun marriage further complicate the matter when children often become irreversible 
jiban for the gay and lesbian co-partners instead of same-sex lovers. In this sense, jiban 
is only as effective as legal marriage when queer individuals have acquired adequate 
upward mobility and the financial capability to be a good consumer/ sexual citizen, and 
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more critically, to be reproductive and fulfil their family duty and thus obtain parental 
acceptance. To put it another way, queer individuals envision a socially acknowledged 
successful life as the precondition of having a role model queer family, while the failure 
to foster durable jiban with one’s chosen ties is linked with the lack of individual 
capability rather than structural factors (see also Wang 2019). When a queer relationship 
powered by jiban comes to an end, the separation process for queer couples can also be 
complicated, just like going through a divorce. I suggest that non-heterosexual people’s 
strategies to create jiban are normalised as the pragmatic and desirable choice under 
existing Chinese social policies and consumer culture.  
 
This ethnography’s second theme is queer parenting, including the various pathways to 
become queer parents (or not) and the moral discourses that emerged from these 
practices. Non-heterosexual people’s desires to be parents can be both linked to the 
normative Confucian familism and viewed as radically queer. While some non-
heterosexual people claim that they have no choice but to have children to please their 
parents or to expect elderly support in return from their children, many non-
heterosexual people disconnect their purpose for entering heterosexual marriages and 
having children from the notions of traditional familial duty. Instead, they frame their 
motivation for being parents as an individual and voluntary choice. Also, a generational 
shift in understanding the parent-child relation and filial piety from ‘obedience’ and 
c‘duty’ to ‘mutual respect’ and ‘equal relations’ is showing. The life stories from 
research participants not wanting children suggest that the symbolic feature of children 
as one’s major resource of elder support has been shaken by the changing notion of 
parent-child relations under socio-economic changes. Non-heterosexual people’s 
motivation for having children were often unconsolidated and represented in both an 
individualistic sense as self-desire and a moral, relational manner as strengthening 
intimate relationships. To have children is, therefore, “also about being a family, being 
together with children, and having someone to refer to as one’s own” (Folger 2008:135). 
Overall, non-heterosexual people’s investment in parenting shouldn’t be interpreted as 
being exclusively traditional or modern as their practices don’t occupy such binary.  
 
There are many ways to become a parent for Chinese non-heterosexual people, but they 
may not be recognised equally in terms of feasibility and moral values. The practices of 
entering heterosexual marriage and surrogacy adopted by non-heterosexual people can 
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lead to conflicting moral interpretations in queer social circles and the wider society.  
Some non-heterosexual people entered zhihun (marrying an opposite-sex straight 
person) or xinghun (gay-lesbian contract marriage) to have children. The practice of 
pianhun (lying to marry an opposite-sex straight person mainly for the purpose of 
having offspring) has encountered increasing moral criticisms under the coming-out 
advocacy and feminist movements and is vanishing among younger generations in big 
cities. Non-heterosexual people’s motivations for entering xinghun marriage could be 
linked not only to marriage pressure but also their desires to be parents that complied 
with the state regulation and the image of a heteronormative family. Yet, co-parenting 
with one’s xinghun partner reveals the complex interplay of legal policies, gender 
norms, and moral values, as non-heterosexual people in xinghun marriages struggle to 
walk the blurred line between ‘nominal’ and ‘real’ marriages. When zhihun or xinghun 
marriage came to an end, the custody of children often became the major divorce 
dispute. 
 
In the case of non-heterosexual people adopting children, biological tie with children 
could still be essentially important, as the existing policy regarding adoption in Chinese 
child welfare centres doesn’t recognise non-heterosexual people as suitable parents. The 
practice of guoji adoption from family relatives saves non-heterosexual people from the 
first step of gaining permission from the child welfare centre as a state institution and 
eliminates moral dispute. Nevertheless, going through the relevant legal procedures can 
still produce discomfort and uncertainty around parenthood for queer parents.  
 
Against this backdrop, using ART alone without entering any form of heterosexual 
marriage has been constructed by non-heterosexual people and organisations work for 
or sponsored by ART businesses as the seeming ideal option for non-heterosexual 
people, especially same-sex couples, to establishing co-parenting relationships. 
However, it is only available to upper-middle-class people who can afford the high cost 
of childbirth and parenting and whose careers are unlikely to be affected by 
organisational and social policies. In the case of same-sex couples desiring children 
together, the children can only be legally bonded to one of them, which they need to 
strategically overcome to address their needs. Moreover, the online debates on the 
practice of surrogacy have been linked closely to gender inequality, which further 
sparks debates on gay fatherhood and same-sex marriage. For many young women in 
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urban China who are concerned about the gender privilege gay men held, gay men were 
only innocent when they didn’t show any desire to reproduce and completely abandoned 
their existing gender privilege. On the other hand, the Chinese ART companies entering 
the pink money market attempt to re-phrase their IVF and surrogacy services as doing 
good deeds and link their business with queer organisations, though issues on gender 
and class inequalities are still present in the ART industry. The relation between LGBT 
organisations and the ART industry therefore encompasses not only sexuality, but class, 
kinship, and gender concerns. 
 
The dynamic interrelations between same-sex relationship and queer parenting practices 
signify the elasticity of kinship in today’s urban China. The idea of blood and biology 
still holds its centrality in Chinese family life, as most non-heterosexual people 
conceptualise blood ties, especially parent-child blood relations, as the central and 
authentic form of kin relations. The conceptions of biology/blood and the legal 
implications of parentage/custody together have shaped the distinction between ‘my 
own children’ and ‘my partner’s children’, hence creating challenges for queer people to 
balance their kinship responsibilities as children, parents, and partners. The emerging 
use of ART and the disputes raised by the alleged distinction between biological and 
social parenthood for queer couples stresses the very uncertainty of queer kinship that 
exists with the ambiguity of state law and everyday heteronormative family norms in 
Chinese society and around the world (e.g., Boyce 2014, Goodfellow 2015). At the 
same time, the various parenting and co-parenting practices documented in this research 
demonstrate the mobilising possibilities beyond the singular definition of blood 
relatedness, that is, (co-)parenthood being constructed and strengthened using the 
language of bodily experience (carrying the baby in one’s body /qinsheng) and affective 
recognition (conjugal/parental love). In the cases of guoji adoption and using the 
egg/sperm of same-sex partners’ relatives, the idea of kinship roles is also mobilised as 
one form of kinship is being used to establish another one. Concisely, the notions of 
blood and its centrality in patrilineal continuality alone doesn’t work to achieve or 
destruct queer co-parenting relationship; rather, it was the queer subject’s capability to 
eliminate the involvement of a third biological or legal parent outside their intimate 
relationship, to negotiate with the uncertainties caused by state policies, to secure well-





At the same time, the parent-child relations for non-heterosexual people have become 
more fluid both in terms of emotional and physical distance. As an increasing number of 
young non-heterosexual people only come back home during national holidays, their 
connections with distant relatives weaken and their relationship with their parents tend 
to be stretched and elastic (Wei 2020). The emerging ‘reverse union’ and ‘small family’ 
further point to elastic meanings of family and relative in contemporary Chinese cities. 
 
The imagination of the queer family in today’s urban China is characterised by many 
voices under rapid social and family transformations. Queer individuals from different 
social backgrounds and generations, LGBT non-profit organisations, same-sex dating 
apps, and ART agencies have all contributed to the discursive and dynamic 
understandings of the queer/tongzhi/rainbow family. For different individuals and 
organisations, queer family can include family modes that are radically different from 
and conforming to the hegemonic hetero-reproductive family model. There is no 
singular version of family-forming processes among Chinese non-heterosexual people, 
as one may have a ‘normative’ past (enter a xinghun marriage and have children) before 
their ‘queer’ present and future (coming out to one’s parents and finding a same-sex 
partner form a queer family). Thus, it is vital not to make a unified characterisation of 
the Chinese modalities of the queer family as if they have a universally impervious 
essence. The diverse Chinese modalities of the queer family challenge the universalist 
assumption of queer modernity that only exists in the form of being out and progressive 
and in the sense of straight, linear time. In this sense, the various forms of Chinese 
queer families obscure the Western-Chinese, past-present, and tradition-modern 
binaries. By capturing the emerging family-forming practices and the image of the role-
model queer/rainbow nuclear family promoted in queer communities, this thesis stresses 
the dynamic interplay of socio-economical class, state law and moral values that come 
to articulate intimate and family relations in today’s queer everyday lives.  
 
At this point, it is crucial to unpack the two major types of moral discourse going on in 
Chinese queer life-worlds, which constantly shape life choices. The first discourse is 
constructed by the state policies and Confucian familism, and is often referred to as the 
‘tradition’ ideology. It suggests that one has no other choice but to fulfil family duties 
through entering a heterosexual marriage, having biological children, and taking good 
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care of family elders. The second discourse is arguably constructed by LGBT 
organisations and Western-originated queer coming-out politics, and is often regarded as 
the ‘modern’ ideology. It asks one to embrace an out and progressive lifestyle that 
attacks heteronormative kinship norms and meanwhile, being a good sexual citizen 
(Rofel 2007). These two discourses seem to be in radical conflict at first glance, while 
this ethnography demonstrates how queer individuals seek to find negotiating spaces 
from the blurred boundaries between the two discourses. Furthermore, queer utopian 
aspirations are marked by both discourses.  
 
The younger generations of non-heterosexual people in urban China endorse and make 
use of the rising emphasis on personal privacy to create and maintain same-sex 
relationships. Yet, personal privacy cannot be conflated with individual freedom, as 
their choices are not free but constantly conditioned by the existing familial and moral 
values and socio-legal systems; queer youth is haunted by the anxiety (lack of security) 
about their same-sex intimate relationships, parental acceptance, and elder life. Being 
financially capable and therefore being able to negotiate with one’s parents for familial 
acceptance is highlighted by non-heterosexual people of all ages.  
 
The life trajectories of middle-aged non-heterosexual migrants successfully settling in 
Shenzhen and establishing a queer form of family/jia embodies queer utopian imaginaries 
for futurity. I concur with Jones that we need to look further to the tension between the 
“queer struggle for a bearable life and aspirational hopes for a good life” (2013:2). For 
the non-heterosexual youth who desires a modern queer lifestyle and committed same-
sex relationships in cosmopolitan cities like Shenzhen, the rising living expense and 
tightening upward mobility, in addition to legal constraints, have inevitably shaped their 
material desires, career and parenting choices, and future aspirations. We must 
acknowledge that the ability to live a completely honest and out life and to establish a 
recognisable queer family in Chinese society remained a class-specific privilege. In 
today’s urban China, having a perfect queer family is not something unimaginable 
anymore, but such imageries, so tightly bounded with class position, remains 
unaffordable for many.  
 
Lastly, it should be acknowledged that the ‘queering’ of kinship is not perceived within 
only the scope of non-normative sexual desires but exists in every aspect of the society 
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at large. For example, increased social tolerance toward divorce and single parenting 
has also reduced social constraints for queer parents to raise children. Non-heterosexual 
people in this ethnography share struggles and uncertainties with straight Chinese 
people in non-normative intimate and family relationships such as DINK (double 
income no kids) families, single parenthood, unmarried, and polygamous relationships. 
Heterosexual relationships that fall out of the hetero-reproductive nuclear family 
category and often don’t/can’t rely on the authoritative recognitions (e.g., biogenetical 
reproduction or marriage), also indicate possibilists to queer the dominant Chinese 
kinship discourses, despite lack of visibility (e.g., Liang 2012). The various 
arrangements of queer conjugal love, parenting, and families in urban China have made 
explicit the malleability and contingence of Chinese kinship, in that way also blurred 
the symbolic distinctiveness of ‘Chinese’ kinship and ‘queer’ kinship. Knowledge of 
both kinship points to transformation that is situated in the interplay of cultural, legal, 
and economic institutions.  
 
Viewing themselves as ‘ordinary (putong)’ Chinese citizens and modern consumers, the 
queer couples and parents I met in urban China attempted to secure their ideal future 
lives and relationships, not by altering structural factors or pursuing marriage and 
reproduction rights as a coherent group, but rather by gaining personal agency and 
purchasing power to negotiate existing legal and social difficulties. In other words, both 
success and failure to form lasting intimate relationships and family were internalised as 
personal matters, infused with the language of personal agency and individual choice. 
Their tactics for forming durable queer relationships were also technologies to minimise 
risks in the foreseen future. Yet, I read their choices and struggles as both individual and 
contextual, as they had a lot to do with the historical and social-legal context (Taylor 
2010, Mizielińska & Stasińska 2017, Heberer 2017, Hildebrandt 2018). In my 
interpretation, the tactics excised by ‘ordinary’ queer Chinese citizens were neither 
radical nor directly anti-normative in terms of challenging heteronormative conventions 
and state institutions. However, they still queer and mobilise the meaning of kinship in 
subtle, nonlinear ways. The hegemonic heteronormative discourses were followed and 
enforced at some life moments and spaces, and were destabilised and transformed at 
others. Ultimately, what should be read as normal and what should be read as queer is 
constantly changing (Weiss 2016, Lewin 2016). This ethnography reflects Muñoz’s 
argument that queerness is performative, a doing rather than being, and queerness’s time 
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is a “stepping out of the linearity of straight time” (2009:25). What shall be 
reconsidered in queer life-worlds and methodology is the seemingly well-defined 
ordinary-queer or transgression-assimilation dichotomies, as queer kinship practices 
encompass both interpretations in shifting contexts.  
 
In short, the practices of queer conjugal relationships, parenting, and family formation 
documented in this research suggest innovative and diverse forms of belonging, family, 
and relatedness beyond blood ties and the heterosexual nuclear family; at the same time, 
class stratification and gender inequalities are often reproduced during these processes. 
Queer relationships and families emerged both within and outside the dominant kinship 
norms co-constructed by the existing state policy and Confucian familism. In the 
context of socio-economic transformations and the technologization of biological 
reproduction, queer futurity and queer utopian imaginaries are made vivid and made 
normalised by state-constructed modernity and glocal market. Queer relationships in 
China are transforming and should not be defined as imitative or alternative to blood 
ties. Non-heterosexual people’s practices of forming durable relationships and family 
both reproduce and transgress the dominant assumptions about blood relatedness and its 
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